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Abstract
In 1946, Monroe C. Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt published an article, “The
Intentional Fallacy,” which objected to the critical practice of treating claims
about an artist as claims about her work. Thus was inaugurated what today is
known as the intentionalism debate. I begin by oering a certain conception
of the debate—not quite a novel conception, for it corresponds more or less to
what Beardsley and Wimsatt took themselves to be doing, but one which, in
recent decades, has increasingly been supplanted by something very dierent. I
argue for the priority of this original conception, which is concerned primarily
with the language and norms of criticism, over the more recent conceptions
which focus on analyses of meaning. I then propose a view which defends the
artist’s relevance against the objections of Beardsley and Wimsatt, so under-
stood. The interest of my view lies in its circumvention of what many have
(incorrectly) thought essential to the position to which Beardsley and Wimsatt
were objecting.
Preface
It hardly needs stating that there would be no artworks were there no artists,
and no artists were there no artworks. But many have felt that more needs to
be said, something about how facts about the artist have some sort of special
relevance to what a work means. It is, after all, the artist’s work. Should not the
artist, then, be shown some sort of deference?
This indeed is how many of us, including professional critics, tend to talk
about works, at least on certain occasions. When we find ourselves perplexed
by something in a work, our instinct is to ask, “what did the artist mean to do
here?” The same, incidentally, is true when we are perplexed by what someone
has said in conversation: we are inclined to ask, “what did you mean by that?”
Is it, then, proper to treat artists with respect to their works as we do people
with respect to what they have said?
Of course, it is usually very dicult to get artists to explain themselves, not
least because artists are usually not around to take questions. But even when
they are around—when one has the opportunity to ask an artist a question
about one of her works—it is not clear what “authority” should be given to
their answers. We might think, perhaps too cynically, that if the inquirer likes
the answer he will be disposed to give it authority and thereafter to cite it as
some sort of proof or validation of his previous suspicions, and that if he dislikes
it he will be disposed to treat it very dierently, as having no authority at all
with respect to a work that, he will believe, “stands on its own.”
But there remains something curious, despite (or perhaps because of ) this
cynical assessment, about the fact that we perform such a dance around the artist
but not really around other people or things. For it sounds like something of
an accomplishment to deny that the artist has any sort of authority. This could
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only be because there is some nagging intuition that pulls us in the direction of
giving the artist some such authority in the first place, however irrational we
may take this intuition to be on reflection.
There is a debate in the philosophy of art which studies such intuitions.
One side, intentionalism, treats an artwork as in some sense the product of an
artist, and on such grounds argues that properly understanding or analyzing its
meaning requires giving some kind of “special attention” to the artist. The other
side, anti-intentionalism, disagrees, believing that, though artworks are surely
in some sense the products of their artists, this does not entail that facts about the
artist must be given any such “special attention.” The disagreement admittedly
sounds vague. In the chapters to come I will attempt to clarify what is really at
stake in it, but the clarification will come against an acknowledgement that, as
things stand, there is considerable uncertainty about the terms of the debate,
about who is arguing for what and against whom.
I have two overarching aims. The first is to developwhat I call a “metacritical”
conception of the debate, one that is at odds with what I will call a “semantic”
conception. I will argue that the former reflects the origins (and true nature)
of the debate, while the latter is the condition into which the debate has
devolved over the years, largely to its detriment. My second aim is to argue for
intentionalism under the former conception, of metacriticism, for this is the only
conception under which I think the debate may be won by the intentionalist.
I domuch of the stage-setting in the first chapter, in which I describe, among
other things, an opposition between a criticism-first approach, which I go on to
adopt, and a meaning-first approach, which, in the second chapter, I characterize
as being in evidence inmuch of the contemporary literature. I also, in the second
chapter, raise some problems facing contemporary intentionalism, problems
which I believe are significant but have not received sucient attention.
In the third chapter, I argue for a theory of meaning, the value-maximization
theory, that is standardly regarded as inimical to intentionalism—as, indeed, an
anti-intentionalist theory. I spend some time dierentiating a possible meta-
critical intentionalism from this “lower-level” theory of meaning, with which
it may be seen to be not only consistent but so eminently compatible as to
facilitate, as I detail in the fourth chapter, a major theoretical benefit, namely
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that of justifying the relevance of intentions to evaluation (which has been a
stumbling block for intentionalists). In the fifth chapter, I more fully articulate
the particular sort of metacritical theory I am advocating, bringing together
the rudiments I describe in the third chapter and the links with evaluation I
develop in the fourth.
The position that emerges is one which, I hope, answers the anti-
intentionalist in terms both more satisfying and more plausible, more dicult to
assail in neutral territory, than the answers that intentionalists have been giving
in recent decades, during which an unhealthy sort of complacency seems to
have set in. It is surprising to notice that there are hardly any anti-intentionalists
around these days (or that opposition to intentionalism is rarely self-identified
as such). One reason for this may be that intentionalists have won the day,
another that the debate is dying a quiet and miserable death, starved of what
nourished it in those acrimonious early decades. I take the latter line, and,
to revive some of the early fire and vigour, take sides, in a number of local
skirmishes, with the anti-intentionalists, many of whose claims I find not only
plausible but, more importantly, unnecessary to refute in order to vindicate
intentionalism.
CHAPTER 1
The Debate
Sensible people are now beginning to hedge on their earlier acceptance of this view,
very rightly, so they explain (with tender humour and so forth) that nobody ever
intended the crude interpretation evidently held by outsiders and students; the
esoteric doctrine held by professors allows a tolerable freedom. We have heard this
kind of thing before. The crude doctrine is what does all the harm, whatever the
Intention may have been; and whether or not the high priests imagine they are above
it makes no dierence.
– William Empson1
A curious feature of the intentionalism debate is that both sides have “hedged”
from the very beginning, so much so that Empson, in the above quote, could
equally well be describing either (though he happens to be talking about anti-
intentionalism). When one looks at the history of the debate, as I do in this
chapter, one ends up finding more sheepish agreement than one would expect.
Part of the problem surely lies in Beardsley andWimsatt’s original article, much
of the interest and provocation of which comes at the expense of the sort of
programmatic detail that is typically expected of founding documents. It is not
clear that they expected their work to be so taken, as a founding document.
Very likely they approached it as one among many shots across the bow of what
they regarded as the ailing vessel of biographically-oriented criticism. Their
chief contribution, certainly in retrospect, was to narrow the biographical terms
1. “The Intentional Fallacy, Again.” 1973. Essays in Criticism XXIII (4): 435.
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of interest to a singular one, that of intention, and this itself has created as much
confusion as clarity.
There is another reason, not unrelated to the latter. A certain historical shift,
precipitated in 1967 by the appearance of E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation
and consummated in 1992 by a landmark collection of essays, Intentions and
Interpretation, described a movement, rarely conscious on any given occasion,
away from the philosophical terrain in which Beardsley and Wimsatt wished
to conduct their discussion, a terrain made hospitable by the blandishments of
the ordinary-language philosophy that thrived at the time of their writing, and
toward dierent terrain, shaped by the return to metaphysics that character-
ized analytic philosophy in the 1970s. While I will not be getting into these
background philosophical trends, which only added to existing uncertainty
about the terms of the debate, I do think they are relevant to the ways in
which individual philosophers conceived of problems, what they took to be
the philosophical tools at their disposal—not, as it were, in a vacuum but as
members of a profession susceptible to intellectual fads and fashions.
My aim in this chapter is to sift out a pressing question about intentions
from the history of the debate. Due to the breadth and variety of the literature
I focus on a select few writers whom I take to be representative of broader
patterns, in an attempt to construct a certain historical narrative of the debate
that foregrounds my own concerns. The chapters to follow will address the
question at which I arrive.
1.1 A Brief History
As with most philosophical debates, one can reach back indefinitely into the past
to find points of origin, eventually reaching Plato (and perhaps beyond, if one is
industrious enough). In my view, the intentionalism debate really begins with
Beardsley and Wimsatt even though one is within one’s rights to perform the
mentioned historical exercise. Doing so is not to my purpose, but, because they
indeed did not emerge ex nihilo, because many of their interests had antecedents
and some of these antecedents are relevant to the shape the debate went on to
take, I begin a little before Beardsley andWimsatt, in particular with two aspects
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of what we now call intentionalism which Beardsley and Wimsatt synthesized
in their definition. One is represented by the fashion of biographically-oriented
criticism, popular but already under attack in the decade before Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s writing. The other is represented in an under-appreciated debate
between C. S. Lewis and E. M. W. Tillyard, which has filtered through into a
niche of the contemporary debate, the “conversation” view, that I will properly
take up in my final chapter.
After mentioning these two antecedents, I oer a treatment of what Beards-
ley andWimsatt were up to, the terms they set for the debate, and then rehearse
some noteworthy contributions that were made between 1946 and Hirsch’s
intervention in 1967. This is all the history I cover here, reserving more recent
material for subsequent chapters, for here I am interested simply to define the
thesis of intentionalism and to describe what it would take to demonstrate it to
be true.
It may seem odd that I am restricting myself to the pre-1967 era even for
these tasks, but really very little has been said since then on the definition
question. The situation is dire if one thinks, as I do, that some more tangible
connection to the origins of the debate is needed for it to still count as the same
debate. I believe that it should so be counted, if only for reasons of historical
continuity. This is why I find it useful to derive the terms of the debate precisely
from its origins, from Beardsley andWimsatt and their contemporaries. Others
may believe that we are no longer having the same debate, but it does not seem
to me that anybody has bothered even to ask the question. So I take it for
granted that we wish not only for there to be a debate, but for this debate to
answer the terms set forth by Beardsley and Wimsatt.
1.1.1 Pre–Beardsley and Wimsatt
Much of the pre–Beardsley and Wimsatt literature has a distinct flavour of
questioning (and hoping to account for) the very possibility of properly ex-
periencing works from the past which issued from cultures and societies very
dierent from our own. It is not necessarily a temporal issue, for the same could
be said of contemporary works from cultures with which we happen to be
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unfamiliar, but temporality seems nevertheless to have been made the issue.
Louis Teeter, one of these early theorists, describes the problem as follows:
Due to the very terms of our existence in a world of change there
are two sets of data concerning a past work of literature which one
may propose to investigate and formulate: its probable meanings
and values to the author and his contemporaries and its possible
meanings and values to the present day reader. (1938, 173)
Teeter goes on to oer a solution in terms of a “relationship [which] may be
discovered between the two sets of values of such a nature that the present while
asserting its own validity may be controlled and enriched by the past.”2 What
is important for my purposes, more than Teeter’s solution, are the terms in
which he frames his investigation. He begins by dierentiating the “historical”
impulse of the “literary scholar” from the “revaluati[ve]” one of the “critic.” His
main question is: how should we understand a work of art? What disciplinary
resources are appropriate? While he is not unconcerned with the notion of
“meaning,” he appears to relegate it to secondary status. The work means
whatever we, using the right discursive practices, should take it to mean. The
alternative, which I will argue is adopted by Hirsch and most of his successors,
is to give priority to the notion of meaning, to the question: what does the work
mean? In virtue of what does it bear this meaning? Under this alternative, the
question about discursive practices is given secondary status: the right discursive
practices are any which lead us to what a work does mean.
I will elaborate on this dierence, and why it matters, in due course. For
now I continue by mentioning another contributor to the pre–Beardsley and
Wimsatt literature. Harold Cherniss, writing in 1943, questions the historical
impulse that Teeter takes somewhat for granted. But Cherniss, too, begins with
a disciplinary distinction, between “history” and “the study of literature.” The
historian
is concerned to comprehend the individuality of a work of art only
in order that he may eliminate it and so extract for use as historical
2. I will follow a convention of omitting subsequent members of consecutive citations of
the same page number from the same source (unless they are demanded by reasons of clarity).
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evidence those elements which are not the private creation of the
author. The student of literature, on the other hand, studying the
same text is interested in it as a separate and unique phenomenon;
his interest in the common elements which it contains is in turn a
kind of interest of elimination, for he is concerned with the manner
in which they have been individualized by the artistic form. ([1943]
1999, 148)
The suggestion here, which Cherniss goes on to confirm, is that the proper way
to understand a work is determined by operative disciplinary norms. Using
one of Thucydides’s works as an example, Cherniss describes how it “presents
an object of study to three dierent disciplines” (history, historiography, and
literature). To treat the work as literature is to interpret it as a student of
literature should, where this task is defined disciplinarily.
But disciplines frequently interact, and, indeed, there is a historical impulse
felt even by students of literature:
A work of art is produced at a definite time, in a definite place,
and for an audience which itself has certain tastes and conventions,
accepted ways of thinking, and a common store of knowledge and
belief.. . . Must one not, then, in order to understand a literary
production, make oneself a member of that original audience to
which it was addressed, learning what they knew, thinking and
feeling as they thought and felt and therewith acquiring the ability
to slough o one’s own environment, knowledge, and tastes so far
as they are at variance with those others? (150)
Cherniss extensively satirizes this attitude. Not only must an adequate reader
have mastery over all the mentioned information, but, because “the work of art
itself was produced by only one among all these men [the author’s contemporary
audience],” “[t]o him alone, the individual author, is due the artifact in its
individuality” (151). An enthusiastic advocate of such thinking is quoted as
saying that an interpreter does not “completely understand [an author’s words]
if he does not understand the soul from which they come. He must be the
interpreter of his soul also.” Extending this “point of view,” Cherniss reaches
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what he takes to be an absurd conclusion, that “[e]ven the sale of Milton’s house,
the number and character of Euripedes’ wives may have been important factors
in the lives of the artists and so in the nature of their literary productions” (152).
Cherniss is what we would now call an anti-intentionalist.3 His views are
indeed very similar to what would come to be Beardsley and Wimsatt’s, in
particular with respect to what he calls the “independent existence” of the work.
But he also introduces ideas that they do not take up. His reason for dismissing
the mentioned historical impulse is partly that “theoretical knowledge, however
exact and complete, is not the immediate perception which only those can have
who are themselves part of this environment [in which the work was produced]”
(153). Namely, it is one thing to accumulate facts about the past, another to
imaginatively occupy the corresponding circumstances in the manner that the
artist’s contemporary audience did. Cherniss also doubts “the tacit assumption
that the sum of biographical incidents constitutes the [artistic] personality,”
even if we decide that we must “address ourselves to the history of that person-
ality” (155). The former idea, concerning the dierence between “theoretical
knowledge” and “immediate perception,” is relevant to a crucial dierence in
styles of approaching the intentionalism debate, one which I will elucidate as I
proceed. The second idea, about what “constitutes” artistic personality, is richly
explored in Lewis and Tillyard (1939), to whom I now turn.
The debate between Lewis and Tillyard concerns a subject that is given
scant attention in contemporary intentionalism, the idea that works put artists
into contact with their audiences. Lewis calls it the “personal theory,” and I
draw from his attacks three separate targets. First, that “to read poetry means
to become acquainted with the poet, as we become acquainted with a man in
intimate conversation” (1). Second, that poetry is “the expression of personality,”
such that “the end which we are supposed to pursue in reading it is a certain
contact with the poet’s soul” (1-2). Third, that “what we attend to, in reading
3. He occupies a position that Teeter characterizes as committed to “platonic essences,
universal human nature, the self-suciency of art, etc.” (1938, 175). Thus Cherniss says that
the work “has significance for all men as men in all times and places . . . the basis of [which]
significance is a set of ideas, emotions, and values which thus far in the history of the civilized
world at least have always been recognized as having validity beyond the arbitrary taste of any
individual or the customs of any locality” ([1943] 1999, 158).
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poetry, is a representation claiming to be the poet; and that to read poetry
well is to have a true idea of the poet” (4). These claims seem related, for the
“contact” mentioned in the second may well be the “acquaintance” mentioned
in the first. But they are logically distinct, for it might be that an important
element in appreciating poetry is one’s getting acquainted with the poet even
if it is not the case that one attends to the poet in the very act of reading.
Lewis makes an interesting concession: “Let it be granted that I do approach
the poet; at least I do it by sharing his consciousness, not by studying it” (11-12).
It is a strategic concession in that it eliminates a certain type of personal theory,
namely that which insists, as the third one above seems to, that to properly
experience a work is to attend to its artist. Lewis believes that one “looks with
[the artist’s] eyes, not at him,” that “[h]e, for the moment, will be precisely
what I do not see; for you can see any eyes rather than the pair you see with.”
In other words, it is only by inference from what I see that I come to learn
something about the artist; but such inferences are “unpoetical results,” not
part of “my poetical experience.” (Note the raising of a dierence between
experience and what is extra-experiential.)
But if this eliminates the third type of personal theory, it may open the door
to the first or the second, for one might think that seeing with the artist’s eyes
is a promising way to become acquainted with him, or to come into contact
with his soul, even if he is not directly encountered, as a figure, in what one
thereby sees. Lewis seems to treat such acquaintance as one which can only be
delivered in a work, but perhaps there are other ways for it to be delivered by
the work, namely as a concomitant eect of experiencing the work a certain
way. (I give attention to various such possibilities in the coming chapters.)
One of the points of disagreement between Lewis and Tillyard concerns,
in Cherniss’s terms, what “constitutes” the relevant personality. Cherniss is
doubtful that amassing biographical information is the right way to approach
personality, for it assumes a certain “psychophysical mechanics,” treats the
human as “a mechanical combination of events and influences” and ignores the
fact that “no reconstruction, however complete, of the external incidents of a
man’s life can reproduce or reveal the essence of the man himself” ([1943] 1999,
155). This brings into relief the way in which the question about biographical
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information and the one about the personal theory may lead in dierent direc-
tions. For if the subject of the former is the sort of historical inquiry I have
described above, and that of the latter is contact with a personal “essence,” then
they would seem to concern dierent issues—the former, discursive practices,
and the latter, the experience of works.
Lewis and Tillyard’s discussion, which proceeds in a helpfully systematic
fashion, demonstrates this dierence. Lewis instigates by questioning whether
there is anything stable or worthwhile to “get in touch with,” over and above the
artwork that lies before one. He considers that “the poet is a man who habitually
sees things in a special way, and that his metaphor and other technique are
simply means by which he admits us to share for a moment what is normal
with him” (1939, 22). Using Keats’s Hyperion as an example, in which there is a
metaphor relating trees to senators, Lewis acknowledges that this is a way of
“seeing trees,” but argues that “Keats could not have seen his trees as we see them
in reading Hyperion before he thought of the senators. To ask, then, whether
he normally saw them thus is simply to ask whether he normally associated
them with the senatorial idea” (23). This Lewis thinks he did not, for a poet’s
words do not “come for the asking, are rare and wooed with hard labour, are
by no means the normal furniture of the poet’s mind, are least of all his own
possession, his daily temper and habitual self.”
Tillyard oers some resistance to this last claim by alluding to “something
established in [Keats’s] mind ready towelcome the senators when they presented
themselves to him,” but he, too, wishes to exclude from consideration precisely
those “accidents, such as toothache, irregular habits, or an uncertain temper,
which interfere with our enjoying this distinguished mental pattern of his,”
which, “though subject to change,” is “definite enough to be called habitual,”
Keats’s “normal self” (35). Lewis counters by rebuking Tillyard for his “purified,
underlying, expurgated version” of personality (53). The so-called accidents
are in Lewis’s view indispensable, without which Keats would not be Keats.
What exactly, one might be asking, is the disagreement here? Lewis is
very defensive of personality, feels that making it fit for purpose as an object of
artistic scrutiny “is an insult. It is to make of a man a mere thing, a spectacle”
(65). Tillyard, meanwhile, presses the importance of attending to personality,
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even if this means expurgating certain “accidents” which do not make up the
“mental pattern” to which we must attend.
I suggest that Lewis is addressing himself more to the subject of experiencing
artworks, and Tillyard more to that of criticism. Lewis does not think one
should be attending to the artist in experiencing a work. Tillyard thinks that one
should be attending to the artist in interpreting a work. These are consistent
views, even if Lewis would likely extend his claim to the subject of criticism and
Tillyard his to that of experience. Even so, their convictions would not withstand
such extension. Being (in the relevant sense) permitted to use biographical
information in criticism is not an indication that one will be able to acquaint
oneself with the artist by experiencing the work. Nor does the mere possibility
of such acquaintance settle anything about what information it is legitimate (or
simply prudent) for a critic to use.
Lewis and Tillyard conflate these issues, in ways that many of their con-
temporaries do not (for instance, Teeter and Cherniss). That Beardsley and
Wimsatt follow suit, as I will show in the next section, is one of the reasons
that the debate went on to take the shape that it did, of somewhat eliding the
distinction.
1.1.2 Beardsley and Wimsatt
Much has been written on Beardsley and Wimsatt’s article. My focus for the
moment will be on their conception of the debate (an under-examined subject).
I begin with the notion of intention, which they simply assume is the term
of interest to their opponents. In fact, this was not true at the time of their
writing, and has only become so due to their influence. Their opening sentence
reads: “The claim of the author’s ‘intention’ upon the critic’s judgment has been
challenged in a number of recent discussions, notably in the debate entitled
The Personal Heresy, between Professors Lewis and Tillyard” (1946, 468). As
may be evident from my discussion, however, Lewis and Tillyard care little
specifically about intentions (they speak in the first instance of personality). The
same is true of Teeter, who is also cited by Beardsley andWimsatt; his concerns
are more generally historical. So there is something strange about Beardsley
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and Wimsatt’s decision to focus on intentions, in particular about their sense
that it is something to be taken for granted. Either they did not realize that
they were changing the terms of the debate, or else they were being somewhat
disingenuous.
What, in any case, do they mean by “intention”? It is common to ascribe to
them the view, using their own words, that intention is “design or plan in the
author’s mind” (469). This is an explicitly mentalistic definition, oering little
detail about the specific mental entity that is meant, and often faces objections
on these grounds. It is said that Beardsley and Wimsatt go wrong in their view
by having too simplistic a notion of intention, either too simplistic a mentalistic
notion or too simplistic in its being mentalistic at all.
I think such objections are misleading. The second of the two charges, that
the notion ought not to be mentalistic, is easily dispensed with, for the sort
of non-mentalistic notion that is usually oered is something Beardsley and
Wimsatt themselves explicitly set aside. They quote “an eminent intentionalist”
as arguing that “the poet’s aim must be judged at the moment of the creative
act, that is to say, by the art of the poem itself” (qtd. 469). This is a way to say
that intention is really part of the work, an internal design or structure. But
Beardsley and Wimsatt are clear that they are not interested to argue about
such a notion.4
One may, of course, object to Beardsley and Wimsatt’s definition on inde-
pendent grounds. This would be a certain philosophical challenge. But it is not
open to the objector to dispute the definition qua stipulation, as if Beardsley
and Wimsatt are uncertain about what they mean to be talking about. The
best one can do is to reject, as not worth one’s time, a debate predicated on a
notion so defined (as opposed to defined in one’s preferred way). This would
amount to a refusal to participate in the debate.
But such an attitude would be premature. There is, in fact, something very
interesting about Beardsley and Wimsatt’s definition, rarely brought up in such
4. Ellis (1974) is even clearer: “To talk of the ‘intent’ of the poem, if this is an abstraction
from the text which is justified by reference to the text, raises none of the problems of the
intentional fallacy—except terminological confusion, for which reason the term is best avoided
in this context” (109).
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discussions. This is that they broach their definition not with the oft-quoted
phrase “plan or design in the author’s mind,” but with the following statement:
“Intention,” as we shall use the term, corresponds to what he intended
in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance.
“In order to judge the poet’s performance, we must know what he
intended.” Intention is plan or design in the author’s mind. (468-469)
Notice the metalinguistic framing. The subject of interest appears to be, not the
phenomenon of intention, but a certain “formula which more or less explicitly
has had wide acceptance.” Beardsley and Wimsatt’s (somewhat casual) analysis
of the thing to which the relevant term in this formula may be taken to refer
is, indeed, “plan or design in the author’s mind,” but this is not of much
consequence to their argument. For they are interested in how critics use a
particular kind of language—what I will hereafter call intention-talk—not, at
least not directly, in the thing in the world to which this language refers.
This also obviates the first of the two charges mentioned above, that “plan
or design in the author’s mind” is too simplistic an account of intention, for
even if we come up with a better account it could not overturn Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s definition, given that their definition is not, in the first instance,
“plan or design in the author’s mind,” but whatever referent is presupposed
by intention-talk. I hesitate, in fact, to call this a definition of “intention” at
all—though it is easy to construe it as one, namely as a functional definition. It
seems instead only to be an expression of their interest in the status and validity
of intention-talk, to properly satisfy which interest they need, of course, to say
some things about intention, but only some things. This is one of the many
ways in which their focus on intentions has been misleading.
Before taking up the intentional fallacy proper, I consider some of Beardsley
and Wimsatt’s claims in relation to the themes that I have been discussing. For
not all of their claims, despite their frequent suggestions to the contrary, are
made in relation to what they properly call the intentional fallacy. Consider
their claim that
Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One
demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we
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infer the intention of an artificer. “A poem should not mean but
be.” A poem can only be through its meaning—since its medium is
words—yet it is, simply is, in the sense that we have no excuse for
inquiring what part is intended or meant. (469)
We are told that there is “no excuse for inquiring what part is intended,” but it
is not clear in what context such requests are to be made. Who is asking, for
what, and when? If we trace the continuities I wish to trace, we see this passage
as fudging the distinction between experience and criticism. To experience
a poem, properly at any rate, is for it to work (in relation to one). A poem
that does not work is one that cannot properly be experienced. The inquirer,
meanwhile, is a critic who is interpreting the poem, who is sought out (or
assumed as a role) by readers of poems when questions arise about a poem’s
working or not working. So while it may be true that one is unlikely to inquire
after intentions when a poem works, these are separate things that ought to be
distinguished.
Lewis did not distinguish them, nor do Beardsley and Wimsatt. Yet, to the
extent that Beardsley and Wimsatt are inheriting concerns from an existing
debate over biographical information, they nevertheless manage to frame their
discussion in the old way, concerning the use of biographical information.
Only, they now demand of biographical inquirers that they be satisfied with a
poem simply working, even though such inquirers, at least in the old style (as
witnessed in the views canvassed by Teeter and Cherniss), reject that poems can
suitably work on a reader in the absence of the reader’s imaginatively entering
certain circumstances, those either of the poet or of the poet’s contemporary
audience.
While Beardsley and Wimsatt do grant that “[t]he meaning of a poem may
certainly be a personal one, in the sense that a poem expresses a personality or
state of soul,” they minimize the relevance of this by adding that “[w]e ought
to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic
speaker, and if to the author at all, only by a biographical act of inference” (470).
Recall Lewis’s claim that what we learn of the poet is an “unpoetical result,” not
part of the “poetical experience.” To this extent, Beardsley and Wimsatt share
Lewis’s perspective on the experience of art. But, in certain other remarks, they
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go beyond Lewis’s edicts. These remarks principally concern criticism.
They consider Croce’s view that “Historical interpretation labours . . . to
reintegrate in us the psychological conditions which have changed in the
course of history. It . . . enables us to see a work of art (a physical object)
as its author saw it in the moment of production” (qtd. 472). Like many of
Teeter’s and Cherniss’s examples, this is explicitly about interpretation as a
discursive practice—what it “labours” to do, namely “enables us to see” (the
“us” being readers of criticism)—and thus is dicult to dismiss simply on the
grounds of its having misconstrued experience (for it is manifestly not about
experience but the role of criticism in facilitating experience). Here Beardsley
and Wimsatt make an original contribution, or at least lay the groundwork for
one. They say that “Croce’s system,” despite having “an ambiguous emphasis
on history,” could inspire a critic to “write a close analysis . . . that involves close
historical study but remains aesthetic criticism.” Notice the shift from poems
simply working to the desiderata for “aesthetic criticism.” Such comments are
metacritical, in that they concern the norms of critical discourse.
I find that there are two components to what Beardsley and Wimsatt argue
in their article. One is an account of “aesthetic criticism,” the other what I
take to be an error theory. The error described in the latter is what properly
goes by the name of the fallacy, but the former often gets the lion’s share
of the attention (leading many commentators to wonder what is supposed
to be fallacious about disagreeing with a certain account of criticism). The
two components are logically distinct but related in Beardsley and Wimsatt’s
argument. The account of aesthetic criticism throws a lot of criticism into likely
error, for the explanation of which an error theory is oered. The error theory
is about a putative error made by critics, not by metacritics (theorists of criticism)
or by consumers of works. Beardsley and Wimsatt thus envision the following
three-level hierarchy: consumers of works read criticism the norms of which are
argued over by metacritics. I will discuss this hierarchy in more detail in the
final section of this chapter, in which I examine Beardsley’s (self-described)
metacritical conception of the philosophy of art. In the remainder of this section
I describe the two components I have just identified.
Take first the account of aesthetic criticism. It is best seen in how Beardsley
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andWimsatt handle certain examples, rather than in any of their programmatic
remarks (of which there are surprisingly few). Unfortunately, the examples
in which they best demonstrate their account are complicated by the thorny
phenomenon of allusion. One such is their final example, in which they canvass
the possibility that Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” alludes to
Donne. They describe “two radically dierent ways of looking for an answer”:
“the way of poetic analysis and exegesis, which inquires whether it makes any
sense if Eliot-Prufrock is thinking about Donne,” and “the way of biographical
or genetic inquiry, in which, taking advantage of the fact that Eliot is still alive,
and in the spirit of a man who would settle a bet, the critic writes to Eliot and
asks what he meant, or if he had Donne in mind” (486-487).
Note that the question of interest is about “ways of looking,” not (at least
not directly) about what is true of the work (or what the work means). The
example is good because it brings out what is supposed to be in opposition, but
the precise formulations given to these ways of looking is less informative than
one would like. For instance, in practising “poetic analysis” the critic is said to
determine whether there is any “resemblance” which is “better . . . thought of”
than not. But, even setting aside that it is unclear what it takes for something
to be better thought of than not, many theorists deny that allusion is simply a
matter of resemblance (Hermerén 1992).
Moreover, the way of “biographical or genetic inquiry” is (one might think)
unfairly characterized as that of “consulting the oracle,” when in fact nobody
really advocates this (at least not in their sober, theoretical moments). As we
saw in the pre–Beardsley and Wimsatt literature, and will go on to see in the
post–Beardsley and Wimsatt literature, advocates of biographical information
are interested less in what an artist has presently to say (if they are interested in
what he has to say at all) than in what he thought and did while creating the
work.
Nonetheless, something general we can extrapolate from Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s remarks is an emphasis on the work itself, what Cherniss calls the
“independent existence” of the work. I think it is best to read such of their
remarks, at least in this context, not as ontological proposals but as metacritical
proposals, namely about how critics should approach works, rather than about
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a work’s having such-and-such fundamental nature. Critics should approach
works as objects of independent interest rather than as merely the residue of,
or conduit for, something that commands greater interest. Thus Beardsley and
Wimsatt say that “there is a danger of confusing personal and poetic studies;
and there is a fault of writing the personal as if it were the poetic” (1946, 477).
If critics treat poems as, say, vehicles for the poet’s personality, where the latter
is their true interest (deriving the personality from the poem), then they are
not treating the poem with the independent interest that is requisite for their
endeavour to count as a poetic study.
One of the ways we are said to be able to tell which sort of study is being
conducted is to look at the nature of the evidence adduced by the critic:
There is a dierence between internal and external evidence for the
meaning of a poem. And the paradox is only verbal and superficial
that what is (1) internal is also public: it is discovered through the
semantics and syntax of a poem, through our habitual knowledge
of the language, through grammars, dictionaries, and all the litera-
ture which is the source of dictionaries, in general through all that
makes a language and culture; while what is (2) external is private
or idiosyncratic; not a part of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists
of revelations (in journals, for example, or letters or reported con-
versations) about how or why the poet wrote the poem—to what
lady, while sitting on what lawn, or at the death of what friend or
brother. There is (3) an intermediate kind of evidence about the
character of the author or about private or semi-private meanings
attached to words or topics by an author or by a coterie of which
he is a member. The meaning of words is the history of words, and
the biography of an author, his use of a word, and the associations
which the word had for him, are part of the word’s history and
meaning. (477-478)
It is often supposed that Beardsley andWimsatt prohibit external evidence while
permitting only internal evidence—also that the mere existence of the third
category is some sort of inexplicable blunder that throws the entire account
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into confusion and incoherence. But none of this seems to me true. The way
Beardsley and Wimsatt make use of this tripartite account is actually quite
subtle. They do not say that any one type is prohibited, or that any other is the
only one permitted. In fact, they do not speak in such terms at all.
They instead make more general statements about the type of criticism
that is produced according to the proportion in which the critic makes use
of the dierent types of evidence. In particular, they say that “a critic who is
concerned with evidence of type (1) and moderately with that of type (3) will
in the long run produce a dierent sort of comment from that of the critic who
is concerned with type (2) and with (3) where it shades into (2)” (478). This
may be viewed as corresponding to the distinction between the way of poetic
analysis and the way of biographical information, respectively.
The latter correspondence better explains Beardsley and Wimsatt’s account
of evidence than do their own explicit definitions of internal and external. The
point about poetic vs. personal study is one of directionality: at what is the
critic directed, the poem in front of her or the personality of the poet? If the
poem, then the critic will tend to use certain types of evidence, namely those
which bear on features of the poem (internal). If the personality, then the critic
will tend to use certain other types of evidence, namely those which bear on the
features of the personality (external). I believe this is much of what Beardsley
and Wimsatt are trying to say, an ambition clouded by the intrusion of notions
such as “public” and “private” which have gotten only more convoluted in the
philosophical literature over the decades.
So much for Beardsley and Wimsatt’s account of aesthetic criticism, at least
for now. I turn next to what I am calling their error theory (what is normally
called their account of the intentional fallacy). Both fallacies and errors are
kinds of mistake, though probably not the same kind of mistake. I find the
terminology of fallacy less helpful, certainly in the case of informal fallacies
(which is the only kind Beardsley and Wimsatt’s could be, given that it does
not concern purely logical terms). Fallacies, moreover, are held to involve
some process of reasoning gone awry, and it is not clear to me that the alleged
mistake of those who are said to fall victim to the intentional fallacy is a mistake
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of reasoning.5 The label of “fallacy” might well have been chosen because it
is catchy (like Lewis’s “personal heresy,” which I imagine he did not literally
take to be a heresy), rather than for any sound logical reasons. But it ultimately
matters little if we persist in calling the relevant error a fallacy. What is more
important is the role the accusation of fallacy is taken to play in Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s argument. It seems to me to play an error-theoretic role.
As Richard Joyce explains with respect to moral error theory, which we
may use as an example, “the object of an error theoretic stance is a discourse: We
are error theorists about phlogiston discourse, not about phlogiston” (2015).
However,
[j]ust as we obviously don’t think that every sentence containing
the word “phlogiston” is untrue (consider “Phlogiston doesn’t exist”
and “17th-century chemists believed in phlogiston”), nor does the
moral error theorist hold that every sentence containing a moral
term is untrue.. . . Rather, the error theorist focuses on a proper
subset of sentences containing the problematic terms: those that
imply or presuppose the instantiation of a moral property.
I think this is a useful model, though it requires careful application. First, we
are concerned with critical discourse, and that, too, of a certain kind, what I
above called intention-talk. Second, we are concerned not with the truth of
intention-talk but with its relevance (in and as criticism). Third, in accordance
with this model, not all uses of intention-talk are held to be objectionable,
only a “proper subset of sentences.” How should this subset be defined? Let us
provisionally say that the objectionable kind of intention-talk, for Beardsley and
Wimsatt, is that which is used to “writ[e] the personal as if it were the poetic.”
As we will see in the next section, in Beardsley’s elaboration on this point, there
is indeed an analogy to terms that “imply or presuppose the instantiation of a
moral property,” namely those which imply or presuppose the instantiation of
an intentional property.
5. In a subsequent article (1949), Beardsley andWimsatt describe the intentional fallacy as “a
special case of what is known to philosophers as the Genetic Fallacy,” “a confusion between the
poem and its origins” (31). I do not go against this understanding, but give it less importance
in my assessment of what Beardsley and Wimsatt are doing.
18 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
To be clear, the alleged problem is not that intention-talk is about intentions,
but that it is (in a range of cases) erroneously taken to be about the work. This
might sound absurd. Surely critics knowwhat they are talking about: producing
poor criticism is one thing, not knowing whether one is producing criticism
at all is another. Here we must look to (what I take to be) Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s specific error theory, which is well-represented in one of their initial
propositions:
A poem does not come into existence by accident. The words of a
poem . . . come out of a head, not out of a hat. Yet to insist on the
designing intellect as a cause of a poem is not to grant the design or
intention as a standard. (1946, 469)
The “standards” are, presumably, the criteria or truth-conditions for inter-
pretations. (Beardsley and Wimsatt do not say anything very precise about
this.) Critics who heavily invest in external evidence, drawing on diaries and
other unearthed documents from and about the artist, are said to be lulled into
making a mistake about such standards. They quite naturally appreciate the
causal relevance of the artist and his intentions—for how else did the work get
to be the way it is?—but mistake this for an aesthetic relevance, a substitute for
“close analysis” of the work. This is meant to explain how so many critics could
be so mistaken, how they could (erroneously) be “writing the personal as if it
were the poetic.”
One may object that it is unfair to saddle a large group of critics with
such a confusion. This may be to contest the account of aesthetic criticism
rather than the error theory, for the error theory takes the fact of error for
granted and attempts only to explain how it could come about (given that
it does). Adjudicating this complex issue as a whole requires looking at the
data of critical practice and analyzing how intention-talk is conducted, e.g.
how biographical information is used. Do the oending critics rely on such
information only because the facts which this information concerns are believed
to be causal contributors to the features of the work? And does such a reliance
betray a sense that it is substituting for “close analysis”? How many critics are
guilty of such a thing anyway, even if some are? What about others? What
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should we say of critics who use biographical information in other ways? While
I don’t quite engage the empirical side of such questions, I do, in what follows,
attempt to clarify the nature of the opposition that gives rise to them.
1.1.3 Post–Beardsley and Wimsatt
Almost everyone writing on the issues I have so far discussed has felt it incum-
bent to mention the “intentional fallacy,” if not to actually take up Beardsley
and Wimsatt’s article. Some of this influence has been salutary, some regret-
table. I am, as I have intimated, skeptical of the fruitfulness of according such
importance to the notion of intention. The choice is strategic for Beardsley and
Wimsatt, in that their error theory relies on there being a confusion between
cause and standard, and the best candidate for an artist’s causal contribution
to a work, one from which an interpretation could be derived, is indeed an
intention. But this alone does not make the notion integral to the issues which
Beardsley and Wimsatt inherited.
In a recent essay, Stein Haugom Olsen (2010) criticizes Beardsley and
Wimsatt for “reconceptualiz[ing] the problem of the relevance of historical and
biographical information in criticism as a problem about authorial intention”
(441). I share his concern, but part with him when he suggests that Beardsley
and Wimsatt attempt to “legislate against all use of biographical information.”
For there is still considerable ambiguity about the sense of “use” that is at issue.
We can see this to some extent in what I have already said, for it is only that
use of biographical information through which the critic writes “the personal
as if it were the poetic” that is held to be objectionable. Many of Beardsley
and Wimsatt’s contemporary opponents similarly overlook this aspect of the
objection.
A prominent literary critic, Leslie Fiedler, takes up the cause of the opposi-
tion in 1952. He concedes that “[i]nsofar as this [anti-intentionalist] position
rests upon the immortal platitude that it is good to know what one is talking
about, it is unexceptionable” (1952, 253). But in objecting to Beardsley and
Wimsatt, he focuses, like many others, on their assertion that “[a] poem should
not mean but be.” Fiedler understands this to mean that “a work of art is, or
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should be, absolutely self-contained, a discrete set of mutually inter-related ref-
erences . . . a closed system, ‘cut-o’ in ideal isolation” (254). This is a common
ontological reading of Beardsley and Wimsatt, about the nature of the work.
Yet, as I have argued, what they are really trying to advance is a metacritical
thesis, about how the work should be approached by critics. It is unfortunate
that, in assertions such as the one quoted by Fiedler, Beardsley and Wimsatt
conflate the subject of experience and that of criticism (in the manner that I
suggest above), which often accounts for their being read along ontological
lines.
Fiedler is not, however, insensitive to the relevant metacritical implications.
He sums them up in “the leit-motif of the New Teacher: ‘Stay inside the poem!’ ”
Beardsley and Wimsatt do say such things, and to back them up oer the
suggestive term “internal evidence.” But if one looks at what internal evidence
is supposed to be (the long quote above), one notices that it includes all manner
of things that clearly do not belong “inside” a work: “our habitual knowledge
of the language,” “grammars, dictionaries, and all the literature which is the
source of dictionaries, in general . . . all that makes a language and culture.” So
the standard sort of objection about the necessity of contextual information,
about the impossibility of blinding oneself to everything other than the work,
does not quite apply.
Through much of his essay Fiedler is concerned to establish that “[t]he
poet’s life is the focusing glass through which pass the determinants of the
shape of his work” (260). This may be true, but we still need some account of
why the “glass” itself, in addition to what it projects, is relevant to criticism.6
Fiedler seems largely to assume this, but at times betrays an uneasiness with
the assumption, as when he attributes the popularity of the “antibiographist
tendency” to “the failure of its opponents to arrive at any coherent theory of
the relationship between the life of the poet and his work,” the willingness of
“biographers . . . merely to place side by side undigested biographical data and
uninspired paraphrases of poems” (258). But in his own attempt to describe the
6. As Ellis (1974) puts it, one might grant that works are “determined by the poet’s problems”
but maintain that “it is irrelevant to their status as literature that they are so determined”
(129-130).
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fundamentals of this relationship, what sort of thing it should even be taken
to be, he seems to founder, to go against what he himself earlier conceded to
be “unexceptionable” (viz. that “it is good to know what one is talking about”).
He complains, namely, that “in a world of discrete, individual ‘experiences,’ of
‘close-reading’ . . . one cannot even talk of so large an abstraction as poetry,”
for according to the antibiographist “[i]t is only ‘poems’ to which the student
must be exposed” (259). Fiedler calls this “our atomized period,” in which “the
ordinary student cannot or will not connect the few facts he knows, the slim
insights he has previously attained, the chance extensions of sensibility into
which he has been once or twice tempted, into a large enough context to make
sense of the world he inhabits, or the works of art he encounters.”
This is, to be sure, an engaging line of thought, one that has been indepen-
dently advanced by, among others, RichardWollheim, who similarly complains
about “an unduly atomistic conception of criticism”:
Certainly, in seeking to understand a particular work of art, we try
to grasp it in its particularity, and so we concentrate on it as hard
as we can: but at the same time we are trying to build up an overall
picture of art, and so we relate the work to other works and to art
itself. (1980b, 198-199)
Beardsley and Wimsatt would likely respond by observing that this is simply
to talk about a dierent kind of discourse, a larger one that perhaps includes
several others. What they call criticism is criticism of individual works, certain
alleged norms of which are what are in dispute in the intentionalism debate.
One way in which a critic may stray from such criticism (of individual works)
is to wander into a study of personality, the temptation to do which, and one’s
lack of awareness about doing which, are what Beardsley and Wimsatt hope to
explain with their error theory (as described above). What other things a critic
does in her writing, even within the same piece of writing, are beside the point.
Nor is she barred from bringing to bear on this more work-oriented criticism
the fruits of her wider-ranging disquisitions (namely, by their being admitted
as internal evidence). To an extent I agree with this style of response, and I
will periodically return to such questions concerning the scope of criticism qua
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criticism.
Let me continue by mentioning a scholar, Victor Erlich, who responds to
Fiedler in terms very dierent from the above. Erlich is representative of the
many commentators who wish perhaps too hastily to have a resolved attitude
toward Beardsley and Wimsatt. Although he is receptive to Fiedler’s opinion
that “inveighing against biography” is “a case of flogging a dead horse,” he
wonders “whether the horse is not merely playing dead” (1954, 130). He
reiterates Beardsley and Wimsatt’s point that a certain kind of criticism “speaks
about a poem” while another speaks “around the poem” (1954, 131). The former
Beardsley and Wimsatt call aesthetic criticism, the latter (or one type of the
latter) biographical criticism. But Erlich also comes down on Beardsley and
Wimsatt for their having “disregard[ed], for the sake of methodological purity,
‘extrinsic’ evidence which could actually help illuminate the work”; this is
to “inhibit critical analysis, to narrow down arbitrarily the range of literary
scholarship.”
It is obvious, however, that if some piece of evidence were to “illuminate the
work,” Beardsley and Wimsatt would have nothing to say against it. So much
Erlich himself concedes shortly after making his pronouncement: “However,
I cannot think of any reputable exponent of ‘intrinsic’ criticism who would
quarrel with this obvious truth.” It is another matter that Beardsley andWimsatt
have little to say about the permissibility of individual pieces of evidence; they
largely restrict their advice to habits of evidence-cultivation.
Such vacillation as Erlich displays is often a symptom of the theorist’s having
all the pieces but neglecting to put them together. Erlich notes that while “[n]o
amount of information of JohnMilton’s property will help elucidate a single line
in Paradise Lost”—perhaps an overstatement—“it would be spurious to deny the
causal nexus between Dostoevsky’s attitude toward his father and the theme of
parricide in The Brothers Karamazov” (131). But Beardsley and Wimsatt do not
deny putative causal facts such as the latter. If anything, they highlight them!
According to Beardsley and Wimsatt it is precisely a recognition of such facts
that impels critics to make of them more than they are. The intentionalist’s task,
Beardsley and Wimsatt believe, is not merely to advocate a recognition of such
causal facts but to argue for their critical relevance. For instance, on what basis
The Debate 23
are critics attributing the theme of parricide to Dostoevsky’s work? If on the
basis of certain other, “internal” evidence, then the biographical information
would seem to be explanatorily inert.
In 1955, Henry Aiken contributes to the debate in an essay whose chief
virtue is its admirable clear-headedness about the distinction between experi-
ence and criticism. The position Aiken eventually reaches is, I think, the sort
of position C. S. Lewis would likely have adopted had he as clearly made the
mentioned distinction. Aiken observes that the term “interpretation” is some-
times “used in a way which seems to refer to the primary activities of reading,
listening, and contemplating” (1955, 747). This he regards “as a misuse of the
expression,” which “[m]ore properly . . . is employed to refer to the activities of
a critic in paraphrasing, describing, explaining, explicating, analysing, and the
like.”7 In its proper sense, interpretation is “an ancillary activity, undertaken in
order to accomplish something beyond itself,” to “guide, direct, and in general
to improve the facility with which primary acts which are proper to works of
art are performed.” Interpretations are “properly judged on this basis,” on how
well they enable us to perform such “primary acts.”
Even though, continues Aiken, in the moment of experiencing a work “the
farthest thing from my mind is what [the artist] may have intended to say,”
with most complex works of art repeated study . . . is necessary
in order to place oneself in a position to perform successfully the
primary acts required for the appreciation of the work. In short,
most works of art have to be interpreted, and it is because of this
that the consideration of what an artist intended to say or do in a
work becomes relevant, although indirectly, to appreciation and to
appraisal. (752)
The key word is “indirectly,” for Aiken’s claim is not that one mentions what
the artist intended because the artist intended it; rather it is because what the
7. Such sentiments are common among artists and critics alike. See, e.g., the book on craft
by novelist and publisher William Sloane (1979): “A true act of reading is quite possibly the
reverse of scanning words professionally, as practiced by the critic. The critic is analyzing and
diagnosing and studying, and he is all the while carrying on a complicated process, which,
at the risk of oversimplification, I shall describe as reading for the writer and writing for the
reader” (79).
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artist intended happens to be a good thing for a consumer of the work to
experience. Here a reference to the intention is, we might think, superfluous
in the piece of criticism, even if without having known of the intention the
critic would not have hit on just the meaning he did.
T. M. Gang (1957) expresses a version of this idea when he says that if an
“intention is reconstructed entirely from the data [of the work] which would in
themselves serve equally well to limit the meaning, there will be no point in
constructing it, and some danger that we may give the construct more authority
than it deserves” (182). This is supposed to be in contrast to recovering an
intention from “external data, such as note-books, prefaces, or letters,” which
Gang claims could make the intention “worth invoking.” But it seems to me
that in either case legitimate doubts arise about the “point” of mentioning the
intention, regardless of how the critic has arrived at the given meaning. The
distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification comes
to mind: a critic’s having discovered the right meaning by consulting what the
artist intended is not ipso facto justification of any subsequent attribution of that
meaning to the work. Attributions of meaning are perhaps to be justified in
other ways, for instance, as in Aiken, in terms of how one would experience
the work under the given conception (which one might think is independent
of whether the artist in fact intended this conception), or, as Gang puts it, by
the “data” of the work “which in themselves serve equally well.”
This is a crucial point which seems to have been ignored by many of
Beardsley and Wimsatt’s contemporary opponents. Some acknowledge the
point but dismiss it as not really what is at issue, as something more nuanced
and sophisticated than what Beardsley and Wimsatt could have been insisting
on. (An example of the latter is Joseph Margolis, discussed below.) This would
not be an entirely unfair accusation, since Beardsley and Wimsatt are not very
clear. But I believe that their claims about cause and standard, about what I am
calling their error theory, bear out this more complicated point. That intentions
have a causal role in producing the work’s features perhaps makes them suitable
to consult to discover what the work means, simply due to probability and
sometimes due to ease, but it does not, Beardsley and Wimsatt believe, justify
the resulting attributions of meaning.
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In 1958, in his opus, Aesthetics, Beardsley makes a noteworthy contribution.
Some of what he says, however, is merely a reiteration and slight clarification
of earlier points, to wit,
we can draw a pretty clear distinction between two types of critic, in
any of the arts. There are those critics who talk steadily and helpfully
about the aesthetic object itself, and who test their statements about
it by what can be found within it. They may take advantage of
external evidence, where it is available, to suggest hypotheses about
what may be in the work.. . . But the proof, the confirmation, of
the hypothesis is the poem itself.. . . There are other critics who
tend to shift back and forth between the work and its creator, never
quite clear in their own minds when they are talking about the
one or the other. They mingle the evidences of intention with
the evidences of accomplishment, and sometimes decide what the
work is or means primarily on external evidence. This is to practice
intentionalistic criticism. (1958, 26-27)
Let me note a few things about what is said in this passage. First, the idea is
reiterated that use of evidence is assessed in terms of what sort of criticism it
leads to, rather than in terms of what is permissible in some individual case.
External evidence is not unthinkingly or reactively outlawed, as if by fiat, but
is rather taken as an indication, when it is heavily relied on, of the kind of
discourse being engaged in. Moreover, such evidence is deemed salutary when
it is used in a certain way, namely to “suggest hypotheses” the “proof” (or
justification) of which is found in “the poem itself.”
Noticing such things helps dispel certain unfair assessments of what Beards-
ley and Wimsatt are up to, at the same time as it brings into clearer focus how
Beardsley and Wimsatt themselves are perhaps being unfair to their opponents.
As I will argue in subsequent chapters, intentionalists may defend the use of
“external” evidence on quite other grounds than those which Beardsley seems
to regard as the only possible ones, viz. to suggest hypotheses that must be
tested against the work. For the moment, let us proceed by looking at how
Beardsley attempts to clarify his case for these being the only possible grounds.
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The exhortation to a critic is to be clear about her subject. Critics who
are said to be unclear, to write “the personal as if it were the poetic,” practice
criticism (in particular, use intention-talk) in a certain way. So do critics who
are said to be clear (they use intention-talk in a certain other way). How should
we characterize these ways, i.e. more precisely than in the vague terms of
internal evidence and external evidence (with which many of Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s opponents have rightly been dissatisfied)? To accuse a critic of writing
the personal as if it were the poetic is, it seems to me, to accuse her of taking
the artist, rather than the work, as her subject. We may thus regard Beardsley
as oering, in what I am about to describe, an analysis of what it means to take
the artist, rather than the work, as one’s subject.
Beardsley dierentiates two kinds of intention-talk, the “harmless” and the
objectionable. He mentions, as an example of the former, Cleanth Brooks’s
assertion regarding some lines of Wordsworth’s that “The metrical situation of
the stanza, by the way, would seem to support the view that the strained eect
is ‘intentional,’ ” and his subsequent clarification in a footnote that “Whatever
Wordsworth’s intention, the sense of the strain fits perfectly the eect which
the poem as a whole demands” (qtd. 27). Here Gang would say, as I quote
above, that the “intention is reconstructed entirely from data which would in
themselves serve equally well to limit the meaning,” and that Brooks’s footnote
is meant to allay the suspicion that the hypothesized intention is being given
“more authority than it deserves.”
We could, moreover, convert this case into another type of “harmless” one.
Suppose Brooks’s belief about Wordsworth’s intention was derived not from
the data of the poem—the “metrical situation of the stanza”—but from some
“external” source such as a diary or notebook. According to Beardsley, such
cases count as responsible criticism only if the critic then justifies the newly-
constructed “hypothesis” by appealing, once again, to the data of the poem (e.g.
to the “metrical situation of the stanza”). For the aim, ultimately, is to talk about
the poem. That Wordsworth had such-and-such intentions is a claim about the
poet. The critic who wishes to bring in such claims must find a way to relate
them to claims about the meaning of the poem. The norms governing how
this may be done, as a general matter, are a subject for the metacritic. Under
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Beardsley’s metacriticism, the only responsible way for a critic to relate external
evidence to the work is to independently (i.e. through “close analysis”) make
sense of the work as meaning the intended thing, regardless of the intended
thing’s being intended.
So much for the harmless variety of intention-talk. Beardsley oers the
following statement as a possible example of the objectionable variety: “In this
work there is an unsuccessful eort to particularize the characters” (28). The
alleged problem, at least in the context inwhich Beardsley seems to be imagining
such a statement, is that we do not know “how much of the [statement] refers
to the work and how much to the artist.” If the statement is principally about
the artist, so that we take it to mean that the artist “wanted to particularize his
characters very much but was unable to,” then it holds no direct interest for
criticism. Its only possible interest lies in our reading it as really being about the
work in some oblique way, something the critic “finds in the [work] that he is
tempted to describe in this fashion.” We then need to be told what the critic
“thinks would test his statement” and thereby to dig out “its nonintentionalistic
meaning” (“what it actually says about the [work] itself”).
Beardsley characterizes the harmless variety of intention-talk as “merely
verbal” and the objectionable variety, when not resolvable in the manner
described, as “inexpugnably intentionalistic.” This distinction is elucidated in
terms of translatability: “even if part of the meaning of such [inexpugnably
intentionalistic] terms can be translated into a direct description or interpretation
of the work itself, there is a residue that cannot” (28). Harmless intention-talk,
by contrast, is said to consist only of “misleading ways of talking about the
work itself,” and hence to be entirely so translatable (without “residue”).
How, one may be wondering, is any of this relevant to Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s larger view? The first thing to note is that Beardsley’s objection to
inexpugnably intentionalistic terms is part of his defence of a certain ideal of
criticism, what Beardsley and Wimsatt earlier called “aesthetic criticism.” The
claim is that criticism of individual works, as opposed to the less “atomistic”
criticism championed by the likes of Fiedler andWollheim, is a particular sort of
thing, susceptible to a particular sort of logical definition. It is a kind of discourse
concerned with the work, such that every sentence properly so classified is
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a sentence about the work. The latter is a logical notion to the extent that
the surface grammar of the relevant sentences might not easily reflect it. One
might need sometimes to “translate” such sentences to get a clearer sense of
their import. When no such translation is possible and the surface grammar
is actually a good indication that the sentence is not about the work, then that
sentence is not properly classifiable as a critical statement. Beardsley defines a
critical statement, with apparently deliberate vagueness, as “any statement about
a work of art” (3).
Now, it might be that no actual piece of writing is what we may call
“pure” criticism, in this logical sense. Actual pieces of writing do lots of things
besides make critical statements, if only to be coherent and readable by actual
people (rather than only by critical-statement-processing machines). But what
Beardsley and Wimsatt are proposing, it seems to me, is a way to regiment the
language of criticism to better reflect its aims and purposes. If a critic claims
to be oering a piece of writing that will largely be about a certain work but
it turns out to be filled mostly with sentences that are not really about that
work, then something has gone wrong. A sociological point that Beardsley and
Wimsatt make, which inspires them to push their analysis, is that too much
criticism is of this sort, filled with disguised claims about the artist.
Their error theory is meant to explain how it could be that so many critics
make the mistake of (in Beardsley’s new terminology) using inexpugnably
intentionalistic terms in an attempt to characterize the work. This is said to
happen when critics make more than they should of the fact that the poem
came “out of a head, not out of a hat.” In such moments, critics allow this causal
fact to double as a standard of interpretation. If a critic thinks this way then he
will indeed take himself to be talking about the work when he reports what
the artist intended, for the intention’s presumed causal ecacy is misconstrued
as aesthetic relevance. So influenced, a critic will say that the artist intended
some meaning as a way of saying that the work means that thing. This is what
Beardsley and Wimsatt’s account of aesthetic criticism identifies as a mistake,
as not really a critical statement.
Although this contribution of Beardsley’s did not make any waves in the
ensuing commentary, some writers did seem tacitly to pick up on it (or simply
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to follow similar lines of thought). For instance, John Kemp (1964) notices that
questions like, “Why did the painter paint a line of this particular shape and
colour in this particular place?,” tend to be given answers that “almost invariably
[are] answers to a quite dierent kind of question, viz. ‘What does this line
contribute to the painting?’ ” (151). If the former sort of question may indeed
be satisfied by answers to the latter sort, then it would seem to refer to the artist
only in what Beardsley would call a “merely verbal” way (not “inexpugnably”).8
Kemp also acknowledges that “[w]e may sometimes find it useful to know what
an artist intended to do, to the extent that . . . a knowledge of his intentions may
lead us to see things about the work of art that we might not have otherwise
noticed.” This, Beardsley would say, is a case of using external evidence merely
to suggest hypotheses that are independently confirmed by the “data” of the
work.
Joseph Margolis, writing in 1965, sees the dialectic clearly but does not hold
the two sides properly accountable. His own view is as follows:
Even if we should have clear evidence of the artist’s intention, in
the sense, say, of an independent document, we should assess the
plausibility of the interpretation it itself pointed to by appeal to
critical canons not bound to that intention, hence, the criterion of
the artist’s intention can be supplementary at best. Furthermore,
even if the interpretation based on the artist’s intent were admitted as
an eligible one, we would be willing to evaluate it against alternative
and equally plausible interpretations, without regard to its special
source. (1965, 97)
One might think that holding such a view is tantamount to coming down
against intentionalism and siding with Beardsley and Wimsatt. But Margolis
claims, somewhat strangely, that “no one would wish to deny” his view, that,
8. See also Lycan andMachamer (1973), in which the authors propose a notion of “detachable
reasons” that is not unlike Beardsley’s notion of “merely verbal” intentionalistic language. In
one of their initial characterizations of their notion, they propose “that ‘—was painted while
the artist was in Rome’ could be replaced by ‘—was influenced by Michelangelo in this way’ (or
better, ‘—looks this way’) without loss of critical ecacy” (100). They express this “by saying
that the artist’s presence in Rome is a ‘detachable’ fact.”
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to the extent that an intention is treated “like any clue, however unusual or
unexpected its source . . . Wimsatt and Beardsley are in agreement with their
would-be opponents” (101).9
Margolis is not wrong in noticing that such eventual agreement is often
reached, but he iswrong in his conception of what ought to be the disagreement
between the two sides, for it is precisely as a “special source” that intentions
are championed by intentionalists, at least in their rhetoric. Margolis’s relaxed
attitude is shared by many contributors to the debate, most of whom are
casual observers of a passing scene and chip in only to register indignation at
having so obviously useful a thing as biographical information be summarily
outlawed. Or, in the manner of Empson (in my epigraph to this chapter), they
are more interested in the cultural eects downstream than in any nuanced
debate between the “high priests.”
One such high priest is Hirsch, who eects, in 1967, what I regard as a revo-
lution of sorts in the debate, one which is as much to his advantage as Beardsley
and Wimsatt’s shift to intentions was to theirs. In particular, Hirsch replaces
the status quo of a criticism-first approach with a new paradigm of a meaning-first
approach. Beardsley and Wimsatt, and virtually all of their contemporaries, be-
gin with the question: what ought a critic do? Hirsch begins with the question:
what is a work’s meaning? One can see this quite clearly in the way Hirsch
chooses to frame the debate. He identifies intentionalism as “the sensible belief
that a text means what its author meant,” and associates anti-intentionalism with
the thesis of “semantic autonomy,” which holds that literature is “detach[ed]”
from “the subjective realm of the author’s personal thoughts and feelings” due
to the fact that “all written language remains independent of that subjective
realm” (1967, 1).
Hirsch’s central claim is that “meaning is an aair of consciousness, not
9. In a substantially revised version of the chapter from which I have quoted, Margolis
changes the above claim that intentions are “supplementary at best” to the claim that they are
so supplementary only “in this [one] sense” (1980, 167). He goes on to suggest, presumably with
respect to another sense, that “ ‘extra-textual’ materials . . . may . . . inform us of what we judge
to be ‘in’ the work—in a way that could not be exclusively and otherwise discerned” (169). I
mention this not only to be fair to Margolis, but also to highlight that he himself evidently
came to be dissatisfied with his initial treatment of the issue.
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of words,” for “[a]lmost any word sequence can, under the conventions of
language, legitimately represent more than one complex of meaning” (4). This
is Hirsch’s line of attack not only against semantic autonomy—which fails to
appreciate that meaning is an aair of consciousness—but also against Beardsley
and Wimsatt in particular, whose proposed method of aesthetic criticism is
alleged to be unable to deliver “objectively valid interpretation.” Although
Hirsch so takes a meaning-first approach, he is conscious of entering a decades-
long debate that is primarily about criticism. What he tries to do is to derive the
relevant metacritical principles from his analysis of meaning. However, as I will
show in the next chapter, those who followed in his wake increasingly neglected
this latter part of the project. The analysis of meaning came to consume the
entire discussion.
Late in his book, Hirsch acknowledges that “[t]he analyses and arguments
of the preceding chapters have paid scant attention to the practical exigencies
of textual commentary” (127). Much of Hirsch’s book is indeed about what he
calls “verbal meaning,” what it is and how it is determined (not by critics but in
the world, so to speak). In arguing for his view, Hirsch distinguishes between
meaning and significance:
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author
meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs
represent. Significance, on the other hand, names a relationship
between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation,
or indeed anything imaginable. (8)
A work’s meaning is supposed to be invariant, always there as the self-same
thing for all people to experience and understand. A work’s significance, by
contrast, may be particular to individual readers, depending on how it is related
to the work’s meaning. This distinction allows Hirsch to explain away certain
competing accounts of meaning as really concerned with significance. He
believes that a “[f ]ailure to consider this simple and essential distinction has
been the source of enormous confusion in hermeneutic theory.”
More tomy purpose here, meaning and significance have “corollaries” which
pertain “to the practice of criticism” (136). These are interpretation and criticism,
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respectively. Hirsch reserves the label “interpretation” for an “explanation of
meaning”—as opposed to an “understanding” of meaning (which we may
view as among Aiken’s “primary activities”)—that is concerned exclusively
(“atomistically”) with the individual work. He acknowledges, however, that
“most commentaries that we [more loosely] call interpretations are concerned
with significance as well as meaning. They draw analogies and point out
relationships which not only help us to understand meaning but also lead us to
perceive values and relevancies” (136). To these Hirsch gives the label “criticism,”
thus providing something of an answer to the earlier complaints about holding
too “atomistic” a conception of criticism.
Terminology aside, there is not much in the foregoing passage with which
Beardsley and Wimsatt would disagree. There is, however, a significant dier-
ence in explanatory priorities. For Hirsch there are
no correct ‘methods’ of interpretation, no uniquely appropriate
categories. One does what is necessary to convey an understanding
to a particular audience. There are many ways of catching a possum.
In his function as an interpreter, the critic’s first job is to discover
which possum he should catch. (139)
But even if it should be the case, as Hirsch believes, that the “possum” which a
critic should catch is always that provided by the artist, it by no means follows
that this fact of ownership ought to be reported in the criticism. And yet
questions of the latter sort, about what a critic ought to write and how, are
what concern Beardsley and Wimsatt. So, perhaps one would not be remiss in
thinking that Hirsch is simply talking past Beardsley and Wimsatt. He gives an
intentionalist theory of verbal meaning, they give an anti-intentionalist theory
of critical discourse.
Here is how I think there might nevertheless be genuine conflict between
Hirsch and metacritical anti-intentionalists. If Hirsch is correct in his analysis
of meaning (the details of which, again, I am leaving for the next chapter), then
there will be a systematic connection between what an artist intended and what
her work means. Hirsch will have supplied, in Fiedler’s terms, a “coherent theory
of the relationship between the life of the poet and his work.” And if there is such
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a theory, it can perhaps be leveraged to metacritical principles. Namely, critics
may be seen to be exploiting its consequences in a rigorous enough fashion that
the metacritic can recognize such use as obeying appropriate norms.10 And if,
at the same time, Hirsch attenuates the appeal of Beardsley and Wimsatt’s own
metacritical view, the one which champions what they call “aesthetic criticism,”
then his own newly leveraged view will seem even more attractive.
Hirsch does not quite put his argument in such terms, but much of what
he is doing can be so described. The problem with his not explicitly putting
his argument in such terms is that those who looked to him for guidance in
constructing their view did not see the importance of leveraging what we may
call a first-order theory of meaning to a higher-order theory of critical discourse,
the latter being, I have said, the true site of controversy in the intentionalism
debate.
1.2 Metacriticism
The question is not whether we shall talk, but whether we shall do it well or badly.
We must try not to talk too much or too soon, or trivially, or incorrectly, or
irrelevantly, or misleadingly.
— Monroe C. Beardsley11
I conclude by more explicitly formulating the relevant metacritical question
about intentions, the one to which I will be addressing myself in the rest of the
thesis. Important to consider here will be Beardsley’s overtly metacritical view
of the discipline of aesthetics. My claim is that this methodological view of his
has been insuciently brought to bear on his anti-intentionalism. I have so far
construed Beardsley and Wimsatt’s points as metacritical largely on the basis of
local evidence and (what I take to be) common sense readings. Here I motivate
this construal more indirectly, as what Beardsley must have meant given his
background methodological views.
10. The way Hirsch (1976) puts such a thought is that “theory codifies ex post facto the
interpretive norms we already prefer” (76).
11. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. 1958. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 7.
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According to Beardsley, aesthetics as a “field of study” “consists of a rather
heterogeneous collection of problems: those that arise when we make a serious
eort to say something true and warranted about a work of art” (1958, 3). The
aesthetician attempts, more specifically, to discover “those principles that are
required for clarifying and confirming critical statements. Aesthetics can be
thought of, then, as the philosophy of criticism, or metacriticism” (3-4). To make
his case, Beardsley compares aesthetics to “two other fields of philosophy: ethics
and philosophy of science.” This ends up being more complicated than he lets
on.
He notes that ethics “undertakes the examination of moral statements,” such
as “It is wrong to kill,” about which it asks “What does the word ‘wrong’
mean?”; but his own qualification that this is just “one branch of ethics,” namely
meta-ethics, should have alerted him to the fact that an equally important
branch concerns itself not with the meaning of terms but with normative
theory. Then there is the more recent branch, applied ethics, which brings to
bear the results of the others on particular moral problems. All of this somewhat
disrupts Beardsley’s case.
The comparison to the philosophy of science is probably more representative
of what he has in mind, for here there is a recognizable expert to whom the
philosopher must defer on “first-order” questions. Beardsley observes that it
is the “task of the physical scientist to provide us with true theories about
the properties of subatomic particles, electrons, protons, mesons, etc. But as
philosophers we are interested in other questions,” for instance: “Do these
particles really exist, independently of the human mind?” (4). In the analogy
envisioned by Beardsley, the natural world is to the scientist what the artworld
is to the critic, and the scientist is to the philosopher of science what the critic
is to the philosopher of art. Recall the three-level hierarchy I mentioned earlier:
consumers of works read criticism the norms of which are argued over by
metacritics. The level of consuming or experiencing works is that of the
phenomena. The level of the critic is that of talk about the phenomena. And,
finally, the level of the philosopher (or metacritic) is said to be that of the concepts
underlying such talk. Aesthetics is “concerned with the nature and basis of
criticism—in the broad sense of this term—just as criticism itself is concerned
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with works of art” (6).
In addition, just as “studying philosophy of science does not qualify you to
be a scientist,” “[s]o, too, studying aesthetics does not make you a critic, still less
a painter or a poet” (4). And “neither aesthetics nor criticism can be carried on
independently of the other; though each has its own tasks, they depend upon
each other.” Aesthetics depends on criticism in that “we can’t do aesthetics
until we have some critical statements to work on.” And criticism depends on
aesthetics in that “for the sake of reasonable criticism . . . aesthetic questions
must be asked.” For instance, when a critic says that “Bruckner was earnest and
honest,” it must be asked, not “Was Bruckner honest?,” but “How do you tell
whether a composer is honest or not?”; “Is biographical evidence relevant here,
or is honesty audible in the music itself ?” (5).
Philosophers will be happy to accept the latter claim (of their relevance to
the practice of criticism), but maybe not the former (of their own inquiries
needing to be filtered through the data of criticism).12 I do not get into this
larger methodological question here, for my interest is only in how such ideas
of Beardsley’s informed his stance in the intentionalism debate (and the very
conception of the debate that we have inherited from him and Wimsatt).
Beardsley in fact acknowledges that not everyonewill agreewith his method-
ological views. In particular, many philosophers will wish to “include among
the problems of aesthetics the nature of the creative process itself: what social
and psychological conditions move the painter and poet, and how they go about
their work” (6). But, for Beardsley, aesthetics properly “take[s] as central the
situation in which someone is confronted with a finished work, and is trying to
understand it and to decide how good it is.” Beardsley thus makes a distinction
between “psychological aesthetics” and “philosophical aesthetics,” the former of
which “deals with questions about the causes and eects of works of art” while
the latter with “questions about the meaning and truth of critical statements.”
Psychology is not always irrelevant—“we cannot ignore psychology”—but its
“data and conclusions” merely “bear upon ours at many points” (e.g. concerning
“the nature of aesthetic experience”) and are never the central focus.
12. Shusterman (2002) objects that, “[a]s merely metacriticism, aesthetics seems essentially a
handmaiden to criticism, thus ensuring its marginal place in analytic philosophy” (32).
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It is therefore no surprise that Beardsley conceives of the debate over inten-
tions as a debate over how critics talk, for as a debate in philosophical aesthetics
it perforce is, for him, a debate that begins from the standpoint of criticism.
This point deserves more attention than it seems to me to have received in the
literature. Although I spoke earlier of alternative ways of framing the questions
of interest, i.e. criticism-first and meaning-first, these are not equivalent in the
options that they present to the theorist. A meaning-first theorist is limited by
the possible relations between meaning and intention. A criticism-first theorist
is limited by the possible relations between critical language and intention-talk.
Not only are these distinct sets of relations—for they relate dierent orders of
things—but it is also doubtful if there will always be a way to leverage one sort
of relation to the other.
Hirsch, as I will soon discuss, takes the operative relation between meaning
and intention to be identity of semantic content, and hopes to derive from this
a critical relation of a simple sort, viz. evidence of intention may be mentioned
in and as criticism when the intention for which it is evidence corresponds
to some meaning of the work (which will occur in almost every case, given
Hirsch’s proposed first-order relation). But critical relations may be far more
complex, and have more to do with the rhetorical aims of the institution of
criticism than with the semantic (or other) properties of artworks directly.
The latter is the sort of direction in which I would have liked to see the
debate go, but internal pressures having to do with the choice of intention
as the focal element, and with the charge of confusion between cause and
standard, muddied the metacritical waters a bit. Looking at Beardsley’s (what
we may call) anti-psychologism about aesthetics (which Hirsch manifests as
well, incidentally), it is no surprise that he looks askance at any purported
relation between cause and standard, more or less taking for granted that there
isn’t any. This has encouraged his opponents to resist the charge of fallacy by
focusing intently on an intention’s causal profile.
Quite apart from all this, the error in explanation of which Beardsley and
Wimsatt make their accusation of fallacy is still slightly mysterious. We have
been told that the “fault” is one of “writing the personal as if it were the
poetic.” And this has been connected, by Beardsley, to a use of inexpugnably
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intentionalistic language. But what exactly counts as “writing the personal as if
it were the poetic,” what “use” of inexpugnably intentionalistic terms?
Something Beardsley leaves open is whether the language of criticism is
exhausted by critical statements and sentences that may be translated into
critical statements (the latter including statements couched in “merely verbal”
intentionalistic language)—or, assuming that this is simply true by definition,
how exactly we are supposed to determine whether a statement is a critical
statement (relevantly “about the work”). The question can already be seen to
arise in what are deemed salutary uses of external evidence. Beardsley grants
that diaries or notebooks that let us know what an artist intended may be helpful
in suggesting hypotheses that we must then test against the work. But how
much of this process may or should be recorded in criticism?
Critics talk in all kinds of ways about all kinds of things, with, it is hoped,
a central focus on the thing they claim to be focusing on. What Beardsley
contends, on his own and earlier withWimsatt, is that in many actual cases there
are parts to such writing which pretend to be what they are not. They pretend
to be about the work when they are really only about the artist. However,
Beardsley’s account of what it is for a piece of criticism to be about the work
is limited to individual sentences (critical statements). If a sentence does not
reveal a particular underlying logical form, then it is not about the work.
What about larger chunks of criticism, e.g. paragraphs, pages, or an entire
piece, about which we may ask this same question? It seems to me that when
a larger chunk of criticism focuses on an individual work, the signs to which
we should look to confirm this fact dier from those to which Beardsley looks
in such inquiries about individual sentences. In particular, it would be odd to
expect every sentence in such a chunk of writing (which claims to be about
some particular work) to be “translatable” into something obviously “about the
work,” and premature to classify all sentences that are not so translatable as
somehow fugitive, mere rhetorical flu and not really criticism.
What we want, again, is to confirm that a piece of writing that claims to
be about a certain work really is about that work. According to Beardsley and
Wimsatt, reports that the artist intended such-and-such are not, on the face of
it, so confirming, do not reassure us that the piece of writing in which they are
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found really is about the work it purports to be about. But why not?
The psychological claim about there being a confusion between cause and
standard does not help here, for it takes the error for granted and is oered
only as a conjecture about how the error could come about (in ostensibly right-
thinking people). Why, however, is it an error to begin with to think that one
is contributing to one’s discussion of a given work by mentioning that the artist
intended such-and-such? One answer is that such a report is not obviously about
the work. Okay, perhaps it isn’t. But why should our sense of what a sentence
is doing in a piece of criticism, in particular of whether it contributes to that
piece being about the work it purports to be about, be determined by whether
or not that sentence is “obviously” about the work? This seems overly narrow.
Another answer, the one Beardsley likely had in mind, is that there is always
some indeterminacy when one reports (from external sources) what an artist
intended, between this being evidence about the work and evidence simply
about the artist. The reason there is an indeterminacy, according to Beardsley,
is that there are no good critical norms underlying any attempt that may be
made, in any individual case, to make reports of what an artist intended part of
a larger discussion that is about the work. This, incidentally, is precisely why
Hirsch chooses to start from the ground up: he argues for necessary connections
between intention and meaning, a recognition of which by critics (even if tacit)
is meant to underlie their practice, a recognition of which stable practice is
meant, in turn, to underlie a metacritical view that permits the critical relevance
of intentions.
In anticipation of such moves, Beardsley insists on the importance of “a
general principle of philosophy that is often not kept in mind,” that “[i]f two
things are distinct . . . if they are indeed two, and not one thing under two names
. . . then the evidence for the existence and nature of one cannot be exactly the
same as the evidence for the existence and nature of the other” (19). But, he
continues, “[t]his point is obscured where the two things, though distinct, are
causally connected, as are presumably the intention and the aesthetic object.”
How obscured? By the fact, acknowledged by Beardsley, that “what we learn
about the artist’s intention is indirect evidence of what the object became” (20).
At least in some cases. The problem, according to Beardsley, is that there is
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nothing systematic we can say about such cases. More troublingly, it is not
clear how critics themselves can be sure that in adducing intentions they really
are succeeding in talking about the work.
I will be sorting out such questions in due course, but what should we make
of all this right now? A standard conception of the intentionalism debate takes
it to be about evidence, the possible status of intentions as evidence. Even in his
final contribution to the debate, Beardsley defines intentionalism along these
lines, as “the thesis that facts about the author’s intention, or facts tending to
show that the author probably had such-and-such intentions, can give evidential
support to the claim that a particular interpretation of a literary work is true or
correct” (1982a, 193). This might seem too narrow a definition, but it enjoys
a default status in the debate, probably because it represents the way one is
naturally disposed to think. This is part of the ingenuity of Beardsley and
Wimsatt’s decision to focus on intentions: they accrue to themselves the luxury
of deciding how their opponents will defy them.
To see what I mean, consider an attempt to describe intentions as fulfilling a
dierent critical role. Dorothea Krook makes the case that “the critical interest
and value of the known authorial intention . . . is obviously that of confirmation:
the statement of authorial intention has the value of confirming the more
correct and complete interpretation of the enacted intention” (1974, 367). But
how does a report of an intention “confirm” an interpretation? Simply by
agreeing with it? Why should such agreement matter? Krook, incidentally,
grants that “the author’s voice, as Wimsatt rightly said, can never be an ‘oracle,’
can never have a unique, or even a special authority” (367). So she seems to
have some sympathy with Beardsley and Wimsatt. But suppose she did not.
Suppose she were a stauncher intentionalist and insisted on a “special authority”
for intentions. What could “confirmation” mean then? Would it not just mean
that any interpretation that corresponds to what the artist intended is thereby
deemed the correct one, i.e. is “confirmed” by the fact of the intention? This,
of course, gets us right back to the evidence model. The temptation is simply to
hold up the semantic content of the intention as something the work probably
means. But why should this be the only way to talk about intentions in relation
to a work? It seems that it should not be, but genuine alternatives are dicult
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to come by.
The central issue, as I see it, is about one’s having, as a critic, legitimate
reasons to talk about intentions, or biographical information more generally;
in particular, to talk about intentions or biographical information as such. The
latter condition eliminates Beardsley’s “merely verbal” explanation, for it is
not merely for the content of what the artist intends but for the fact that it
is she who intends it that we must be mentioning her intention. One way
to follow through on such a desideratum is, indeed, to view reports about
intention as evidential, for, quite plausibly, it is only in virtue of its being
the artist who intended a given thing that we might hold the intention to be
evidence of what the work means. Another person’s intention (or simply any
other vehicle for the intended content) does not matter in the same way. But I
think such evidential claims are dicult to motivate, not quite for the standard
epistemological reasons (e.g. that intentions are “inaccessible”), but due to the
diculty of formulating adequate critical principles. What this means for the
prospects of intentionalism is something to be discussed at length. I do this
throughout the thesis, eventually reaching in my final chapter a point at which
I put together an intentionalist position that I believe meets the mentioned
desideratum—namely, of legitimizing in and as criticism talk of intentions as
such.
CHAPTER 2
Intentions and Interpretation
I like watching rehearsals: they are far more interesting than performances. One can
see in a rehearsal every detail of what has preceded: who loves whom, who is
nervous, who is confident, who is vain, who has been bullied by the director, who is
admired by the rest of the cast, who is on the verge of tearful disaster. A performance
does not wholly conceal such things, but it conceals some of them; whereas here
before me lay the whole pattern, or what I liked to think was the whole pattern.
– Margaret Drabble1
I have understood the intentional fallacy as the error of “writing the personal
as if it were the poetic” (with an emphasis on the writing). I have argued that
Beardsley and Wimsatt’s psychological claim about critics confusing cause
and standard ought to be distinguished from their accusation of error: the
psychological claim is designed to explain or make intelligible the alleged
prevalence of the error. The error itself, entailed by Beardsley and Wimsatt’s
account of “aesthetic criticism,” is that of a critic’s failing to talk about the work
she is otherwise or ostensibly talking about. In the present chapter, I examine
the arguments concerning this accusation of error—concerning, that is, the
thesis of intentionalism.
I myself view intentionalism as the thesis that there are sound critical prin-
ciples underlying the critic’s practice of making mention of intentions as such.
I understand the latter qualification (“as such”) to mean, roughly, that critics
1. The Garrick Year. 1964. Penguin Books, 83.
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are mentioning the artist’s intention at least in part due to its being the artist’s
intention. Another way to cast this idea (not without its own complications)
is in terms of Beardsley’s notion of “inexpugnably intentionalistic language,”
viz. that language which cannot be “translated” into statements strictly about
features of the work. Beardsley’s main example of intentionalistic language that
is so translatable is what we may call loose talk, not really about intentions and
couched in such language only for convenience. To mention intentions using
inexpugnably intentionalistic language is, by contrast, to mention them as such.
Although my way of formulating the thesis of intentionalism does, I believe,
reflect the target of Beardsley andWimsatt’s objection, the standard formulation
owes, instead, to their choice of taking any possible relevance of “writing the
personal” to be evidential in nature. On their understanding, as I said at the
end of the previous chapter, the intentionalist must establish that evidence of
intentions is also evidence of the meaning of the work. I restrict myself in this
chapter to arguments advanced under the banner of this standard formulation.
I start by moving beyond the bare notion of a critical statement, which,
as I earlier noted, Beardsley somewhat unhelpfully defines as “any statement
about a work of art.” The particular sort of critical statement in which I will be
interested is the interpretive statement, which Beardsley defines as “a statement
that purports to declare the ‘meaning’ of a work of art,” where meaning is “a
semantical relation between the work itself and something outside the work”
(1958, 9). The dierence, of course, is that one may say many things about a
work of art that do not pertain to its meaning (or, more generally, to the work
qua work). Although I will continue to speak of criticism generally, my focus
in this chapter will be on interpretation and work-meaning.
The intentionalist holds that, in the ideal sort of case, evidence to the eect
that the artist had such-and-such intentions constitutes evidence not only of
intentions but also of some interpretive claim about the work (that the work
has such-and-such meaning). The critic is said to be justified in adducing such
evidence in virtue of its secondary evidential property, regarding an interpretive
claim that the critic wishes to advance. Recall, however, that “general principle”
on which Beardsley has insisted: “[i]f two things are distinct . . . if they are
indeed two, and not one thing under two names . . . then the evidence for the
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existence and nature of one cannot be exactly the same as the evidence for the
existence and nature of the other” (1958, 19). Given this principle, and the fact
that the artist’s intentions are one thing and the work another, it would seem
to follow that evidence of the existence and nature of the artist’s intentions is
not exactly the same as evidence of the existence and nature of the work.
This would not mean that intentions cannot ever be evidence for the work,
for it might still be that some evidence of the existence and nature of intentions
is also evidence of the existence and nature of the work, even if intentions and
work are distinct. As I mention in the previous chapter, Beardsley himself allows
for cases of this sort, in which the “two things, though distinct, are causally
connected.” If intentions and work, though distinct, are causally connected, it
will sometimes be the case that “what we learn about the artist’s intention is
indirect evidence of what the object became” (20).
Take these as two ways for one to go about arguing for an evidential variety
of intentionalism: either in terms of complete evidential overlap, where we
are dealing with identical things “under two names,” or in terms of partial
evidential overlap, where we are dealing with two things that are causally
connected. In the former case, the intentionalist’s claim would be that there
is somewhere a relevant identity between intentions and work, e.g. intended
meaning is identical to work-meaning, so that evidence of the one is ipso facto
evidence of the other. This is often called absolute intentionalism. In the second
case, the intentionalist’s claim would be that the causal connection between
intentions and work makes it possible for some evidence of intentions to also be
evidence of the work. This is often called moderate intentionalism. I divide my
examination of the arguments along these two varieties of intentionalism, and
argue that ultimately neither thesis has been successfully defended in prominent
arguments.
2.1 Absolute Intentionalism
Although absolute intentionalism was originally the default intentionalist
position—certainly assumed to be so by anti-intentionalists like Beardsley and
Wimsatt—contributors to the debate did not have much occasion to think
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of matters in terms of absolute/non-absolute until Hirsch, who, somewhat
frustratingly, could be read as almost any manner of intentionalist—absolute2,
moderate3, or hypothetical4—depending on which of his remarks one took
to be representative. Hirsch remains so elusive due partly, I think, to his
attempt to solve a problem about criticism in terms of notions which pertain
only to meaning. I have described some of what this involves in the previous
chapter. Here I extend this analysis as part of a characterization of absolute
intentionalism.
Hirsch is indeed most commonly viewed as an absolute intentionalist, and I
will so be reading him here. This follows from taking seriously his assertion that
“meaning is an aair of consciousness, not of words” (1967, 4). In saying this,
he means to subsume work-meaning under intended meaning so that works
have meaning only derivatively, in that they point to a consciousness which
truly “bears” the meaning. William Irwin, who develops Hirsch’s point, makes
this more explicit: “Texts are simply convenient indicators of meaning but truly
speaking cannot possess meaning themselves” (1999, 60). On the basis of such
a semantic thesis, Hirsch may, using Beardsley’s evidential principle, deduce
the claim that any and all evidence of intended meaning is ipso facto evidence
of work-meaning, for the two terms are identical. Thus, a critic who adduces
evidence of the artist’s intention is thereby adducing evidence of what the work
means, whether she knows it or not. All such intention-talk is vindicated.
This metacritical way of describing Hirsch’s absolute intentionalism, simple
as it may sound, is far enough removed from the standard way to have practical
consequences for how dierent theorists will relate to him. Take, for example,
Knapp and Michaels (1985). They are fellow absolute intentionalists who
criticize Hirsch for not remaining true to his absolute intentionalist convictions.
On my way of putting things, Hirsch turns out to be immune to their criticism,
for they simply misconstrue the dierent levels of theorizing at play. They are,
2. See Beardsley (1970, 17) for the canonical reading, to which most subsequent theorists
have deferred.
3. See Iseminger (1992) for a sympathetic such reading, and Juhl (1980) and Knapp and
Michaels (1985) for an unsympathetic such reading.
4. See Vandevelde (2005), who argues that what Hirschmeans by intention is a “construction”
of “what belonged to the milieu of the author,” not “what was in the head of the author” (72).
Intentions and Interpretation 45
incidentally, self-described “anti-theorists,” but this only adds to the confusion
that induces them to make statements such as the following:
once it is seen that the meaning of a text is simply identical to the
author’s intended meaning, the project of grounding meaning in
intention becomes incoherent.. . . The mistake made by theorists
has been to imagine the possibility or desirability of moving from
one term (the author’s intended meaning) to a second term (the
text’s meaning), when actually the two terms are the same. (12)
Knapp andMichaels accuse Hirsch of this mistake, and find “odd” his “transition
from definition to method” (13). All one must establish, to their mind, is that
“textual meaning” is “the author’s intended meaning.” But, of course, if the
controversy to which Hirsch is addressing himself partly concerns method,
then it will make sense that he is eager to draw methodological conclusions
from his definition of meaning. This is the case in the intentionalism debate,
which Knapp and Michaels incorrectly construe as being, not about criticism,
but about the definition of work-meaning.5
P. D. Juhl (1980) is another example. He, too, expresses disappointment in
Hirsch, not because he sees no need for Hirsch’s “transition from definition to
method” but because he does not recognize in Hirsch any such transition at all.
He sees Hirsch as simply failing to give a robust enough intentionalist theory of
criticism (as opposed to failing, in particular, to leverage his intentionalist theory
of meaning to such a theory of criticism). The intentionalist theory of criticism
Juhl himself defends is that “there is a logical connection between statements
about the meaning of a literary work and statements about the author’s intention
such that a statement about the meaning of a work is a statement about the
author’s intention” (12). Note that this is an explicitly metacritical thesis, about
statements of meaning rather than about meaning directly. It is, moreover, the
same result of absolute intentionalism at which I above arrived on Hirsch’s
5. Hirsch, in a reply, is equally bewildered by Knapp and Michaels, agreeing with the thrust
of their argument concerning the definition of work-meaning but claiming to be unable to
“see the consequentiality of their argument . . . about the practical nullity of the idea of intention”
(1985, 49, emphasis added).
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behalf, using Beardsley’s evidential principle. But Juhl does not take Hirsch
even to be trying to defend such a thesis. On Juhl’s construal,
Hirsch believes that there is no logical connection between the
meaning of a work and the author’s intention. He holds rather that
we ought to accept the author’s intention as the decisive criterion
of what a text means, since otherwise literary interpretation will
be hopelessly subjective and therefore unable to provide genuine
knowledge about the meaning of literary works. Whereas Hirsch
is more or less explicitly oering a recommendation as to what
critics ought to do in interpreting a text—namely, try to ascertain
the author’s intention—my view is that they are necessarily doing
so already, in virtue of what it is for a literary work to have a certain
meaning. (12)
The problem, which I think is evident in the quoted passage, is that Juhl is
misconstruing certain of Hirsch’s remarks as a recommendation for critics, when
they are really a recommendation for theorists (of meaning). The “we” who,
Hirsch argues, ought to so accept the author’s intention are theorists of meaning.
By so accepting the author’s intention, namely by recognizing that work-
meaning is intended meaning, we (still theorists) are said to put ourselves in a
good position to counter Beardsley and Wimsatt’s theory of criticism. Hirsch’s
theory of criticism, absolute intentionalism, is in fact the same as Juhl’s.6 The
distinction between these two levels to Hirsch’s argument, first a theory of
meaning that secondly is leveraged to a theory of criticism, has thrown o
many commentators.
Jack Meiland, from whom Juhl takes direction, follows through more ex-
plicitly on such a misreading. He recognizes that it is dicult to maintain
that Hirsch is not oering a theory of meaning, given that “Hirsch sometimes
[in fact, often] talks in a way which can lead one to the conclusion that he
6. What complicates matters is that, in a subsequent work (1976), Hirsch does advance a
view on which it is critics who, he says, “ought” to do certain things, namely in the light of
certain ethical imperatives. But Hirsch explicitly sets aside such arguments in his earlier work
(1967, 26-27). See Meiland (1978, 44) and Irvin (2003, 77) for what I take to be persuasive
objections to this ethical argument, which I do not discuss here.
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is identifying author’s meaning with the meaning of the work” (1978, 27).
Meiland’s exegetical solution is to explain away such appearances by pointing
to “other passages [which] support the view I suggest,” that “Hirsch is to be
taken as recommending that interpretation be a historical inquiry into a past
consciousness, that of the author” (28, emphasis added). My view, which I take
to be preferable if only because it makes better sense of all of Hirsch’s remarks,
is that these are not mutually exclusive. Hirsch is doing both, “recommending”
(to metacritics) the second, metacritical thesis on the basis of “recommending”
(to semanticists) the first, semantic thesis. Meiland’s own theory is of precisely
this two-level sort, on which works are said to have “textual meaning derived
from conventions, which meaning can then serve as the criterion for validity
for interpretations” (40). But Meiland resists the idea that Hirsch is doing the
same with an intentionalist (rather than a conventionalist) theory of meaning.
As we have seen, Knapp and Michaels make the error of taking Hirsch
to not need anything more than (in eect) a theory of meaning. Meiland
and Juhl, meanwhile, make the error of taking Hirsch to not even be oering
a theory of meaning. A yet other sort of error is made by Gary Iseminger
(who is representative of many contemporary intentionalists in this respect),
that of speaking of both types of theorizing simultaneously and without due
dierentiation. In the context I wish to highlight, Iseminger is discussing the
following Hirschian premise: “If exactly one of two interpretive statements
about a poem, each of which is compatible with its text, is true, then the true
one is the one that applies to the meaning intended by the author” (1992, 77).
Iseminger says of this premise that it is “an ontological principle rather than
an epistemological one,” for it is “not, except indirectly, advice on how one is
likely to find out which of the two contradictory statements about the poem is
true; instead it claims to tell us what makes the true one true” (85). My sense,
however, is that the given premise is neither an ontological principle nor an
epistemological one, if these categories are held to apply to the artwork directly
(its nature and how we come to know it, respectively), for the premise is not
directly about the artwork at all. It is instead about interpretive statements about
the artwork, making it a metacritical principle.
It might be replied that not much is to be gained by dierentiating the stated
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metacritical principle from the semantic(-cum-ontological) principle which
it can be seen to imply, for the truth-conditions of interpretive statements
straightforwardly reflect the conditions under which works bear meanings.
Namely, an interpretive statement that the work means such-and-such is true just
in case the work means such-and-such. But I believe that dierentiating the
two types of principle does matter, in particular because a theory of criticism
may concern itself with subjects other than the truth-conditions of interpretive
statements. Indeed, the intentionalism debate revolves around a search for just
such a theory of criticism, namely one that is about, not the truth-conditions,
but the relevance of certain types of statement commonly found in criticism
(what I am calling intention-talk).
The absolute intentionalist’s claim just happens to be, in eect, that the truth-
conditions of interpretive statements are such as to secure a blanket relevance for
all sorts of intention-talk. However, it is not such truth-conditions themselves
but the underlying theory of meaning which, in addition to entailing certain
truth-conditions, would secure a critical relevance for intentions. That is,
meaning’s being “an aair of consciousness, not of words” entails both (a) that
an interpretive statement that the work means such-and-such is true just in case
the artist intended such-and-such, and (b) that talk of intended meaning just is
talk of work-meaning. The former consequence must not be given too much
attention, for it is the latter which truly addresses the anti-intentionalist.
I have spent so much time on readings of Hirsch’s view, more than on
Hirsch himself, because these readings are what are important for my purposes
(identifying wayward paths in the intentionalism debate). Hirsch, as I have said,
is somewhat of an elusive figure. Not much is to be gained these days by teasing
out the import of the variety of suggestive comments he makes, especially since
his manner of arguing for intentionalism, namely his meaning-first approach,
is (as I see it) not particularly fruitful. But, due precisely to his influence in
the literature, it is important to attend to how those who reacted to him were
choosing to read him.
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2.1.1 The Arguments For
I turn now to some of the main arguments that have been given for absolute
intentionalism, most of them in some sense due to Hirsch. The first argument,
explicitly advanced by Hirsch, may be called the indeterminacy argument. The
second, which has been developed by various of Hirsch’s successors, in particular
Juhl (1980) and Knapp and Michaels (1985), I will call the agency argument,
reflecting the emphasis given in such arguments to the notion of the artwork
being the product of (normally, human) agency. Although I will be objecting
to such arguments, drawing on existing objections in the literature, this itself
is, I recognize, no special undertaking given that absolute intentionalism is
essentially a vanquished view. My focus will instead be on facilitating my
own subsequent objection to both absolute and moderate intentionalism, the
anities between which have not, I claim, been suciently appreciated.
The indeterminacy argument is given by Hirsch in the following passage:
Obviously, any brief word sequence could represent quite dier-
ent complexes of verbal meaning.. . . But if a determinate word
sequence does not in itself necessarily represent one, particular, self-
identical, unchanging complex of meaning, then the determinacy
of its verbal meaning must be accounted for by some other discrim-
inating force.. . . That discriminating force must involve an act of
will, since unless one particular complex of meaning is willed . . .
there would be no distinction between what an author does mean
by a word sequence and what he could mean by it. Determinacy
of verbal meaning requires an act of will. (1967, 46-47)
This is an argument for treating meaning as “an aair of consciousness, not
of words.” The idea is supposed to be that meaning must be an aair of con-
sciousness, in particular of an act of will, because otherwise meaning would
not be determinate. Hirsch means something specific by “determinate” (44),
the details of which need not detain us here—in particular because there does
not exist a reading around which a majority of commentators have coalesced.
Beardsley reads “determinate” as “unambiguous” (1970, 26), but does so with
the impression that he is making the best of an unhelpful notion. In what
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follows, I largely skate around this notion, taking it to mean something like the
bare minimum we want from a meaning qua meaning (my own somewhat clumsy
expression).
There are two ways to understand what is going on in the indeterminacy
argument. Either we take Hirsch to be playing something like a “numbers”
game, where the claim is that, without an authorial will selecting certain
meanings, there are (in most cases) simply too many options from which to
choose, such that it is implausible for us (as theorists of meaning) to attribute all
of them to the works in question;7 or else we take Hirsch to be making a more
philosophical point about the nature of meaning itself, that meaning is not, so
to speak, self-standing but always “somebody’s meaning” (1967, 3). The latter is
typically how Hirsch is read by those who oer what I am calling the agency
argument, to which I will attend shortly. Let me first consider, briefly, what I
have called the “numbers” construal of the indeterminacy argument.
On this construal, all we seek is a “genuinely discriminating norm,” some-
thing that will reliably pare down the overabundant variety of possible meanings
that, Hirsch believes, every word sequence can logically support. The author’s
will obviously represents such a norm, but, as was evident even to Hirsch, it
represents only one possible such norm. Why should it be the one that we
(again, as theorists of meaning) adopt?
An alternative that Hirsch considers is the norm of “public consensus,” which
claims to narrow down the range of possible meanings by pooling the eorts
of “every competent reader.” Hirsch does not think this provides sucient
discrimination of the possibilities (13). But how much discrimination do we
really want? Most theorists are happy, I think, to allow some sort of pluralism
of meaning. Maybe for some of these theorists the pluralism defined by the
public consensus, problematic as it is, is suciently discriminatory. For instance,
Goldman (1990) has a view on which works often support many “acceptable”
interpretations, such that (as he says in response to Hirsch) “we can rest content
7. A theorist of meaning may be said to “attribute” meaning to works in the sense of
espousing a theory on which works bear meaning in certain ways. A critic, by contrast, may
be said to “attribute” meaning to works in the sense of saying of some particular works that
they bear some particular meanings.
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with [this] indeterminacy or multiplicity” (213).
Hirsch appears to lean monistic, toward a view on which there should
always be (as it is often put) “a single right interpretation.” But this is not
entirely clear, for Hirsch’s notion of determinacy can be read, pluralistically, to
entail that a work’s meanings may be ambiguous. He allows (pace Beardsley’s
interpretation of “determinate”) that “most verbal meanings are imprecise and
ambiguous,” while insisting that “to call them such is to acknowledge their
determinacy” (1967, 44). Yet, to say that some meaning is ambiguous is to
say that it is ambiguous between two or more meanings, in which case those
meanings would seem to be separable possibilities.
Thankfully, we may set aside such complications by attending to other
discriminating norms which, still ignoring the artist, seem to provide just the
level of discrimination that Hirsch desires, namely those which refer to individual
readers. Meiland observes that “the ‘reading’ of any reader whatsoever of the
work” is “just as historically real and determinate as that of the author” (1978,
34). Hirsch might object that it cannot quite be the will of some individual
reader that could matter, in the way that, he believes, the will of the author
matters; but if we are concerned simply to achieve a level of discrimination, to
eectively pare down the possibilities, then all we need is an eective norm,
regardless of where it comes from or how arbitrary it seems.
It therefore appears that Hirsch will have to abandon the “numbers” con-
strual, for Meiland’s suggestion (and several like it may be imagined) does
seem to provide a “genuinely discriminating norm.” It also, incidentally, takes
seriously Hirsch’s injunction that meaning be somebody’s meaning, only raising
the question of who that somebody should be, the artist or the audience. Juhl,
unlike Meiland (who is not an intentionalist), concludes from the possibility of
these other genuinely discriminating norms that “the question whether a theory
of interpretation provides a genuinely discriminating norm is neither the only
nor the most important consideration in assessing its adequacy” (1980, 23-24).
What we should attend to is instead the “much more basic consideration . . .
whether the proposed theory corresponds reasonably well to the way in which
we in fact construe literary works—whether, that is, it constitutes a reasonably
close approximation to our concept of what it is for a literary work to mean
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this rather than that” (24).
Juhl’s way of arriving at and defending a theory of criticism diers from
Hirsch’s way, the latter involving a fundamental theory of meaning from which
are drawn conclusions about what critics are really doing in talking about a
work. Juhl instead argues at the level of discourse directly. He looks at the
sorts of reasons people routinely give for their interpretations, in particular of
utterances in ordinary discourse, and concludes that deferring to the speaker’s
intention is the natural recourse. In other words, Juhl defends the artist’s place
as the somebody whose meaning matters by generalizing on the data of (in
particular, ordinary) discourse.
But this isn’t the only way in which Juhl argues. Before getting to (what I
will call) his discourse-related argument, I examine his articulation of what I am
calling the agency argument, a premise of which we have already encountered
in the proposition that a work’s meaning must be somebody’s meaning. What
does this proposition mean, and how could it figure in an argument for in-
tentionalism? As I have said, the central idea, though it will have appeared in
various forms across the history of philosophy, is typically traced, in the limited
context of the intentionalism debate, to Hirsch’s assertion that “meaning is an
aair of consciousness, not of words.”8 Words themselves, which make up
texts, do not bear meaning (“on their own,” as it is often said). Works, on the
other hand, as “utterances,” bear meaning, but only derivatively, in virtue of
consciousnesses that may be said to generate this meaning. Such is the kind of
thought that Iseminger has in mind when, in the passage of his I discuss above,
he calls his Hirschian premise an “ontological” principle.
Juhl appears to subscribe more or less wholesale to this kind of thought, if
at a metacritical remove. He says of examples of texts “produced by chance,”
e.g. by monkeys typing randomly or by computers, that they are held by most
of us to be meaningless (which for Juhl is the relevant test), even if, ignorant of
their provenance, we could easily be led to believe (falsely) that we are making
some sense of them. For “our concept of the meaning of a literary work appears
8. A philosopher often brought up in these discussions is John Searle, who had been promot-
ing intention-oriented views of speech acts shortly before Hirsch entered the intentionalism
debate. See Searle (1965).
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to involve the notion of an author’s intentional activity, of his actual use of the
words in question to express or convey something” (48). Knapp and Michaels
similarly use the example of a “curious sequence of squiggles in the sand” toward
the meaningfulness of which one’s attitude is said to change depending on one’s
beliefs about how the squiggles have come about (1985, 15). The argument
for intentionalism latent in such remarks may, in its simplest form, be put as
follows:
1. It is only as generated in a certain way, namely as the product of in-
tentional activity, that an artwork bears meanings such that it can be
interpreted.
2. Therefore, one should interpret an artwork in correspondence with the
intentions involved in the intentional activity that generated it.
Let us grant (1), for even if we have quibbles with how it is phrased, some
suitably refined version of it is likely to be accepted by most theorists, even by
anti-intentionalists.9 The controversial proposition is (2), and it will readily be
seen why the inference to it might not go through. Meiland puts the point
succinctly: “it is an additional step from this view that a work must have an
author in order to be meaningful to the view that a work must have the author’s
meaning in order to be meaningful” (1978, 38, emphasis added).
Juhl disagrees:
One might object that this argument shows only that what matters
is whether someone meant something by a word sequence he has
produced, not what the person meant by it. But it is hard to see
why it should matter that someone meant something by the words
if it does not matter what he meant. If an interpretation of a work
is not a statement about what someone meant, then why should it
matter whether anyone meant anything by it? (1980, 110)
9. Beardsley accepts it: “[The] stipulation that artworks must be ‘artifacts,’ the product of
intentional human activity, is to my mind sound” (1982b, 311). See also Stephen Davies (1991)
on what he calls the “artifactuality condition,” and Grice (1957) on “natural” vs. “non-natural”
meaning.
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Here is a possible reply which I take to be roughly accurate. The relevance
of intentional activity simpliciter is that it “types” its products as certain sorts
of object, i.e. artifacts, in this case artworks; and objects so typed are thereby
susceptible to interpretation. Now, it may matter, to some extent, what an artist
intended. One often finds views on which, for instance, the artist must have
intended to make an artwork (non-circularly defined), or to engage artistic
media in specific ways, or whatever else. But this might only be a subject
for the definition of art, which does not concern us here. What need not be
admitted, in any case, is that in order to interpret works, or to allow that works
bear meanings, we must hold artists’ intentions also to fix these interpretations
or to specify these meanings.10 A more general way to put the point is that
a meaning’s being somebody’s meaning, to the extent that this must be the
case, need not amount to that meaning’s being intended by that somebody; a
meaning may be said to be somebody’s in the sense that it accrues to a work
only if that work is the product of that person’s (artistically relevant) intentional
activity. This doesn’t foreclose the possibility that a work means what the artist
intended, but it doesn’t require it either.
So much for the agency argument. I conclude this section by considering
Juhl’s discourse-related argument, which will be especially relevant to subse-
quent chapters. Because he gives many examples, designed to have a cumulative
eect, and because I will periodically return to the issues they concern, I here
only introduce such examples and give some indication of how I will be treating
them.
I call the argument “discourse-related” because it proceeds from observations
of how interlocutors understand each other in ordinary discourse. From this
Juhl draws conclusions about “our common concept of the meaning of a literary
work.” Two things to note about this. First, Juhl presupposes, quite clearly,
a certain analogy between ordinary discourse and art, which I mostly ignore
here. (I properly take it up in chapter 5.) The second thing to note is that
while Juhl appears to follow Hirsch’s lead in adopting what I called in the
10. See Beardsley (1982b): “There is no logical disharmony in maintaining that intentions
are crucial in making something an artwork but irrelevant to determining what the artwork
means and how good it is” (306).
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previous chapter a “meaning-first” approach, this is not altogether clear. He
couches all of his intentionalist claims in metacritical terms and starts from the
data of discourse, but his metacritical conclusion, about there being a “logical
connection” between statements about intentions and statements about work-
meaning, depends upon his having first established a certain conception of “our
common concept of the meaning of a literary work.” He need not, however,
take this circuitous route, for he could more simply argue for his metacritical
conclusion strictly on the basis of his generalizations on the data of discourse,
leaving out the notion of meaning altogether.
Juhl describes the structure of his argument as follows: “I shall consider texts
(or utterances) which, under the rules of language, have at least two possible
interpretations. I will argue that the author’s intention logically determines
which of the linguistically possible interpretations of a text is correct” (47).11
The following is one of his examples, originally from George Dickie:
Suppose I suddenly realize that what I said to you yesterday was
ambiguous. I phone you and straighten things out. Still, what I said
yesterday, taken by itself, remains ambiguous; what is no longer
ambiguous after the phone conversation is what Imeant (or intended
to say) yesterday. With yesterday’s conversation plus today’s phone
conversation, I have now succeeded in saying what I meant to say.
When the sentences uttered yesterday and the sentences uttered
today are taken as constituting a single disclosure, they mean what
I meant all along. (qtd. 91)
Juhl calls the speaker’s first utterance u1 and his subsequent clarification u2.
What the speaker intended ism1 and the other possible meaningm2. Though
the situation is very abstractly described, we are meant to consider the eect of
u2. How should it be understood in relation to u1?
Dickie thinks that u1 remains ambiguous betweenm1 andm2 even after u2,
and that only u1 + u2 means m1. Juhl sees things dierently. He takes u1 to
have meantm1 all along (if that is what the speaker truly intended), and u2 to
11. This, incidentally, is also Iseminger’s strategy. See his Hirschian premise, quoted above.
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be merely a clarification of this fact, relieving us, as hearers, of the misappre-
hension that u1 is ambiguous or means something else. In defence of such an
assessment, Juhl contends that “information about the speaker, concerning his
beliefs, feelings, and so on, aects the way we would take the [first] sentence,”
for “after the explanation the (first) sentence would surely succeed in conveying
to a hearer (unless he wants to misunderstand) what . . . [the] speaker means”
(53). It is, moreover, precisely to “aect the way his [first] utterance is taken”
that the speaker “oer[s] an explanation.”12
This is unlikely to convince someone like Dickie (or Beardsley), but I think
Juhl is rightly seizing on a certain intuition which is often either ignored or
taken for granted. This is that in such cases hearers simply care more about
what the speaker intended to mean than about what, in some detached sense,
his words may be taken to mean. Juhl acknowledges with respect to such
cases that “[a]ny competent speaker of English knows that the [first] sentence
is ambiguous and what its linguistically possible readings are,” but counters
that “although the sentence a speaker uses may be ambiguous, it does not follow
that his utterance of that sentence is ambiguous” (54-55). He concludes that
“a speaker’s statement about his intention seems ordinarily to be sucient to
disambiguate his utterance (of an ambiguous sentence)” (55).
Much more needs to be said about such examples, but let the following
suce for now. While Juhl rightly distinguishes between the meanings of
sentences and the meanings of utterances, the latter being what sentences mean
on given occasions, it is by no means obvious, as Juhl seems to take it to be,
that sensitivity to occasion of use should lead us, as theorists, simply to defer to
the speaker’s intention (and nothing else). We must be more circumspect about
what we concede to the intentionalist here. Even if what an artist intended is
seen to matter to our sense of how he should be understood, this mattering
need not manifest itself in the simple terms of taking work-meaning to be
identical to intended meaning. The question of how else it may manifest itself
12. See Stecker (2010): “In conversation, we believe we can grasp the intentions of our
interlocutors normally without asking for clarification (or else asking for clarification would be
pointless)” (146, emphasis added). See also Carroll (1992): “In ordinary language, we are prone
to say that when a speaker disambiguates her earlier utterance, she has told us the meaning of
the utterance” (106).
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pertains to the negotiation of a shift from absolute intentionalism to moderate
intentionalism, to which I now turn.
2.2 The Misspeaking Objection
The shift to moderate intentionalism was precipitated by intentionalists begin-
ning to accept that an artist may “misspeak,” i.e. fail to mean what she intended.
I will call the encouragement to recognize such cases the misspeaking objection
to absolute intentionalism. Let me start by saying that while the misspeaking
objection could well suce to refute absolute intentionalism (for, quite plausi-
bly, there will be such cases), it would not, in my view, get at the real problem
with absolute intentionalism, which I take to be something more in line with
Beardsley and Wimsatt’s objection (as I have been developing it). The real
problem, in short, is not that the artist’s intention is too often taken to be what
the work means (or vice versa), but that the reasons given for this identification
(whenever it is made) presuppose a skewed picture of criticism, one which
directs the critic toward the artist rather than toward the work. Even if the
moderate intentionalist patches up her view by reducing the number of cases
in which intended meanings are identified with work-meanings, she might
nevertheless leave herself open to the more serious charge by presupposing the
same skewed picture of criticism. Yet, in the absence of this skewed picture, it
is not clear how the moderate intentionalist can maintain that intentions are
critically relevant. Or so I will argue in this section.
I begin by doing something slightly unusual, decoupling, for the purpose
of comparison, what I am calling the misspeaking objection from another
objection to which it is often too quickly assimilated, what I will call, following
Iseminger, the Humpty Dumpty objection. The latter invokes the famous Lewis
Carroll character who claimed to be able tomean just what he liked by any given
expression (in particular, to mean “a nice knockdown argument” by “glory”).
So it is that, on the Humpty Dumpty objection, absolute intentionalism is
said to implausibly assume that “a text can mean anything anyone wants it to
mean” (Iseminger 1992, 79). The misspeaking objection, meanwhile, is often
expressed slightly dierently, as the objection that absolute intentionalism fails
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to “preserv[e] the intuitive dierence between what ends up being said (or
conveyed) . . . and what some agent was trying (or aiming) to say” (Levinson
1992, 236); or that “it is easy enough to identify [work-]meanings that were
not the object of the author’s intentions and which conflict with the latter”
(Livingston 2005, 147). Most theorists take these two objections to be equivalent
(Iseminger 1996, 321), for both seem to allege that absolute intentionalism is
unable to handle cases in which intentions fail. I think, by contrast, that there are
complications here of which we should take account, and that taking account
of them will deliver us an instructive (if ultimately unsuccessful) rebuttal to the
misspeaking objection.
A standard account of the Humpty Dumpty scenario is due to Keith Donnel-
lan (1968). He observes that “Humpty Dumpty believes himself to be the master
of the meaning of his words in that if he intends a word to mean such and such
then it will mean that when he uses it” (211). But, Donnellan continues, those
who take this to constitute an “absurd theory of meaning” might themselves
be presupposing an absurd theory of intention, on which nothing “could be
easier than forming an intention” (211-212). They might think that there is
“no diculty in the possibility of Humpty Dumpty forming the intention to
mean by a word what it does not standardly mean, while at the same time
having no reason at all to suppose that his audience, Alice, will understand him”
(211). Donnellan believes, instead, that having an intention to mean something
involves “expectations regarding one’s audience” (among which is the expecta-
tion that one will be understood). Since it is unlikely that Humpty Dumpty
expected Alice to understand him, it is also unlikely that he truly intended to
mean “a nice knockdown argument” by uttering “glory.” If, on the other hand,
it were common knowledge that Humpty Dumpty so used the word “glory,”
or if he had prefaced his use of “glory” with “an explicit stipulation” to the eect
of his definition, then we would be encouraged to think of him as being in a
position to form the relevant intention. But none of these conditions obtain in
the scenario as described. Thus, one might espouse a Humpty Dumpty theory
of meaning consistently with accepting that, in the described scenario, Humpty
Dumpty’s use of “glory” did not mean “a nice knockdown argument.” One
need not, that is, attribute to Humpty Dumpty a failed intention.
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This account of the Humpty Dumpty scenario, which I propose to adopt in
what follows, may inform our thoughts about the “misspeaking” phenomenon
(rather than vice versa, as is often the case in the literature).13 An absolute
intentionalist could say that in the egregious cases, where it just does not seem
like what was intended could possibly be what the utterance means—like in
the Humpty Dumpty scenario—it is not that the intention fails but that the
speaker simply fails to have the intention. In other, more ambiguous cases,
where the intended meaning is conceivably the meaning of what was said (but
so is much else), the absolute intentionalist could stick to her guns and say that
the intended meaning is indeed the meaning of what was said. This would
constitute a certain reply to the misspeaking objection in that it denies that
any of the proered cases are ones in which the intended meaning is not the
meaning of what was said.
Let me expand on this point a little. The misspeaking objection focuses
on what I have just called (for convenience) the “egregious” cases, especially
when it is raised by moderate intentionalists, who are allied with absolute
intentionalists on what I have called the “ambiguous” cases. But the reply I have
described attempts to bridge the divide, to disabuse moderate intentionalists of
their perception that they need to moderate absolute intentionalism at all. This
goes as follows. Moderate intentionalists conclude from the egregious cases
that some account must be given of the “success conditions” on intentions, for
only some intentions, it now seems, make their presence felt in the work.14 The
absolute intentionalist interjects, saying that the success conditions with which
we should be concerned apply not to intentions but to the having of intentions.
In other words, we should push the question of success back a level, such that
what is in doubt is not whether the work means what was intended but only
whether anything was intended. The strategy therefore is to explain egregious
cases as those in which the speaker could not have formed the relevant intention
(rather than to concede that an intention failed). The absolute intentionalist
will, of course, have to tell us why the artist is so unable in such cases. One
13. To defend myself against possible charges of begging the question, let me note that
Beardsley himself has adopted Donnellan’s account. See Beardsley (1982a, 202-203).
14. See Stecker (2008, 39) and Livingston (2010, 412) for such lines of reasoning.
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possibility is simply to defer to the account Donnellan provides with respect
to the Humpty Dumpty scenario. Namely, the artist is unable to form the
relevant intention in egregious cases because he does not, in such cases, expect
his audience to understand him.
But is this true of all egregious cases? Could an artist have unreasonable such
expectations, under a misapprehension about what his utterance will mean?
If so, then he would satisfy the conditions on having an intention while still
finding himself in an egregious case. Imagine a speaker in Humpty Dumpty’s
situationwho is innocent rather thanmischievous. That is, she sincerely, though
incorrectly, believes (for whatever reason) that the meaning of “glory” is “a
nice knockdown argument,” and on this basis expects to be so understood by
Alice. Given that the speaker expects to be so understood, her ability to form
the relevant intention would, it seems, be secured (at least under Donnellan’s
account). But now the intuition that the speaker’s utterance of “glory” does
not mean “a nice knockdown argument” becomes threatening again for the
absolute intentionalist, for the speaker here does intend what the utterance does
not mean. If so, there are success conditions on intentions, not merely on the
forming of intentions; and the shift to moderate intentionalism again looms.
A number of possible replies are open here to the absolute intentionalist.
The most obvious involve coming up with other reasons why the speaker in
such cases is not in a position to form the relevant intention (granting that she
will satisfy the expectation requirement). Such other reasons will have to be
plausible, and cohere with our standing thoughts about the nature of intention.
But maybe something can be done along these lines.15 I focus, in any case, on
a dierent sort of reply, one to which I expect even the most sophisticated of
the latter sort of manoeuvres will have eventually to resort, that of repudiating
any metacritical implications for one’s theory of meaning. I will illustrate what
I mean using the views of William Irwin, an absolute intentionalist who seems
to be forced into making such a reply.
15. Livingston (2005) discusses a variety of possible such conditions, e.g. that one be able to
do the intended thing (beyond merely expecting to be able to do it), or that it be relevantly in
one’s “control” (11). I don’t know if a case can be made that it is not relevantly in the “control”
of speakers in egregious cases to do the relevant thing.
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Irwin quite clearly adopts the strategy that I have been describing. He holds
that “[i]ntention is limited by belief, and thus our ability to intend is more
constrained than moderate actual intentionalists typically recognize” (2015,
141). He also follows Donnellan’s account of the Humpty Dumpty situation:
The Humpty Dumpty example would need to be modified only a
little for Humpty Dumpty to succeed, such that the words do mean
what he wants them to mean. For example, through repeated use,
Humpty Dumpty could establish the slang or idiolect convention
of meaning a nice knock-down argument by ‘glory’.. . . [He then]
could have a reasonable expectation of being understood by [Alice]
the next time. (144)
Note that Irwin, in his modification of the example, ascribes to Humpty
Dumpty a “reasonable” expectation of being understood. This diers from the
modification I recently considered, in which the expectation is unreasonable.
An unreasonable expectation of being understood still secures the speaker’s
ability to intend, but reinforces the intuition that the intention will fail (for if it
is unreasonable for the speaker to expect that he will be understood, this may
well be because he is misspeaking). How does Irwin propose to deal with such
a case?
His central example is that of J. K. Rowling’s professed intention that one of
the characters in her popular Harry Potter series, the character of Dumbledore,
be gay. Irwin holds that if Rowling genuinely did intend that Dumbledore be
gay—if this wasn’t just “a thought that occurred to her but which she never
intended to communicate by the text”—then her work does indeed have this
meaning (i.e. Dumbledore is indeed gay). But one of the conditions on her
having this intention is that “she [have] believed it was in principle possible for
readers to grasp that meaning” (146). She could believe this either reasonably
or unreasonably. Irwin happens to think that such a belief on her part, should
she have had it, would have been reasonable. In defence of this claim, he refers
us to comments Rowling has made about a relationship between Dumbledore
and another male character which, as it is described in the work, could be taken
to have sexual undertones (so at least some fans have argued).
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It is important to see that Irwin does not take this “textual evidence” by
itself to establish that Dumbledore is gay, for it is not conclusive as to this fact.
It only opens up the possibility that Dumbledore is gay. Given that Dumbledore
could be read as gay, it is not unreasonable, argues Irwin, for Rowling to have
expected that he so be read (at least by some people). That is to say, Rowling
had a basis on which to reasonably form such an expectation. Thus Irwin’s take
on this example is that it is really (in my terms) an ambiguous case, rather than
an egregious one.
But Irwin considers a dierent example (this time fictitious) which he
concedes would be egregious: Rowling saying that “she had always intended
Hermione Granger to be a vampire” (143). In this case, “absolutely nothing in
the text suggests Hermione is a vampire,” and so it is not clear on what basis
Rowling’s expectation to be so understood could be deemed reasonable. Taking
Hermione to be a vampire, admits Irwin, “would be the equivalent of saying
that ‘glory’ means a nice knock-down argument.” Irwin nevertheless insists
that, even in this case, Hermione is a vampire if Rowling truly intended her to
be one. Rowling’s expectation to be so understood would be unreasonable, but,
to the extent that she had this expectation, she could have formed the relevant
intention; and, to the extent that she had the relevant intention, her work does
mean what she intended. Such is the absolute intentionalist’s position. Yet
holding such a position with respect to Hermione’s being a vampire is, Irwin
recognizes, deeply counterintuitive. Virtually no critic would accept such a
reading even if it were established that Rowling had intended it. It thus seems
that the absolute intentionalist must oer, on pain of refutation, some palliative
explanation.
Irwin provides one by way of Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and
significance. Recall that, for Hirsch, meaning is “that which is represented by a
text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence,” and
significance “names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a
conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable” (1967, 8). Irwin
proposes to “repurpose” this definition as follows: meaning is as Hirsch says, but
significance need not be “based in meaning”; it is rather “any understanding of
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the text other than what the author intended” (2015, 144).16 The utility of this
repurposing is supposed to be that, under it,
intentionalist readers have a plurality of possible understandings
open to them through significance, even though meaning is strictly
limited by authorial intention. Intentionalist readers are not stuck
with a single, unpalatable interpretation; they can choose to focus
on significance rather than meaning.
So even though the meaning of Rowling’s novels would include Hermione’s
being a vampire (if Rowling were to have intended this), its significance may
include rival “understandings.” Given this possibility, a critic may choose to
go with some significance that runs contrary to the meaning. Since “most of
us would conclude that the text is aesthetically flawed to the extent that we
understand it as including the fact that Hermione is a vampire,” “[f ]or aesthetic
reasons it would be preferable to continue to understand the text as if Hermione
were not a vampire. That would be the significance of the text that most readers
would prefer on aesthetic grounds” (146).
It is worthwhile to pause on this reply, for it is, in my view, a good illus-
tration of contemporary intentionalism’s misplaced priorities. It is odd to hear
an absolute intentionalist speak disparagingly of being “stuck with a single,
unpalatable interpretation,” when such a circumstance (minus the pejorative
characterization) is precisely what one would have thought absolute inten-
tionalism is seeking. Of course, Irwin does not deny that the unpalatable
interpretation is true, for the work really does mean the unpalatable thing (again,
assuming Rowling intended it). Rather, Irwin seems to be advocating a critical
neglect of this true interpretation given its aesthetic consequences: the work
turns out to be “aesthetically flawed” if this interpretation is taken too seriously.
This is how the unpalatability is explained. But what sort of discussion are we
now having, and how did we get here?
After a number of attempts to push back the alleged failure of intentions to
the failure of having intentions, the absolute intentionalist has had to confront
16. I imagine Irwin means to say, more carefully, not that significance does dier from
meaning, but that it may so dier.
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a case in which it appears to be intentions themselves that have failed. This
appearance may be due to our underlying intuition that an intention to mean
a given thing is simply not infallible (unlike maybe other kinds of intention,
such as an intention to have an intention). In any case, when confronted with
such a case, in which the relevant failure cannot be explained as a failure to
have an intention, the absolute intentionalist chooses finally to abandon his
theory of criticism for the sake of his theory of meaning. Namely, he allows
that critics should in such cases reject the artist’s intended meaning in favour of
other, rival meanings—should even prefer the latter as ways to “understand”
the work—despite the fact that the artist’s intended meaning is the only real
meaning of the work. But for what reason is the absolute intentionalist so
holding on to his theory of meaning? The original aim, recall, was to leverage
an intentionalist theory of meaning to an intentionalist theory of criticism; but
here the latter is being forsaken to preserve the former. The plot seems to have
been lost.
The moderate intentionalist will grant in egregious cases that the work
does not really mean the unpalatable intended thing, and in granting this will
take herself to suer no consequences to her theory of criticism. She will
continue to maintain, as the absolute intentionalist no longer can, that the
concept of meaning has normative implications for criticism. Namely, any and
all meanings of the work, whether intended or not, will fulfill the requisite
critical roles of being justifiably reported in criticism, being preferred over rival
meanings, being touted as ways to understand the work, and so on. The absolute
intentionalist cannot say the same, for there will be a range of work-meanings
which for her serve no such critical role.
However, in connection with these gains, the moderate intentionalist also
loses something. She loses reasons to suppose that intentions as such may be
reported in and as criticism. As I earlier explained, the absolute intentional-
ist has a background theory of meaning (on which meaning is “an aair of
consciousness”) that delivers the critical relevance of intentions as such. That
this theory also seems to imply that artists may never misspeak (in the sense
of intending what their works do not mean) is, of course, a mark against it.
But in rejecting this theory of meaning on such grounds (of the misspeaking
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objection), the moderate intentionalist creates a new question for herself: how
exactly are intentions, then, critically relevant?
Moderate intentionalists who do not suciently attend to this question run
the risk of assuming the absolute intentionalist’s answer. This may occur in one
of two ways: either by the moderate intentionalist’s inconsistently maintaining
that work-meaning is distinct from intended meaning while treating the former
as having no independent existence, or by her treating only the subclass of
successful intentions in this special way (as the true site of meaning). The latter
does not yield a contradiction, but I will now develop a certain objection
to absolute intentionalism, distinct from the misspeaking objection, that will
equally apply to this second type of moderate intentionalist, who espouses, in
eect, a sort of delimited absolute intentionalist theory of meaning.
Consider what it means to take seriously Hirsch’s assertion that “meaning
is an aair of consciousness, not of words.” Irwin, who does take it seriously,
rightly draws from it the conclusion that it is “irrelevant . . . how a particular
meaning is presented in textual form” (1999, 58). Works are simply “clues” to
the artist’s intention, “convenient and conventional indicators of the meaning
that is in the mind.” Notice the order of priority here: works are treated as
evidence of intentions, rather than vice versa. This sort of consequence has been
met with much confusion in the literature, rather than, as I would recommend,
frank opposition. For example, when Dickie and Wilson (1995) run up against
Hirsch’s clear assertion of such a reversed priority, they are puzzled and assume
that he must mean something else: “Hirsch must, of course, deny this, because
on his theory the movement is from intended meaning to utterance meaning”
(237). But this is incorrect. The “movement” is very much from utterance-
meaning to intended meaning, for the latter is supposed to be the only genuine
meaning.
If the “meaning in the mind” is the real target—everything else presenting
only means of discovery—then it begins to seem that Beardsley and Wimsatt
were not too far o in characterizing the ensuing picture of criticism as one of
“consulting the oracle.” Against this picture, Beardsley believes that “works are
self-sucient entities, whose properties are decisive in checking interpretations
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and judgments” (1970, 16).17 This doesn’t, of course, mean that intentions
will not help us understand a work (they might even be indispensable); but it
is to deny that they are the target of interpretation. As Wilson, in a separate
article, puts it, “[a]n anti-intentionalist need not deny that biographical facts
about the artist are relevant to interpreting the work of art, only that the sole
or primary relevance such facts can have to interpretation is their bearing on
the artist’s intentions” (1997, 309). To believe, by contrast, that intentions are
the target is to believe that attention to the work is merely contingent, kept
up unless and until better evidence comes along (like, say, an exhaustive list of
sincerely reported intentions left behind by the artist). The work is very nearly
an impediment or obstacle, something to be gotten around.
This consequence is mishandled not just in the manner of Dickie and
Wilson, who ignore it, but by Irwin himself, who foregrounds it but adds the
qualification that the text is “the most important clue we have as to the meaning
of the author” (1999, 61). Sherri Irvin, in a review of the literature, seems to
take this to be good enough, noting that “as is now widely acknowledged, the
best and most detailed evidence for an author’s intentions with respect to work
meaning is almost certain to be found in the work itself, and thus ascertaining
the author’s intentions will involve a very close inspection of the work” (2006,
116). But this is to miss the point that such inspection, no matter how close,
will always be contingent, and will treat the work as merely a clue to something
else.
The problem, of course, is that critics do not normally treat works in
this way, as mere clues. Indeed, this is the reason why, as we saw, Irwin
eventually has to abandon any hope of predicating an intentionalist theory
of criticism on his theory of meaning, for it does matter to critics “how a
particular meaning is presented in textual form.” That Rowling’s text gives
no indication of Hermione’s being a vampire does influence a critic’s sense
of whether Hermione should be so understood. Irwin may go on taking the
17. See Stephen Davies (1991): “An aesthetic interest in an artwork is an interest in it as
the individual that it is, and not an interest in it merely as the means to some independently
specifiable end” (185). Also, Lang (1974): “comprehension of the work—and thus confirmation
that the data collected elsewhere are at all relevant—must come finally from the object itself”
(306).
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latter meaning to indeed belong to the work given Rowling’s intention, but if
this ends up having no relation to whether it is appropriate for critics to talk
about this meaning or to invoke Rowling’s intention, then perhaps we should
question the relevance of such a view to the intentionalism debate.
Such, at least, is my own objection to absolute intentionalism. And a similar
objection would apply to moderate intentionalists who attempt to defend the
critical relevance of intentions by making their discovery an aim of interpre-
tation, for such a way of speaking seems to presuppose that intentions are (in
eect) the true bearers of meaning. What we need instead, given that the work is
to be treated as the bearer of meaning and hence as the target of interpretation,
is an account of how intentions may relate to the work (such that they may
justifiably be mentioned in and as criticism).
2.3 Indirect Evidence
At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined two possible ways to defend an
evidential version of intentionalism: either in terms of complete evidential overlap
or in terms of partial evidential overlap. The former, which assumes an identity
between intended meaning and work-meaning, is represented by absolute
intentionalism. The latter, which relies on there being some other relation
between the two concepts, is what I will presently discuss.
As I noted earlier, Beardsley concedes that sometimes “what we learn about
the artist’s intention is indirect evidence of what the object became” (1958, 20).
This may seem tantamount to the thesis of moderate intentionalism—thus,
a concession—but I think the qualifier, “indirect,” is significant. Although
Beardsley is here somewhat reticent, it seems to me that he is not very sanguine
about the explanatory potential of an account that treats evidence of intentions
as indirect evidence of a work’s meaning. I will try to describe what diculties
might be entailed in giving such an account, and then underscore why some
such account must nevertheless be given if intentionalism of the evidential
variety is to be vindicated.
According to Beardsley, direct evidence is “evidence from the direct inspec-
tion of the object,” while indirect evidence is “evidence from the psychological
68 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
and social background of the object, from which we may infer something about
the object itself” (1958, 20). He gives the example of a man and his son, who
are, of course, distinct, but so related that evidence about either of them may be
indirect evidence about the other. For instance, “any evidence about the height
of either of them will be indirect evidence about the height of the other, in virtue
of certain laws of genetics, according to which the tallness of the father aects
the probability that the son will be tall” (19-20). Indirect evidence forces us to
make inferences about the target object: the height of the son is inferred from
the known height of the father on the basis of genetic laws. Direct evidence,
by contrast, may be delivered by something like ascertaining the son’s height
using a tape measure.
It is worth asking if the latter sort of procedure, too, entails an inference.
Beardsley seems to think not, but it is not clear why. Suppose we measure
the son’s height in the manner described: we hold the tape against him, mark
o the numeral printed on the segment closest to the top of his head, then
note down the value. This piece of evidence—the written-down value, so
ascertained—certainly seems as “direct” as anything could be. We don’t seem
to need to make any inference to conclude that it is a record of the son’s height.
But this may only be because the inference is very natural; we are in the habit
of employing such a method to figure out a person’s height. By contrast, the
inference made on the basis of genetic laws, though also in its way natural, may
need to be more overt, such that we are forced to represent it to ourselves as
we are making it.
The notion that there is an overt inferential step in the case of indirect
evidence is, I believe, the source of Beardsley’s dissatisfaction with such evidence.
It is what makes, for him, mention of such evidence, at least in the first instance,
not really about the work, hence prima facie irrelevant to criticism. Its status
as “indirect,” however, reflects the circumstance of such evidence having been
made relevant, just as evidence of the father’s height has been made relevant
to an investigation of the son’s height by the investigator’s reliance on genetic
laws. But evidence of the father’s height (direct evidence relative to the father)
is not, in the first instance, about the son. Similarly, direct evidence about an
intention, drawn from “biographical inquiry, through letters, diaries, [and]
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workbooks,” is not, in the first instance, about the work. It may serve as indirect
evidence of the work, but only when it is made relevant through the critic’s
exploitation of certain “laws” which relate intentions to work. The critic must
in such cases make overt inferences from intentional facts to interpretive claims.
The grounding of such inferences in sound principles is what will guarantee
the relevance to criticism of the sentences in which evidence of intentions is
thus reported. This will be the critic’s justification for mentioning intentions as
such.
I therefore take the relevant point to be, not that an inference is made
in the one case (indirect) but not in the other (direct), but that some further
account needs to be given of how the former operates. If a critic wishes to use
biographical facts as evidence for the work, then she must make them relevant
to the work, given that, in their most natural aspect, they are not already so
relevant (unlike, say, facts about the work’s features, or so-called “internal”
evidence).
Beardsley is skeptical about both the scope and the desirability of infer-
ences from biographical facts to interpretations. In his height example, indirect
evidence is made relevant through an exploitation of genetic laws. But can some-
thing similar can be done with respect to criticism? Are there any “laws” which
provide bridge principles relating intentions to works, and which, moreover,
critics themselves can be seen to be exploiting?
The second issue, at least, may be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.
Beardsley takes criticism to be “a principled activity,” but also feels that “in a
great deal of criticism they [the principles] are working under the surface to give
coherence to the discourse, to give cogency to the argument” (1970, 11, second
emphasis added). So a critic could be seen to be exploiting the relevant laws or
principles, should there be any such, even if she is not explicit that she is doing
so, and maybe even if she is not conscious of doing so (such that, if one were to
ask her, she would not report that she is doing so).18 But the question remains
whether there are any such critical principles or laws.
18. Arguably, by being cultured into a given practice of criticism, a critic will come to see
certain types of critical reasoning as fruitful and others as unfruitful, despite never having
devoted much time to assessing the theoretical underpinnings of such dierences.
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It will be useful at this point to distinguish principles from laws, in the
sense in which Beardsley seems to be thinking of them. Consider, again, the
height example. The relevant laws here are genetic laws, not “height” laws. But
we might think that there are certain “height principles”—namely, principles
of reasoning concerning height—that derive their utility in part from their
accordance with the relevant genetic laws. Someone in casual conversation who
is curious about the height of a certain man but in possession of information
only about the height of his father may make certain sound inferences on the
basis of commonly accepted “height” principles. She might say: “his father is
tall, so he is probably tall.” In saying this, she might not explicitly mention any
“height principles,” though she will probably be able to articulate them to some
extent if pressed, and probably will not invoke any genetic laws, which she
may not be able to articulate at all. But, like many people, she will be used to
making such inferences in everyday life, usually to good eect (which explains
why the principles continue to be relied upon). One might therefore state the
dierence between principles and laws as follows. Principles concern discourse
while laws concern facts in the world to which a discourse must accommodate
itself through principles (so that the discourse may better serve its own function,
among other things).
Consider, now, the case of criticism. The alleged principles are critical princi-
ples, in particular those which facilitate inferences from the facts of intention to
the facts of work-meaning. But must these principles furthermore be responsive
to any reality beyond themselves? Are there any relevant laws from which they
derive their plausibility? While we need not continue to use the vocabulary
of “laws,” the standard answer here, which even Beardsley grants, involves the
“causal connection” between intentions and work. Though Beardsley grants
such a connection, he also, remember, thinks it a “fallacy” to take this to yield a
standard of interpretation. I will oer a reconciliation of these two claims in a
moment, but first let me underscore the importance routinely accorded in the
debate to an intention’s causal profile.
Intentionalists, indeed, have felt this to be important. Hirsch elevates inten-
tions because he believes they constitute a “discriminating force which causes
the meaning [of a work] to be this instead of that or that” (1967, 16). Wollheim
Intentions and Interpretation 71
is interested in only those intentions which “cause the painter to paint as he
does” (1987, 19). Joseph Margolis opposes standard varieties of intentionalism
because he thinks that “explanation in interpretive contexts is normally not
construed in causal terms” (1992, 44). Alan Goldman similarly takes himself to
be rejecting intentionalism in rejecting a view on which “interpreters aim at
causal explanation” (1995, 99). Paisley Livingston (2005) draws on a rich philo-
sophical literature to propose the following account of an intention’s success
(or “realization”):
(a) One must “perform, or . . . try to perform, some action guided by the
plan embedded in that intention.”
(b) One must “thereby . . . bring about a state of aairs in which the situation
specified in the plan is matched by relevant features of the actual world.”
(c) “[T]his situation must be achieved in the right sort of way; in other words,
the realization of intention cannot involve ‘deviant’ causal chains, where
acting on an intention leads to behaviour that contributes to an outcome
which happens to match the intended results, but does so via a bizarre
and totally unexpected chain of events.” (11)
All three conditions speak to an intention’s causal profile. In (a), the intention
is said to “guide” the action the agent performs. In (b), the action so guided is
said to “bring about” the plan of the intention. In (c), this “bringing about” is
said to involve no “deviant causal chains” (i.e. no accidents).
The situation of an artist’s intention fulfilling all of Livingston’s conditions
would look something like the following. The artist forms an intention to mean
such-and-such in a work that he is in the process of creating. He performs some
action guided by this intention, attempting to get the developing work to mean
such-and-such. He brings about a state of aairs in which the work does mean
such-and-such, as he had planned. His so bringing about the work’s meaning
occurred not by accident but through the “right” (vague) causal pathways
leading from intention to work.
Suppose we accept something like this account of an intention’s causal profile
as the relevant “facts in the world” (or “laws”) that should inform the desired
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critical principles (relating intentions to work).19 What sort of critical principles
could be constructed on this basis—ones which, moreover, underpin actual
critical practice? Let us return to Beardsley’s skepticism about such principles.
He would probably grant everything Livingston says about the causal profile
of intentions, but still find it inadequate as a foundation on which to construct
critical principles that are useful and that critics can actually be seen to be using.
This would be his manner of denying that the “causal connection” between
intentions and work renders intentions suitable as standards of interpretation.
But what could be his reason for such skepticism?
The answer most likely has to do with our natural preference for direct
evidence. We see this clearly in the height example, in which the two types
of evidence do not provide equally good information. For who would not
prefer the precise numerical value delivered by simple measurement to making
vague and shaky inferences on the basis of popular understandings of biological
research that itself, even in a laboratory setting, could not deliver anything
remotely so precise (certainly not at the time of Beardsley’s writing, but proba-
bly not even today)? The analogy may be unfair—indeed, intentionalists will
surely call it out as such—but it is useful for understanding Beardsley’s thinking.
Consider a situation he describes in which direct evidence and indirect evidence
“go hand in hand—for example, the painter writes in an exhibition catalogue
that his painting is balanced in a precise and complicated way, and we go to
the painting and see that it is so balanced” (1958, 20). Beardsley says that “here
there is no problem,” but, in fact, the disparity already makes itself felt: learning
that the artist intended the work to be such-and-such is usually not something
to which we give as much weight as our directly having experienced the work
as being such-and-such. This is why a situation in which direct evidence and
indirect evidence “conflict, as when a painter tells us one thing and our eyes
tell us another,” “there is a problem,” one which Beardsley encourages us to
resolve by trusting our eyes (or at least discourages us to resolve by distrusting
19. Interestingly, Livingston has a separate “meshing” account of successful intentions that
concerns only artistic intentions (2009). As far as I can tell, it bears no relation to his causal
account. I take this to be indicative of how intentionalists have not adequately described the
relevance to interpretation of such causal facts. Livingston, at least, seems to realize that such
facts do not themselves present standards of interpretation.
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our eyes).20
A number of questions suggest themselves here. First, even if indirect
evidence is less helpful than direct evidence, can it not still be mentioned? Is
it not still relevant, especially in cases where direct evidence is not available?
This is a complicated thing to decide. Usually critics are in a position to amass
the relevant direct evidence, i.e. “see for themselves,” for a critic who has not
“directly inspected” a work will probably not be writing about it. There might,
of course, be unusual situations in which direct evidence is simply unobtainable,
such that the critic must go by a series of dierent types of indirect evidence
(as in the case of lost silent films). However, in such cases the critic himself
will admit that he is making the best of a bad situation, one which should not
inform our thoughts about the normal state of aairs.
Second, it might always be wondered, against the intentionalist, whether a
given piece of evidence about intentions really is indirect evidence of the work.
For instance, what makes it the case that a critic who reports that a painter
claims to have intended that his painting be balanced in a certain way is indeed
saying something about the work? It could, of course, turn out that the painting
is not balanced in that way, but this is not the issue; the critic may still have
said something relevant, if sound critical principles are “working under the
surface.” So the question remains, even if we think that evidence of intentions
may sometimes be indirect evidence of the work, how this could be so, both in
some given case and generally.
Third, we might wonder if it is fair to hold up legitimate such cases of
indirect evidence as representative of much actual intention-talk that makes
use of inexpugnably intentionalistic language. It might be the case that, even
in the best of circumstances, critics are justified in inferring from the artist’s
intention only that the work means something very generally in the vicinity of
20. As Beardsley could perhaps acknowledge, sometimes we do best to suspend trust in
our senses until they are adequately trained, even if ultimately we must not circumvent our
senses. Yet even moderate intentionalists, in dealing with such cases, are tempted to fall
back to something like the absolute intentionalist’s strategy of denying that the artist truly
intended the thing we cannot discern. See, for example, Carroll (1992): “with cases where
the authorial pronouncement is so arbitrary, we may discount it, not because we think that
authorial intentions are irrelevant [or have failed], but because we think that the report is
insincere” (i.e. the artist did not really have the intention) (99).
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the intended meaning. But this inference might be so general as to almost
never be worth the critic’s time. Just as knowing that a man’s father was tall
may be practically useless if one is interested to know exactly how tall the son
is, so might knowing that the work means something vaguely like what the
artist intended be practically useless if one wishes to know something more
specific, as critics usually do. This depends on the use a critic wants to make of
the information, in what context and for what purpose she wants to talk about
the given meaning.
All this is to say that there is a need for an account of critical principles that
vindicates a wide range of intention-talk, at least if one believes that a wide
range of it is acceptable criticism. Contemporary intentionalism, in my view,
does not directly address this question. What one finds in the literature from
intentionalists are theories of meaning that seek to amend absolute intention-
alism in the light of the misspeaking objection. To the extent that they treat
the notion of work-meaning as critically normative (unlike Irwin above), they
will, of course, incur metacritical commitments. But these need to be teased
out and situated in the framework I have proposed.
Consider what might fairly be called the default view among moderate
intentionalists, which arose directly out of initial assessments of the misspeaking
objection. It may be summarized as follows: when the artist’s intended meaning
is consistent with the relevant conventions, then the work means what was
intended; otherwise, the work means something else or nothing at all. So,
for instance, Iseminger claims that the meaning of a work “is the meaning
compatible with the text that the author intended”—where compatibility with
the text is cashed out as compatibility with the conventional meaning of the text
(1996, 321). More clearly, Noël Carroll claims that “[t]he intentions of authors
that the modest actual intentionalist takes seriously are only those intentions of
the author that the linguistic literary unit can support (given the conventions
of language and literature)” (2001, 198).
It is not dicult to see how one might arrive at such a view from an
accommodation of the misspeaking objection. Intuitions that some speaker’s
utterance didn’t really mean what she intended typically depend upon our
notion of the conventional meanings of the words used. Or at least it is sucient
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to think so with respect to many of the egregious cases that first come to mind.
Humpty Dumpty, supposing him to have genuinely intended to mean “a nice
knockdown argument” by “glory,” did not succeed in his intention because,
the thought goes, the relevant conventions did not include “a nice knockdown
argument” as a possible meaning for “glory.” This is perhaps why alternate
scenarios in which such a convention is established beforehand are often felt to
deliver a dierent intuition, of Humpty Dumpty succeeding to mean what he
intended.
Robert Stecker has called this “convention-constrained” intentionalism,
for it holds that intentions succeed to the extent that they are constrained by
conventions (2010, 149). Stecker objects to it on the grounds that convention-
constraint is neither necessary nor sucient for success. He believes that an
artist might succeed in her intention despite the intended meaning being
unconventional, and that she might fail in her intention despite the intended
meaning being conventional. How one feels about these possibilities depends
upon how one feels about certain examples. Stecker adduces examples which
he takes to demonstrate each of the two possibilities. But what would this show,
even if he is correct? Consider that a convention-constrained intentionalist
could attempt the same manoeuvre that I above show Irwin to be attempting,
that of divorcing his theory of meaning from his theory of criticism. He could
say that, in cases of the first sort, it is not that the unconventional thing is
what the work means, just that it is how the work should be understood (as its
significance, or whatever other concept one wishes to introduce). He could
similarly say, in Stecker’s second sort of case, that the conventional thing is
what the work means, just not how the work should be understood.
So the real question is, again, not about meaning, or any other such property
of the work (significance, or whatever else). It is instead about certain normative
implications bearing on the practice of criticism. Now, Stecker could easily
conduct his argument at this normative level—indeed, he already does to the
extent that he is reaching conclusions about howwe “should understand” certain
utterances. But more pressing than the question he considers, viz. whether
the biconditional entailed by convention-constrained intentionalism is true,
is the question whether such a view is even relevant. Namely, does it answer
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anti-intentionalism? It seems to me that it does not. Suppose it is true that
a work means what its artist intended when this intention is consistent with
conventions. So what? Does anything prevent Beardsley and Wimsatt from
simply granting this?
One might think that when the intended meaning is indeed what the work
means, the critic is justified in reporting this fact about the intention. But
why? What makes it, for a critic, a fact not only about the intention but also
about the work? The mere coincidence of meaning? This will strike many
as counterintuitive, for we do not think that mere coincidence of meaning
between a given thing and the work makes it critically relevant. Is it the
convention-constraint? This seems equally implausible, for it is not clear why
something’s being consistent with conventions should make it critically relevant
to something else (the work) that (let us suppose) is also so consistent.
The convention-constrained intentionalist might say that it is a normative
principle in criticism that we should always understand a work to mean what an
artist intends when this intention is consistent with conventions, such that critics
who engage in intention-talk are tacitly relying on this principle (which “works
under the surface”). Their intention-talk is thus justified. But is any of this true?
What reason have we for thinking that such a principle is, indeed, operative?
For instance, is it really plausible to suppose that critics who push conventional,
intended meanings are always relying on this distinct critical principle, and
that those who push unconventional yet no less intended meanings are relying
on some other principle (or no principle at all)? How, in other words, may
this principle be seen to operate? As John Martin Ellis observes, our theory
must “confront the task of formulating in conceptual terms what causes [critics]
to make one kind of move in one situation, but a dierent one in another
kind of situation; it must attempt to formulate and distinguish the aspects of
the two kinds of situations that are relevant to their dierent treatment, and
to sort out the factors involved” (1974, 5). It strikes me as unlikely that the
convention-constrained intentionalist will have plausible things to say here.
That an intention is (un)conventional may aect how a critic talks about it,
maybe even whether she talks about it, but is unlikely to determine why she is
even considering talking about it (i.e. what “move” she is making).
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Something similar may be said of many of the other prominent accounts of
moderate intentionalism. All of them oer “success conditions” on intentions,
but in doing so largely presuppose that intentions are critically relevant to begin
with. Stecker’s own view is that “an intention is realized in a work only if it is
possible for an audience to grasp the intention . . . [in a way] that is grounded
in linguistic, literary, and other relevant conventions or contextually supported
extensions or departures from those conventions” (2008, 39). This is a more
sophisticated variant of convention-constrained intentionalism, aims to more
accurately describe when intended meaning corresponds to work-meaning,
but still does not establish that critics are right to concern themselves with
intentions in the first place.
Accounts of success conditions attempt, in eect, to approximate the cir-
cumstances in which critics arrive at a meaning that the artist also intended. But
even if one of these accounts gets this correspondence perfectly right, a back-
ground theory is still needed to explain why critics should concern themselves
with the correspondence. I find that intentionalists, in trying to come up with
increasingly accurate accounts of success conditions, end up making intentions
increasingly irrelevant. It becomes less and less clear why it is important that a
meaning with certain characteristics, short of being intended, is also intended.21
Perhaps in recognition of this, Stecker splits his arguments between what
he calls the “proper aims” issue, which “concerns what interpretations of art-
works are trying to accomplish,” and what he calls the “work meaning” issue,
which concerns whether or not there is “something that we can identify as the
meaning of the work” (2010, 146). Stecker’s answer to the latter is essentially
his theory of success conditions. Works indeed have meanings, and these mean-
ings correspond to the contents of successful intentions. Meanwhile, on the
subject of the “proper aims” issue, Stecker professes to be a pluralist. He thinks
interpreters legitimately have multiple aims, one of which is “discovering the
intentions of artists.” But why? What makes this even one of the legitimate
aims of interpretation? Stecker answers this in his treatment of the following
21. Livingston (2010) so characterizes Stecker’s account, taking it to provide “an intention-
independent standard of success, that is, one that does not itself rely on an intention-determined
textual meaning” (414).
78 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
objection, which is very similar to the aspect of Beardsley and Wimsatt that I
have been developing:
One other objection to actual intentions as an aim of art interpreta-
tion does not deny that we try to comprehend this sort of thing but
denies that it has anything to do with the interpretation of artworks.
Rather, it claims it is concerned with the biography of the artist.
The argument behind this objection is simple. Intentions belong to
people, not things. Artists are people; works are things. Therefore,
discovering intentions is finding something out about artists, not
artworks. (148)
Beardsley and Wimsatt similarly believe that the personal is one thing, the
poetic another, and that to write the one as if it were the other is to commit an
error.
Stecker’s reply is that “although people have intentions and things don’t,
people’s intentions transmit properties to the things those people do and make that
are ontologically dependent on those intentions” (148, emphasis added). Here he
seems to flirt with absolute intentionalism in the manner that I describe at the
end of the previous section. Or so one might reasonably conclude, taking the
mentioned “ontological dependen[ce]” to arise out of meaning’s being “an aair
of consciousness, not of words.” Indeed, Stecker encourages this reading by
saying that the critic aims at “discovering the intentions of artists,” rather than
aiming at discovering the meaning of works (using intentions as, say, evidence).
It is, again, a matter of directionality. At what is the critic directed, the work
or the artist?
To be fair, Stecker does retreat to a more complicated position by saying
that the foregoing is true only of certain intentions, namely those which “bear
. . . on the type of thing done or produced” (148). He distinguishes these from
intentions which bear on what a work “means or communicates,” and therefore
makes something like the accommodation I suggest above in my response to
the agency argument. But he does not, then, say how the latter sort of intention
achieves its relevance to criticism, if not through the mentioned “ontological
dependen[ce].” For he continues to hold of both types of intention that “when
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we discover artistic intentions, though we do find out something about the
artist, we also find out something about the work.” But why? What makes
information about intended meanings relevant to a critic? A theory of success
conditions tells us only about a correspondence, not why this correspondence
is worth talking about.22
It is easy, I think, for pluralists about aims to elide the latter distinction,
because any attempt to explain why criticism should, rather than simply may,
pursue a given aim is dismissed as “dogmatic.” Ellis calls this “wise eclecticism,”
the view that “we should stop trying to rule that one kind of evidence for a
literary interpretation is in principle better than another (e.g. biographical as
distinct from structural) and accept that ad hoc decisions will need to be taken
in each case” (1974, 4). Such an attitude “suspends the most unpleasant forms of
these arguments and lets dierent people get on with doing what they want to
do” (106). It is what seems to lead, for instance, Berys Gaut to his “patchwork
theory,” on which “talk of the meaning of the work” is identified as “talk of a
very diverse set of properties,” some of which, such as irony and allusion, are
best served by the critic’s attention to the artist’s intentions (1993, 602). But
what sort of attention is the latter, even in these limited contexts? Here the
theorist typically falls back into the absolute intentionalist’s picture. Göran
Hermerén, in giving his moderate intentionalist account of allusion, is explicit
that “it is primarily persons that allude . . . not texts. Texts can, however, be
said to allude to other texts in a secondary or parasitic sense, or as a shorthand
for a complex relation” (1992, 216). Such a view, though it may be limited to
one type of work-meaning, is still objectionable if one feels that even here the
critic should be directed not toward the artist but toward the work.23
22. It might be replied that intentions are worth talking about due to their causal connection
to a work, as described in Livingston’s account above. But even if we grant this, as I do, we
still need to be told how this causal connection underlies critical principles, for the connection
itself does not present a standard of interpretation.
23. Alternatively, perhaps certain senses of allusion and irony are simply not as relevant to
criticism as is often supposed. That is, they may be straightforwardly biographical rather
than aesthetic, in which case it will be no surprise that “to answer a biographical question,
biographical evidence is certainly necessary” (Ellis 1974, 131-132). StephenDavies (1982) argues
for something similar with respect to the notion of representation, that what is aesthetically
relevant is not representation per se (an intentional notion) but what he calls “representational
character.”
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The lack of a convincing account relating intentions to work has led many
commentators to digress as a means of escape. Recall, for instance, the objections
that were considered from Fiedler (1952) and Wollheim (1980b) in the first
chapter, i.e. that the conception of criticism presupposed by anti-intentionalists
is too “atomized.” While Fielder recognizes that placing “side by side undigested
biographical data and uninspired paraphrases” is not sucient to relate the two
(even should they indicate the same meanings), his solution (as I see it) is to
give up the quest for such a relation. The line both he and Wollheim adopt is
roughly the following: it is true that critics are talking only about the artist and not
about the work, but there is nothing wrong with this; a properly holistic conception of
criticism would recognize such discourse as critically relevant. My own inclination,
as I have already indicated, is to deny that Beardsley and Wimsatt are assuming
anything overly “atomistic.” It seems to me not only true but also desirable that
a form of critical discourse exists which focuses on the single work; indeed, this
is just what is commonly meant by “interpretation” (when it is about how the
work should be understood). And very likely many of our other discourses
about art (concerning, say, the oeuvre of an artist, or traditions and genres)
depend upon such an “atomistic” level of criticism, which we may think of as
foundational.
The so-called “neo-Wittgensteinians” in the debate seem to me similarly
to digress. Colin Lyas, for instance, denies that intention and work-meaning
are two terms that need to be reconciled through something like Beardsley’s
notion of indirect evidence (1992, 137). But he also denies that work-meaning
is therefore to be regarded as a mental entity, derivative of consciousness. Lyas
agrees with Beardsley that “if the words do not have a certain [determinate]
meaning, then the authorial will cannot give them one,” while also believing,
contra Beardsley, that “to say that the words of a text have a determinate mean-
ing is to say that a speaker makes his intentions clear in them” (149). It might
reasonably be wondered why Beardsley cannot simply accept this consequence,
agreeing to disagree about the relevant sense of “intention.” Given such an
understanding, the only dierence between him and the neo-Wittgensteinians
would be terminological, e.g. what Beardsley calls “merely verbal” intentional-
istic language the neo-Wittgensteinians will insist on calling “inexpugnably”
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intentionalistic, even though there will be no referential dierence between
their respective characterizations of such language. This in eect is to cede the
issue to the anti-intentionalist.24
Many other such examples can be given. All of them stem from a theorist’s
having paid too much attention to his theory of meaning and too little to its
normative or metacritical implications. If I am right, then it is such implications
that should be made the focus and that should guide any attempt to articulate
the relevance of intentions. To know how to go about doing this, however, one
must first have a relatively clear idea about the aims of interpretation (Stecker’s
“proper aims” issue), which is what I attempt next to provide.
24. Dickie (2006) reaches the same conclusion: “When the old conception of intention
is replaced with the new neo-Wittgensteinian idea, the problem that Beardsley and other
anti-intentionalists were concerned with evaporates. In eect, [the neo-Wittgensteinian
intentionalist] is saying that Beardsley was right about his intentionalist opponents, but that
both he and his opponents had presupposed a mistaken theory of the nature of intentions” (75).
See Wilson (1997, 310) and Staten (2010, 433, n. 18) for related objections.
CHAPTER 3
The Aims of Interpretation
It all comes back to that, to my and your ‘fun’—if we but allow the term its full
extension.
– Henry James1
My objection to absolute intentionalism has focused on the picture of criticism
to which it leads. It is a picture that orients the critic toward the artist, not
toward the work. I have charged the moderate intentionalist with unreflectively
falling back on such a picture when pressed, with not having any alternative
to compensate for the abandonment of the absolute intentionalist’s theory of
meaning. In making this charge, I take myself to have incurred something
of an obligation to say more about what it is, then, for the critic to be ori-
ented toward the work. I have certain views about this, and they tend toward
value-maximization theory (as it is called). My overarching contention is that
intentionalism need not be opposed to such a theory, for they simply operate
at dierent levels, the latter at the level of the truth-conditions for interpre-
tive claims and the former at that of the relevance of certain kinds of discourse
(intention-talk).
In the first section of this chapter I outline and defend the foundations of
value-maximization theory. While doing so, I identify an ambiguity that I go
on to clarify in a way that will, I hope, not only satisfy the value-maximizer
1. “Preface to ‘The Golden Bowl’.” 1934. In The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces, 327–348.
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 345.
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but also facilitate my own metacritical intentionalist view, the rudiments of
which I introduce in the penultimate section.
I should add that my aim is not to launch a vigorous defence of value-
maximization theory or of its foundations. This would be a larger undertaking
than I have the space for here. I aim merely to develop along a certain line
what I take to be plausible versions of each, so as to have something concrete to
point to as underlying my metacritical intentionalism. The latter could perhaps
supervene on some other such theory of the truth-conditions of interpretive
statements, but I happen to agree with value-maximization theory. Even if
my fellow intentionalists will not follow me across enemy lines, so to speak,
I hope to demonstrate by my eorts that the standard oppositions one finds
in the literature miss a good deal of what is possible. They miss, in particular,
the metacritical nature of Beardsley and Wimsatt’s objection to intentionalism,
the most important aspects of which lie orthogonal to issues concerning the
criteria or truth-conditions of interpretations.
Let me begin by stating the value-maximizer’s thesis in the simplest terms
possible: the aim of interpretation, and of criticism generally, is to maximize
the values of works. This is an ambiguous statement, but already in view
is the consequence that whether or not we accept an interpretation—that
is to say, choose to understand the work according to it, prefer it to rival
interpretations, and so on—will fundamentally be a matter of how valuable that
interpretation makes the work. Also apparent is how such a thesis could pose a
threat to intentionalism. To the extent that interpretations are true in virtue of
maximizing value, they cannot also be true in virtue of reporting intentions,
given that intended meanings will not always maximize value. As Stecker puts
it, “[t]he basic proposal is that the purpose of interpreting artworks is to better
appreciate them. The subsidiary claim is that focus on the intention of the artist
is not the best route to achieving this, or alternatively, it is to shift our attention
from the proper aim of interpretation to a dierent improper aim” (2010, 147).
Stecker defends intentionalism on a number of grounds. He first says that
“intention-oriented criticism can enhance appreciation as well as any other type
of criticism.” If this is meant to reconcile the two views, it may be asked how a
criticism is “intention-oriented” if its aim is to enhance value (rather than to
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discover intentions). Are intentions mentioned because they are intentions, or
only because the intended meanings enhance value? For it is not enough to say
of certain intended meanings that they enhance value, given that this does not
establish that their being intended is one of their critically relevant attributes.
Stecker also objects that it is not merely enhancing value that should be the
aim, but “to do this by pointing to something in the work that is not obvious,
or at least by pointing to a nonobvious way the work could be taken” (147).
The significance of this is that value-enhancement must be responsive to the
nature of the work qua work, for perhaps there are ways to enhance a work’s
value that do not treat the work as a work. But Stecker concludes too quickly
that “one route to this is via the actual intentions of artists.” He assumes that
to maximize a work’s value through a “deeper understanding” of it requires
a critic to adduce evidence of the artist’s intentions. This may be to beg the
question, for the value-maximizer is oering a view on which how a work
should be understood is determined precisely by value-considerations. We may
thereby be led to meanings that, as it happens, are intended, but, again, this is
not enough.
Lastly, Stecker objects that “it is simply dogmatic to maintain that enhanced
appreciation is the goal of art interpretation. Someone may simply want a
better understanding of a work, or, more narrowly still, be curious about what
an artist intended to do in it” (148). This seems, however, too easy a way to
smuggle in intentionalism—recall the “wise eclecticism” I mentioned in the
previous chapter—in addition to ignoring, again, that it is precisely in terms
of value-considerations that value-maximizers propose to explain how works
should be “understood.” We need to be told why curiosity about what an artist
intended is curiosity about the work—why it is not merely biographical curiosity.
A similar burden falls, of course, on the value-maximizer. She needs to tell us
why value-maximization is critically relevant. I turn now to an argument for
this latter claim.
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3.1 The Aesthetic Argument
Most arguments for value-maximization take a predictable form. Noël Carroll
gives them a useful name, “the aesthetic argument,” and describes as follows
their common form:
since the point of consuming art, and of interpretation as an adjunct
to artistic consumption, is to maximize aesthetic satisfaction, we
should always favour those interpretations that aord the best aes-
thetic experience that is compatible with established textual mean-
ing conventions. (1992, 114)
Cleaned up, the argument goes as follows:
1. The point of consuming art is to maximize aesthetic satisfaction.
2. The point of interpretation, as an adjunct to artistic consumption, is to
promote or aid the point of consuming art.
2a. The point of interpretation is to promote or aid the maximization
of aesthetic satisfaction.
3. Interpretations should be selected on the basis of how well they promote
or aid the point of consuming art.
3a. Interpretations should be selected on the basis of how well they
promote or aid the maximization of aesthetic satisfaction.
I have deliberately made both the second and the third term parasitic on the
first, in order to reflect the signal importance of that term. It is what directs
the whole argument, for whatever is identified as the point of consuming art is
believed to filter down into the aims of interpretation and thus into the criteria
for correct interpretations. (1) and (2) are premises. (3) is supposed to follow
from (2), in that whatever is the point of interpretation will determine what
counts as a correct interpretation. (3a) is supposed to follow from (1) and (3),
through a specification of the “point” at issue.2
2. One could also derive (3a) from (2a), in the same way one is supposed to be able to derive
(3) from (2), except with the point from (1) already substituted in.
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The foregoing explanation admittedly raises more questions than it answers,
for the argument is deceptive in its apparent simplicity. Carroll spends less
time describing the argument than in attacking its soundness. I believe that the
argument requires considerable elaboration for us to see how it may even be
valid, let alone sound. In the interest of clarifying a number of relevant issues, I
spend the rest of this section fleshing out its three terms. In doing so, I hope to
demonstrate not only its eminent plausibility but also a latent ambiguity that I
will subsequently exploit.
3.1.1 First Term
To say that there is a point to consuming art is likely to make a claim about the
function of art. Stephen Davies (1991), who takes up this subject in the context
of the definition of art, describes a sense in which concepts may have associated
functions:
Many of our classifications arise not so much from an attempt to
describe the way the world is as from the quite deliberate imposition
upon the world of a structure that derives directly from our needs,
interests, and desires. The point of many of our concepts obviously
relates to our needs and concerns. For example, we have the concept
of food because generally we value our lives, and the maintenance
of our lives depends upon our nourishing ourselves in a deliberate,
ongoing fashion. (26)
There is often an identifiable reason why we have certain concepts, such that
we wouldn’t have them if the things held to fall under them did not generally
satisfy the reason. The case of food is a good example, because it is only due
to our need to conceptually aggregate the nourishing things that the concept
of food arose. It is also a good example because it allows us to distinguish a
concept’s having a function from its being a functional concept, for, as Davies notes,
“[n]ot all things that could nourish us or other creatures are classed as foods”
(28). But if the things that do fall under the concept of food, however this
classification is made, were not in general nourishing, there would be no such
concept.
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Davies is inclined to say something of this sort about art, that it is not a
functional concept but does have a function. What matters for my purposes is
the latter issue, whether art has a function (and, if so, what the character of this
function could be). I will ignore the further question about whether art is a
functional concept.
The question whether art has a function is, I hope, easily answered in the
armative, for it is precisely the sort of concept, like that of food, that owes
its existence to our needs and interests. The only pertinent question has to do
with the character of its function. Davies opens this inquiry as follows:
Artworks might serve a great many useful functions—as paper
weights, investments, topics of conversation at boring parties, and
so on—but here the question is: What distinctive function (or func-
tions) is served by artworks? In what way are (or were) artworks
important enough to us that we feel (or felt) the need to mark them
o as a class of their own? (52)
Davies defers for the most part to Beardsley’s views, calling them “the most
detailed and sophisticated of those available.” I propose to do the same, not
quite for Davies’s reasons but because, first, they are consistent with the views
of the value-maximizers I will go on to discuss and, second, because I have a
standing interest in Beardsley’s anti-intentionalism.
In one of his final comments on the present set of issues, Beardsley chooses
to talk in terms of the aesthetic point of view: “To adopt the aesthetic point of
view with regard to X is to take an interest in whatever aesthetic value X may
possess” (1982c, 19). He goes on to understand a work’s aesthetic value in
terms of experience: “The aesthetic value of an object is the value it possesses in
virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification” (21). Beardsley is often
on these grounds accused of being what is called a “value empiricist,” namely
one who denies the existence of aesthetic properties or values that cannot be
experienced.3 I will for the most part avoid this controversial subject, for I
believe it is possible to hold that it is the function of art to aord a certain
3. See, e.g., Currie (1989), chapter 2.
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sort of experience even if it should turn out that some artworks have aesthetic
properties or values that may not so be experienced.
I claim that the function of art must involve the making available of certain
sorts of experience because having certain sorts of experience is an essential part
of the reason why we have the concept of art at all: those of our interests and
reasons which sustain the concept of art are interests and reasons in having cer-
tain sorts of experience. One can see this if one imagines a world in which what
we would otherwise like to call artworks were never experienced. Suppose that
“artists” in this world as a matter of course destroy their “artworks” immediately
after creating them (in isolation), leaving interested parties with no recourse
but to hear an account of the work if the “artist” is willing to provide one. It
is not a stretch to conclude that, in such a world, not only would there be no
such interested parties, but no distinctive concept of art would freely arise to
aggregate all instances of the described practice.
My claim about experience is thus more minimal than related claims that
have incurred the ire of those who resist value empiricism. I do not say that all
artworks must by definition be capable of providing a certain sort of experience.
This would be akin to treating art as a functional concept. Nor do I say that all
possible values of an artwork qua artwork must be capable of being experienced,
which is (perhaps) value empiricism. It is quite possible that some artworks run
against the grain, so to speak, of the function of art. But I believe it is relatively
clear that art is not the sort of thing (like, perhaps, currency) that is functionally
unrelated to experience, such that its value has little or nothing to do with its
being experienced. How one should think of the sort of experience at issue is,
of course, a further question.
We have so far been told by Beardsley that to adopt the aesthetic point of
view toward an artwork is to take an interest in the aesthetic gratification that it
has the capacity to provide. What, however, is aesthetic gratification, and what
does it mean for an artwork to have the capacity to provide it? Here Beardsley
returns to some of his familiar themes. He mentions, for instance, an “attention
to the formal unity and/or the regional qualities of a complex whole” (1982c,
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22). I prefer to explain such ideas in slightly dierent terms,4 for which I turn
to the value-maximizer Alan Goldman.
Goldman accepts much of what I have already proposed. He believes that
“[t]he ordinary concept of art . . . includes implicit reference to [a] sort of value
or valuable experience,” and that aording such experience is not only “the
central function but also . . . the primary source of value in art” (1995, 2-3). He
holds, moreover, that
if . . . it is more than an accident of history and language that various
art forms are grouped together under the evaluative concept of fine
arts . . . then it is not implausible that at least many great works
or paradigms share a kind of value that in large part explains the
importance of art for many people. This value ought to be also
more or less unique to art if its importance cannot be explained by
features it has in common with many other institutions and kinds
of objects. (7)
A problem Goldman encounters is “how to acknowledge th[e] value-producing
features of great artworks without overemphasizing their separate contribu-
tions.” He resolves it in terms of “the ways that these separate sources of value
interact in relating dierent elements within works,” which interaction is said to
“creat[e] fully engaging and intensely significant experience of these elements
and works” (7-8). Aesthetic value is thus said to reside in a work’s
challenge . . . to our perceptual, cognitive, and aective capacities,
and their full occupation and fulfillment in meeting that challenge,
remov[ing] us entirely from the real world of our practical aairs.
It is in the ultimately satisfying exercise of these dierent mental
capacities operating together to appreciate the rich relational prop-
erties of artworks that I shall argue the primary value of great works
is to be found. (8)
Though Goldman talks of “great works,” this is, it seems, for the purpose of
describing a paradigm. I take it to be his way of acknowledging, as I do above,
4. But see Beardsley (1958), and also Mathers and Dickie (1963).
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that perhaps not all works will manifest such value, or provide such experience,
despite the fact that it is part of the function of art to do so (great works as a class
fulfilling, if anything does, this function).5
Like many value-maximizers, Goldman is somewhat uncomfortable talking
of “bad art.” He claims that “[w]hether there can be bad art (or bad fine art)
is at least controversial given the ordinary concept. But even if this category
were granted, genuine art should still be intended by its producers or judged
by its displayers to aord valuable experience” (1995, 2). The first disjunct
(“should still be intended by its producers. . . ”) brings us close to taking art to
be a functional concept. I have no desire to do this (though it may be true).
The second disjunct, about how works should be judged, is the subject of the
second term of the Aesthetic Argument, to which I will turn shortly. Before
doing so, let me consider an important challenge to the foregoing conception
of aesthetic value.
Carroll, with whom I began, does not think that the value associated with
the function of art can be restricted to aesthetic value. Set aside, for convenience,
the terminological issue having to do with distinguishing the “aesthetic” from
the “artistic.” The substantive disagreement here is that Carroll does not take
the characteristic values of art to be exhausted by the sort of thing Goldman
describes, whatever we call that. According to Carroll,
in dealing with artworks we have more interests than aesthetic
interests—as “aesthetic interests” are usually construed within the
philosophical tradition—and . . . there is no reason to think that
these [other] interests are always trumped by aesthetic ones. (1992,
117)
The chief such other interest Carroll mentions is one that he calls “conversa-
tional.” He proposes that our experience of a work is “roughly analogous to
a conversation.” By this he means that such experiences “involve a sense of
5. Such a conception of aesthetic value is not, I should add, unique to Goldman, as he himself
makes clear. Kant, for instance, similarly took such value to lie, as Goldman says, “in the
harmonious exercise of the faculties of imagination and understanding in free play, without
the imposition of concepts or rules that could reveal a fixed purpose to the aesthetic object”
(1995, 9).
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community or communion that . . . rests on communication,” such that they
require, in order to be “fulfilling,” “that we have the conviction of having
grasped what our interlocutor meant or intended to say” (118). The claim is
that it is part of the function of art to provide not only aesthetic experience of
the sort Goldman describes, but also conversational experience of the sort that
he (Carroll) describes.
I am inclined to reject this claim, at least as it pertains to the function of art.6
Goldman encounters a claim such as Carroll’s in the Tolstoyan view that art
is “a means to communicate or arouse emotions,” a view which “cite[s] the
human need to communicate feelings [and] the communal bonds created when
emotions are shared” (1995, 4). He objects on the grounds that such a view
does not “indicate a value . . . that is not to be readily found outside art,” or
“that can[not] be achieved in other ways as well,” for “there are more direct
ways to communicate emotions . . . and better ways to study psychology” (4).
While I agree with Goldman’s conclusion, I am not sure about the reason he
gives. Someone like Carroll could reply that, in fact, art is peculiarly situated to
communicate emotion and to oer studies in psychology. (How this could go
may easily be imagined.)
The objection must therefore be slightly dierent, not that conversational
experiences can be had otherwise, but that to take art to be principally concerned
with them (so as to make their facilitation a function) is somehow to distort
what we take art to be in the business of doing. Here I oer a variant of my
objection to absolute intentionalism from the previous chapter. I said there that
taking seriously what absolute intentionalists propose orients the critic toward
the artist rather than toward the work. It seems to me that this intentionalist
view of the function of art does the same. If we take it to be a function of art to
aord conversational experiences, such that getting one’s interlocutor right is
paramount, then we are conceiving of a practice in which the artwork itself
is less important than what it is being used by the artist to convey.7 This is
6. See chapter 5 for an extended discussion of the analogy.
7. See, e.g., Stecker (1993), who at times admits as much: “When we are involved in a
conversation, we are just as, if not more, interested in what our interlocutor intends to say as
what she does say” (473). I raised such a point in the previous chapter in my discussion of what
I called Juhl’s discourse-related argument.
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to reverse the order of priority. Even if it is important that artworks are used
by their artists to convey things, such conveyance cannot be the reason why
we have artworks. For if it was, then the practice both of art and of criticism
would look very dierent. There would, for instance, be little need to scrutinize
works from which we did not believe we could extract the artist’s intentions, or
whose artists had manifested their intentions elsewhere, in some more readily
comprehensible form.8
Carroll may try to turn the objection around on me. He might say that to
take art to be in the business of aording satisfying aesthetic experience orients
us too much toward such experience, at the expense of the work. He does in fact
say something like this in his objection that the value-maximizer “presume[s]
a species of aesthetic hedonism” (1992, 122). He invokes “Robert Nozick’s
very provocative, antihedonistic thought experiment” in which one is asked
if one would like to be plugged into “an experience machine that would give
[one] any experience [one] desired” (qtd. 122). Carroll agrees with Nozick’s
conclusion that “our answer here will be obviously no,” for “the pleasure of
these simulated experiences is not enough; we have a stake in actually having
the experiences in question.”
My reply is that the analogy does not hold up (even if we agree withNozick’s
somewhat contentious take on his thought experiment). Carroll imagines an
opposition between the intentionalist who encourages “really encountering
interesting and brilliant authors” and the value-maximizer who encourages
“counterfeiting such encounters” (123). But the latter is not characteristic of the
value-maximizer, who, in promoting the value of aesthetic experience, is not
asking anybody to counterfeit anything. In fact, the value-maximizer’s analysis
8. Michael Oakeshott ([1959] 1991) makes a point that supplements my own: “the opportuni-
ties which works of art (some more so than others) give for the neglect of their poetic character
may also be an oblique means of getting themselves recognized in their poetic character. Our
attention may be attracted to a work of art, in the first place, for some entirely extraneous
reason—because it seems to represent something in the practical world which is familiar to us
or of special interest, because it supplies us with a piece of historical information we have been
seeking, because some detail catches our fancy, or merely because it is the work of a friend or
an acquaintance—but having, in this manner, been lured into looking or listening, the mood
of contemplation may supervene and its proper character as a poetic image may, suddenly or
gradually, come to impose itself upon us” (538-539).
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does not mention encounters with artists at all, neither real nor fake. (This will
become especially clear in the example with which I conclude this chapter.)
In general, I do not think that my objection to Carroll’s claim about the
function of art may be turned around on me, for it seems to me that to be
oriented toward (what Goldman characterizes as) the aesthetic experience a
work aords just is to be oriented toward the work as a work. I can’t see how
the same may be said of the intentionalist alternative, that to be oriented toward
the artist (or what she wanted to communicate) just is to be oriented toward the
work as a work. The absolute intentionalist tries to maintain this through her
theory of meaning, but the infelicity of such a position is frequently brought out
in the context of critical practice (as in my discussion of Irwin). The moderate
intentionalist has no way even to maintain the position, plausibly or implausibly.
3.1.2 Second Term
I turn now to the Aesthetic Argument’s second term, which states that the point
of interpretation is to promote or aid the point of consuming art. We have at
this point established that the point of consuming art is to have aesthetically
satisfying experiences. We have also established something of a precedent for
dealing with “. . . point of. . . ” claims, namely in terms of function. To say that
interpretation has such-and-such a point is to say that this is its function—that
this satisfies the needs and interests in the service of which we so aggregate the
things that fall under the concept. Let us examine this premise, and see where
it gets us in the hands of the value-maximizer.
Beardsley, in another one of his later essays (1982d), describes two models
of criticism. One is what he calls the “Consumers’ Union model of (professional)
criticism” (CU), and the other what he calls “the press agent (or PA) model of
criticism.” On the way to these models, which I will discuss in a moment,
he makes a crucial distinction: between “critic” as a role that any of us may
assume and “critic” as a professional status. The latter applies to “one who makes
criticism his occupation: one whose function is not merely to criticize but to
help others make their criticisms” (149). In this stricter sense, critics are “those
who set themselves up, or are set up by others, to make public judgments for
94 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
the purpose of guiding the choices of others who are less qualified than they,
perhaps by the lack of talent or time.”
I propose to adopt this stricter definition as a paradigm, with the under-
standing that it is meant not quite to exclude those who have not so made
criticism their “occupation” but to render their activity explanatorily secondary
(in the present context). My claim is that, to understand the function of criticism
(and by extension of interpretation), we must look to people who have made
criticism their occupation, or at least to this occupation itself, which most clearly
enshrines those of our needs and interests in the service of which we have a
concept of criticism in the first place.
I imagine that Beardsley had something like this in mind, for he reasons
fromwhat he calls the “normative authority” implicit in this stricter definition to
his CU model, on which, in the manner of “the specialist in Consumer Reports,”
“the critic’s primary obligation is to the consumer of art—the audience, the
viewer, the reader, the listener. His service is a public service; he tells us, as
best he can, what we need to know to make intelligent choices about works
of art” (150). The PA model is an alternative on which “the critic’s primary
obligation is not to the consumer, but to the producer—that is, to the artist and,
indirectly, to the art itself as a form of enterprise involving many artists, present
and future. The critic is the handmaiden of the work, preparing the way for it”
(155). These views seem roughly to correspond to the value-maximizer and the
intentionalist, respectively. The former takes the primary function of criticism
to involve guiding consumers to aesthetic satisfaction, while the latter takes this
obligation to involve revealing the “communicative act” in which the artist was
engaged.
As I see it, the first, CU model has to be correct as a basic account of the
function of criticism. Although interpretations have many benefits, among
which are benefits to the artist and, as Beardsley says, “indirectly” to the art
itself, these strike me as contingencies rather than as functional necessities,
responsive more to how criticism must accommodate itself in the culture than
to those of our needs and interests in the service of which the concept arose in
the first place. Beardsley therefore is quite right to reach the CU model from
his prefatory remarks about the paradigm of the professional critic (“whose
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function is not merely to criticize but to help others [viz. consumers] make
their criticisms”).
It might be felt that this is not quite to reach, yet, the desired claim that
interpretation is an adjunct to artistic consumption. All we have said is that it is a
function of criticism to help consumers make their criticisms, while we needed
to have said something about enhancing the consumer’s experience. This may,
however, already be entailed by Beardsley’s remarks, for he does not mean
that the critic’s job is to help the consumer become more like her, a good
critic (although this might happen, too). It is rather to help the consumer
“make intelligent choices about works of art.” To make an intelligent choice
is, in large part, to have some idea of the sort of experience a given work will
provide and to decide whether or not one wishes to have that sort of experience.
To get better at knowing which works will so aesthetically satisfy, such that
one chooses to experience more of them, is to enhance one’s overall aesthetic
satisfaction in one’s engagement with art. This, of course, is in addition to the
fact that criticism will (ideally) help us get the most out of the works we do
choose to experience. The function of criticism may thus be seen to be parasitic
on the function of art, for what critics are in the business of doing is enabling
art to better fulfill its function (of aesthetically satisfying).
Such at least is one way of putting the point, which we have reached on the
basis of what we have taken the function of art to be. For it is only because
the function of art is to aord certain sorts of experience that the function
of criticism is connected to the facilitation of such experience—by, in part,
enabling consumers to make “intelligent choices.” Otherwise, if the function
of art were something else, what counts as an “intelligent choice” would also be
something else. For instance, if the function of art were to communicate the
intentions of artists, then intelligent choices for the consumer would involve
seeking out not the most aesthetically satisfying but the most “communicative”
works—those which best communicate what their artists intended. This seems
less plausible as an account of what audiences do (and what critics help them
do), which itself is further proof of the value-maximizer’s conception of the
function of art.
So far so good. We must, however, identify something more specific about
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interpretation—beyond what it shares with criticism as to its function—in order
to reach the conclusion of the Aesthetic Argument. Granted, the function of
criticism is a fortiori the function of interpretation (given that interpretation is a
component of criticism). But how does the function of interpretation parasitize
upon the function of art? How, that is, does interpretation enable art to better
fulfill its function of aesthetically satisfying (or help consumers “make intelligent
choices about works of art”)? To answer this, we have to say something about
the sort of thing an interpretation is.
3.1.3 Third Term
Interpretation is frequently held to be a kind of explanation, namely of the
meaning of the work (or, if we do not like to talk of meaning, simply of how the
work is to be understood). Goldman, who believes this, elaborates as follows:
[I]nterpretation is a certain kind of inference to the best explanation.
In interpreting elements of artworks we explain why they are
placed in those contexts, for example, to convey a certain meaning,
express a certain feeling, or lead into the development section. In
interpreting whole works, we explain their artistic points, why they
exist as artworks, how they fit into various traditions, what artistic
values they serve. (1995, 98)
Goldman admits that this account substantially “leaves open the kind of expla-
nation” at issue. His own preference is for “a kind of teleological explanation,”
where the “purposes to which we appeal . . . need not be external purposes in
the mind of the artist who creates it but may be Kant’s ‘purposiveness without
purpose’ internal to the structure of the work” (102). This leads us to “in-
terpret an element of a work by explaining its role in creating artistic value
through its contribution to representation or content, expression, or the formal
coherence of the work,” and to “interpret a work as a whole by explaining
those representational, formal, and expressive qualities that make it artistically
valuable.”
Goldman’s argument for this teleological account ends up being very similar
to the Aesthetic Argument:
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We arrive at this conclusion by considering the fundamental pur-
pose of interpretation itself: to guide perception toward maximal
appreciation and therefore a fair evaluation of a work. This purpose
also generates the criterion of acceptability for interpretations. The
best interpretative explanations are those that guide the perceptions
of an audience toward maximal appreciation of a work, those that
maximize its value for the audience. (102)
We are not told exactly why we should take the mentioned thing to be “the
fundamental purpose of interpretation,” but Goldman seems to have in mind the
sort of inference I describe above, from the first term of the Aesthetic Argument
to the second term. The function of interpretation is to “guide” consumers to
“maximal appreciation” because the function of art is to aord such appreciation.
Furthermore, the “criterion of acceptability for interpretations,” falling out of
the function of interpretation, selects all and only those interpretations which so
guide consumers (to “maximal appreciation”). The latter inference represents
the conclusion of the Aesthetic Argument.
But how exactly is the conclusion meant to follow? Note that the specific
form of the second term at which I arrive above speaks very generally about
art as a whole (or a consumer’s engagement with art as a whole). The claim is
that, due to art’s function of aording aesthetic satisfaction, criticism’s function
(adjunctive to that of art) is to assist consumers of works to experience such
satisfaction. This is still a highly ambiguous claim, and does not really make
any practicable demands on critics. Goldman, however, seems to assume that
there will be a demand to maximize the value of every single work. This requires
further examination, if only to understand what is being demanded of critics.
Take, first, the assumption of maximization. This is a word that comes
quite naturally to those whom I have been calling value-maximizers, but,
when pressed as to its utility, such theorists are quick to shift their position. “I
should perhaps have avoided the term ‘maximize,’ with its strongly quantitative
connotation,” says Goldman (1991, 246), in response to a challenge from Robert
Stecker (1991), who, calling the term a “misnomer,” wonders “what it would
be for an interpretation to maximize either the artistic value of the work or a
98 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
particular artistic value belonging to it” (243).9 Goldman acknowledges that
“there may be several ways to maximize at a given time,” adding that “even if
one interpretation of a work is best for a time, it may grow stale” (1991, 246).
But it is not clear if he means, as a result, to substitute something else for the
notion of maximization. What else is there?
Stephen Davies (2006), another value-maximizer who is uncertain about
the nomenclature of his view, suggests the term satisficing: “interpreters often
aim at satisficing rather than maximizing” (224). He does not say what exactly
he means by this, but, as the term is usually understood, it implies some sort of
threshold.10 The idea would be that correct or acceptable interpretations need
not make the work as valuable as possible, only valuable up to a point, or past
some threshold. In fact, Goldman says things to this eect as well, in addition
to his talk of maximization: “An interpretation is acceptable when it guides an
audience to an experience of a work above some threshold of value derivable
from the work” (1995, 105, emphasis added). So the solution is to deny that
the values of works must be maximized; they must instead only be raised above
a certain threshold.
But is this revised proposition equally supported by the series of inferences
we have been following? The Aesthetic Argument speaks generally of aesthetic
satisfaction, so I suppose it is a question whether this means maximal satisfaction
or some other, possibly lower level. It seems tome that it must meanmaximal, for
there is no reason to suppose otherwise. If the function of art is to aesthetically
satisfy, why is it not thereby to maximally so satisfy? What reason have we for
demanding any less of the interpretations we allow ourselves to be guided by?
Don’t we, in seeking out art, want to have experiences that are as aesthetically
satisfying as possible? If so, then the satisficing proposal begins to seem arbitrary.
Whence a lower threshold?
Perhaps one reason not to require maximally satisfying aesthetic experiences
is that there may be such a thing as having, as Beardsley puts it, “too much of
9. This exchange between Stecker and Goldman is based on an earlier article by Goldman
(1990), which he extended in his subsequent book (1995). I have been drawing on the latter
for his considered views.
10. See Simon (1956). Byron (2004) is a useful introduction.
The Aims of Interpretation 99
these good things” (1982c, 34). The worry Beardsley is considering is that “a
serious and persistent aesthetic interest will become an enervating hyperaes-
theticism, a paralysis of will like that reported in advanced cases of psychedelic
experience.” But he does not buy it. In his view,
the objects of aesthetic interest—such as harmonious design, good
proportions, intense expressiveness—are not drugs, but part of the
breath of life. Their cumulative eect is increased sensitization,
fuller awareness, a closer touch with the environment and concern
for what it is and might be.
In thinking this, he seems to me in line with the Aesthetic Argument, on which,
by my lights, the idea is indeed that critics must maximize values, not merely
achieve some sub-optimal threshold.
Whenever a satisficing proposal is oered as an accommodation of worries
about maximizing, there is a danger that we are simply substituting one sort of
maximization for another. Michael Byron puts this concern as follows:
Here’s a general approach to arguing that satisficing is not a distinc-
tive choice strategy, but rather just one kind of optimizing strategy.
First ask: In virtue of what is an alternative “good enough”? The
satisficer as such chooses an alternative because it is, in some way,
good enough, whether or not it is the best. Assume that doing so is
rational, in some sense. But something about the alternative must
rationalize or justify the choice: It is presumably some feature of
the alternative that makes it good enough. However the chooser
answers this question, the feature(s) mentioned can be built into a
conception of good, utility, or whatever according to which the
choice is optimizing. (2004, 10)
Whether or not this is true generally, I propose to defend some such claim with
respect to the present situation in order to bring satisficers into the fold of a
more expansive view of maximization.
Much of the perceived trouble with value-maximization arises from its
association with individual works. This association is not mandated by the
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Aesthetic Argument, nor does it map well onto the practice of critics. There
must, of course, be consequences for how individual works are treated, for it
would be very odd if the function of interpretation were to maximize the values
of works and this had no bearing on how a critic is to treat individual works.
But let us say, more specifically, that the function of interpretation might be
to maximize the values of works even if it were not the case that this function
must be fulfilled by a critic’s treating each work in isolation from other works
in order to figure out how that work’s value, alone, could be maximized.
What is the alternative? Here I think the intuitions of theorists such as
Fiedler andWollheim, whom I describe in previous chapters as pushing for a less
“atomized” criticism, have some purchase. I still disagree with their contention
that the target of interpretationmust be more expansive than the individual work,
but I think that much of what they feel to be true can be captured by a slightly
dierent claim, that the principleswhich underlie a critic’s treatment of individual
works must be responsive to more than just the consumer’s engagement with
that individual work. They must be responsive, in addition, to art history, to
genres and movements, and, perhaps, to facts about the artist. This last item
is, of course, the subject of our controversy, and I will soon defend its place
in the list in terms slightly dierent from those proposed by standard varieties
of intentionalism. For the moment let us ignore its presence and carry on
characterizing this more expansive conception of value-maximizing.
What are these principles of which I speak, and how do they work? The
principles operate to orient a critic toward the work in a certain way, namely
the value-maximizing way. They impress on the critic the need to view the
work as an object from which a certain sort of valuable experience may be
extracted. But they do this, with the integrity of the practice at stake, not
by blinding the critic to all but the single encounter with the solitary work.
They instead take into account that the people whom the critic is addressing
are members of communities which trac in diverse forms of experience. A
critic who acknowledges that experiencing a work in dierent ways is never in
the easy control of a consumer, that such ways have to be “trained into,” will
understand that what she recommends is likely to have consequences elsewhere
if taken seriously. That is, a critic who tells a consumer that a given work ought
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to be experienced a certain way is taking on the burden of having to justify not
merely the value that so experiencing that work will bring to the consumer, but
also how training himself to so experience a work will aect the consumer’s
experience going forward, in future encounters with art. The critic is thus
endorsing not merely abstract meaning-propositions but ways of experience,
in which case the consequences attendant to the latter have to be considered.11
This clearly does not get us any sort of easy criterion of the sort the value-
maximizer would like. Although it is still true that critics must maximize the
values of works in the interpretations they recommend, this notion has been
made a little murkier. One subject of dispute will concern the range of works
the critic is to take into account. Obviously, the critic is not (nor could she
be) privy to the histories of every one of her readers, to what art all these
readers have been exposed and are likely to be exposed. So decisions must be
made, and these decisions will themselves be norm-governed—in large part, I
contend, by the omnipresent consideration of value-maximization. The critic
will often place a given work in a web of other works so that each is profitably
experienced in association with the others. Such is the case when a critic is
considering an artist’s oeuvre, or a particular artistic movement. She might
even choose to understand a work in the light of a movement of which it is not
a part but to which it bears certain anities. I thus treat value-maximization
almost as a meta-criterion, a criterion which governs more local criteria of
interpretation. It is not quite that the critic weighs in every single one of her
interpretive decisions the dierent possibilities for value enhancement. It is
rather that she gets herself into these local decisions only on the basis of having
approached her overall task as one of attempting to enhance the work’s value
for the consumer.
I believe that my re-framing of value-maximization theory achieves the
result at which Goldman and Davies are aiming (or gives them a justification for
the result they seem only unstably to assume). They wish to speak of satisficing
rather than of maximization, but at the same time to hold on to some notion of
11. Lang (1974) mentions something similar: “certainly the viewer adjusts his expectations in
light of a cumulative experience of the capabilities of art as well as of directives posited by the
single work” (309).
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maximization, for the latter seems to follow from their theory. I reconcile these
demands as follows. Maximization is indeed entailed by the underlying theory,
by the given conceptions of the function of art and the function of criticism,
respectively. Satisficing, or rather something which approximates it, enters
the picture as the critic’s accommodation of his actual task to the function of
his practice. It is not that he is looking to reach some sup-optimal threshold of
value with respect to any given work, rather that his ambitions as to making
value accessible rarely, if ever, apply to single works in isolation. They always,
instead, are more expansive, taking into account broader sweeps of art history
and a consumer’s life-long engagement with art. In order to maximize value
across these broad sweeps, which pose constraints on the experiential attitudes
it is possible (or simply prudent) to adopt with respect to individual works, the
critic invariably ends up recommending ways of experiencing individual works
that do not make those works as valuable as possible when considered in isolation
(but perhaps as valuable as possible in the context of the broad sweeps).
It is important to see that we arrive at this conception through what I have
been calling a criticism-first approach. We begin with the question: what ought
a critic do? To whom is she speaking, and for what purpose? The alternative,
meaning-first approach begins by asking: what is the meaning of a work, and
how is that determined? To start from the latter perspective is to be forced
into a conclusion about the individual work, i.e. that a work means whatever
maximizes its value. But to say this is likely to miss that the relevant and useful
notion of maximization, which follows from the Aesthetic Argument, is a
metacritical notion, applying to the critic’s task, not a semantic notion, applying
to the properties of individual works irrespective of criticism. Using the former,
we are led to explain how the value of an individual work is maximized in terms
of the critic’s sense of how that work fits (or should fit) into the experiential
landscape of the consumers she is addressing. To maximize a work’s value is
thus not some abstract task involving the calculus of that work alone, but an
accommodation of that work into existing histories of art experience.12
12. Walton (1970) famously raises a concern about letting value-considerations dictate (in his
terms) the category of a work. He observes, namely, that it is always possible to come up with
a novel category in which a given work has much higher value than it does in the category in
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This explicitly metacritical version of value-maximization—which I believe
many value-maximizers could be persuaded to accept—is orthogonal to what
will be my metacritical version of intentionalism, in that the former concerns
the truth-conditions (or “acceptability”-conditions) of interpretive statements
whereas the latter will concern only the critical relevance of certain kinds of
discourse. Under value-maximization, an interpretive statement that the work
means such-and-such is true (or acceptable) just in case experiencing the work
as such-and-such is to maximize its value.13 But I have no pretensions to
making any competing claim for my version of intentionalism, which seeks
only to justify intention-talk (of the inexpugnably intentionalistic sort) as
critically relevant. So much is sucient to refute Beardsley and Wimsatt’s
anti-intentionalism.
3.2 The Rudiments of Intentionalism
As we have seen, Goldman takes interpretation to consist in teleological ex-
planation, where the telos is something like aesthetic value. The interpreter
asks himself how the elements of the work may fit together to create a valuable
experience for the consumer, and recommends those interpretations which he
feels allow the work to do this best. (In my refinement, it is the most valuable
experience constrained by the critic’s sense of how some wider range of art
may be experienced.) An intentionalist alternative Goldman considers is causal
explanation: “If we held that interpreters aim at causal explanations, then we
which we normally place it—leading to a counterintuitive result that our usual categories for
works are often mistaken. I evade this sort of objection by letting value-considerations always
be sensitive to, as I say, existing histories of art experience, to the fact that not all possible modes
of experience are relevantly available to consumers of art.
13. Such an account, once my refinement is implemented, could be made to cohere with other
accounts that seem to propose competing truth-conditions. For instance, that conventions are
important determinants of work-meaning could be understood in terms of value-maximization.
The critic judges that consumers will maximize a work’s value in the context of a relevant
range of works if she interprets them all, to whatever extent, according to what are (perhaps
for this very reason) deemed the relevant conventions. This could also explain why a critic
will sometimes ignore conventions, namely because she does not believe they will be so value-
maximizing. This is a way in which value-considerations may go all the way down, so to
speak.
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might arrive at the view that they aim to uncover artists’ intentions, since these
will figure prominently as causes in the production of artworks” (1995, 99).
Stecker more or less accepts such a construal (1991, 244). While he denies
that interpretations need always be explanations, he seems to agree that to
be an intentionalist with respect to those that are is to view them as causal
explanations. This is also in line with what many other intentionalists believe.
In the previous chapter, I described the importance they place on the causal
profile of intentions.
My own view is that it is dicult to construe interpretation as causal expla-
nation, mainly because it is dicult to view aesthetic properties as that sort of
explanandum. Goldman, in his assessment of such an intentionalist proposal,
does not give much attention to its causal aspect (instead focusing on general
intentionalist arguments which do not much have to do with causation). But
it is worth inquiring into the causal aspect. What could it mean to give a
causal explanation of a work’s meanings? Stecker claims that causal explanation
amounts to “understand[ing] a work as the product of a particular artist (time,
place, tradition, etc.)” (244). But it is only as a certain sort of product, namely
an aesthetic product, that an artwork properly attracts the interest of critics.
Typically artworks are many sorts of product: educational, religious, industrial,
etc. Not all of these will bear on their aesthetic status, but to many of them
will the artist’s intentions be causally relevant (to the extent that such intentions
are causally implicated in bringing about that object with those physical prop-
erties). So some discrimination as to cause must be made. But what sort of
discrimination?
Recall from the previous chapter that Livingston’s (2005) account of an
intention’s causal profile essentially came down to his third condition, that the
“causal chain” between intention and work not be “deviant.” Such a condition
is usually treated as theoretically given, but I am not sure that it can be, for it
seems to do most (if not all) of the explanatory work. In particular, it separates
successful from unsuccessful intentions. And if successful intentions are treated as
ipso facto aesthetically relevant, as it seems to me they are, then the condition is
not merely a causal but also an aesthetic one. And yet, the relation between these
two roles, causal and aesthetic, remains unclear. This is one way to understand
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Beardsley and Wimsatt’s original objection.
Let me put the point slightly dierently. An artist’s intention is said by
intentionalists to sometimes be causally ecacious. But, we might ask, causally
ecacious at what? To say causally ecacious at getting the work to mean such-
and-such is to beg the question, for what we are wondering is precisely how an
aesthetic notion such as work-meaning may be analyzed purely in terms of an
intention’s causal profile. That is, the intentionalist needs first to make sense
of the very idea of an intention’s being causally ecacious at getting the work
to bear aesthetic properties—in addition, say, to physical properties, many of
which will not have anything to do with what the object is like qua artwork.14
Some sort of background theory of aesthetic relevance is needed. Beardsley
expresses this thought in terms of the need for critical principles which connect
an intention’s causal profile to the inferences critics are justified in making (in
and as criticism). I have described his skepticism about this in the previous
chapter.
Although I propose to leave it open whether any such account of aesthetic
relevance, in terms of causation, may succeed, I suggest that causation is not in
fact as important to the intentionalist as the obtaining of certain counterfactuals
which she chooses to interpret a certain way. In particular:
(i) Had the artist not intended such-and-such, the work would not have
meant such-and-such.
Causation is sometimes analyzed in terms of counterfactuals such as (i),15 so that,
if one restricts the alternatives suitably, (i) is entailed by the relevant causal claim.
But this does not seem to me strictly necessary. The intentionalist can more
directly defend a certain interpretation of (i), which I will describe presently,
and forgo reliance on the notion of causation altogether. While an artist’s causal
powers are certainly necessary to bring about the circumstances in which (i)
14. This admittedly is a very loose way of speaking, for it might be held that a property of
the artwork, rather than of some physical object with which the artwork is spatially coincident,
just is an aesthetic property. For the sake of simplicity, I largely gloss over such ontological
questions.
15. See Lewis (1973) for a canonical view.
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could be true, they need not furthermore enter into the interpretation of (i)
which is believed to secure the critical relevance of intentions.
What sort of interpretation of (i) is at issue? It seems to be the following: it
is in virtue of the artist’s intending such-and-such that the work means such-
and-such. Establishing something like (i) is a very natural way to go about
arguing this, for such an interpretation quite easily explains (i), which otherwise
would seem very odd. I take such an interpretation to concern (what I will call)
“meaning-determining” intentions, those which are said to determine meaning.
There is, however, a second sort of counterfactual that intentionalists could
defend (but seldom do):
(ii) Had the work not meant such-and-such, the artist would not have in-
tended such-and-such.
Although it might be possible to interpret this in terms of its being in virtue of
artists’ intentions that works mean what they do, it more naturally lends itself
to an interpretation in terms of (what I will call) “meaning-tracking” intentions,
those which track meaning. So interpreted, (ii) describes a scenario in which a
work means what it does only if the artist, astute as he is, undertook to make it
mean that.
There are some tricky things concerning counterfactuals which I am largely
going to elide in my exposition of (i) and (ii), in particular having to do with
relevant alternatives.16 One might, for instance, wonder if it is possible for
dierent intentions to, as it were, “compensate” for each other, so that (i)
is routinely falsified for individual intentions but perhaps not for classes of
relevantly similar intentions. Such details will not matter for me, for I do not
plan on defending any precise such counterfactual as (i) or (ii). I use them
merely for illustrative purposes, to demonstrate two very general theses that
intentionalists may try to defend.
It seems to me that what the intentionalist really wishes to establish, behind
any talk of causal explanation, is something like one or both of these counter-
factuals interpreted in one or both of these ways—often it is ambiguous which
16. See Nozick’s (1981) attempt to define such a notion for his (so-called) “truth-tracking”
theory of knowledge.
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sort of interpretation of which sort of counterfactual is being proposed. I will
next describe both kinds of intention, and make some preliminary remarks
about how each may be relevant to criticism.
3.2.1 Meaning-Tracking Intentions
It is dicult to speak in the abstract of an intention’s “tracking” work-meaning,
absent a theory of meaning which describes something tangible that is (or is not)
being tracked. I therefore propose to begin to put to use the value-maximization
theory developed above. As I have said, I allow that work-meaning is ultimately
or generally determined by value-considerations, such that the truth-conditions
of interpretive claims are usefully given in terms of value-maximization. I
express this as follows: an interpretive claim that the work means such-and-such is
true just in case such-and-such maximizes the value of the work. We may on
such grounds adopt the following amendments of (i) and (ii), substituting in
the appropriate notion of work-meaning:
(i*) Had the artist not intended such-and-such, such-and-such would not
have maximized the value of the work.
(ii*) Had such-and-such not maximized the value of the work, the artist would
not have intended such-and-such.
I will continue to focus on (ii*) when discussing “meaning-tracking” intentions,
for it more naturally lends itself to that interpretation.17 The idea with respect
to such intentions is that the artist is astute about value-considerations, about the
likely eects on the consumer of the various artistic choices open to her. The
artist is able reliably to create a work that is correctly interpreted as it is (based
on certain value-considerations) because her intentions track the relevant facts
about value-maximization. The artist knows that if he does such-and-such, the
ensuing work will be interpreted in such-and-such a way, that if he instead
17. It is also for such convenience that I omit two further counterfactuals in this vicinity,
namely (iii) had the work meant such-and-such, the artist would have intended such-and-such,
and (iv) had the artist intended such-and-such, the work would have meant such-and-such.
These are not, of course, entailed by (i) and (ii), respectively, given that their “antecedents”
define dierent sets of relevant alternatives.
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does some other thing, the work will be interpreted in some other way, and so
on.18
There is much that could be said about such a proposal, especially in the light
of what I have already said. For instance, it is a feature of my analysis of critical
practice that whether or not an interpretation of some work counts as value-
maximizing is partly a function of the relevant range of background works
against which that work’s value is being maximized. (I have also said that the
selection of this background is to some extent norm-governed, based on larger
considerations of what background makes the work most valuable.) Therefore,
whether or not an artist’s intentions are to count as “meaning-tracking” will
depend in part on whether the value-considerations to which they are sensitive
are themselves relativized to the right background range of works. What this
means, practically, is that the artist must be working with a consciousness of the
right sort of tradition, that which forms the optimal background against which
the value of her work may be maximized. If a critic believes that a certain work
is to be situated against a background quite dierent from that envisioned by
the artist, this is grounds on which the critic could judge the artist’s intentions
to not track the work’s meaning.
Such consequences abound, some of which will be discussed in due course,
but it is important first to consider a more fundamental question, about what is
supposed to make “meaning-tracking” intentions (should there be any such)
critically relevant to begin with. An artist who is astute about value-considerations
may, of course, put such knowledge to use in oering criticism of her own
work, but this is not the sort of thing we are after. We wish to know how a
critic, even if it is the artist herself, may use—in particular, mention in and as
criticism—such knowledge as known by the artist (rather than merely as truths
which happen to be known by the artist).
One reason one might think that “meaning-tracking” intentions are not
quite relevant, or at least do not quite vindicate the relevance of the artist as
such, is that the described circumstance as pertaining to the artist does not
seem relevantly dierent from the same sort of circumstance pertaining to some
18. Wollheim (1987) describes a sense of this in terms of “the artist’s posture,” “his reliance
upon the experience that he himself has in front of the picture” (45).
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other person, not the artist, who also happens to be so astute. Of course, this
other person will have no real control over how the artwork comes about, so
that, even if she knows what will be the aesthetic outcomes of various artistic
choices, she cannot really do anything with this knowledge. But it is not clear,
an objector will continue, why the observations of such a person may not still be
mentioned in and as criticism if the artist’s “meaning-tracking” intentions may
be, if what is at issue is only the fact that the given propositional attitudes are
reliable. For this other person, too, may be said to possess “meaning-tracking”
attitudes, i.e. beliefs if not quite intentions.
I bring up such an objection because it usefully highlights the sort of thing
I must explain. Let me start by granting that if such a person should be found,
one who has “meaning-tracking” attitudes, such of her attitudes may well be
critically relevant. I take this to be a desirable outcome, for it will make it
possible for critics who cite other, more sensitive critics to still be saying things
that are critically relevant. But it depends on whether or not the critic has a way
to integrate such facts into an ongoing series of critically relevant statements. I
thus return to a subject I introduced at the end of the first chapter, that of how
it is to be determined whether a piece of discourse is about a given work. I there
described the issue in terms of Beardsley’s somewhat ambiguous notion of a
“critical statement,” which he defined as “any statement about a work of art.”
Setting aside the obvious problems having to do with aesthetic vs. non-aesthetic
such statements, of interest to me was, and still is, Beardsley’s limitation of the
issue to individual statements. I continue my earlier thoughts by noting that
it is dicult, if not impossible, to determine of any single statement, simply
by looking at it alone, whether it is relevantly about the work. For very often
a statement achieves its critical relevance by contributing in a certain way to
some ongoing piece of discourse that, as a whole, is critically relevant.
It will now be asked what determines whether some ongoing piece of
discourse is critically relevant. Let me preface my remarks on this by making
clear that I do not propose to give any strict definition of “criticism.” We
might be tempted to turn to the Aesthetic Argument, but I doubt if it can be
of help. For the Aesthetic Argument provides only functions, not definitions, and
it is not clear that “criticism” is a functional concept—or, at least, that it is the
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sort of functional concept which the Aesthetic Argument could describe, one
according to which something counts as critical discourse only to the extent
that it enables consumers of the work to derive aesthetic satisfaction from the
work. The latter view does not seem correct, for something may be criticism
without being so enabling; it would simply be bad criticism. I have described
criticism as having a certain function, one which informs its instances, how it
is practised, etc. But I do not think I need a full-fledged definition of criticism
to engage in the sort of theorizing in which I am interested here.
In the previous chapter, I considered a more specific kind of critical state-
ment, what Beardsley calls an “interpretive statement.” Although there may be
much more to criticism than interpretive statements, I restrict my comments
to such statements for convenience. For they are important enough to be
representative of how things stand with criticism generally. I will say that a
statement that is constitutive of a piece of discourse is critically relevant if it
contributes to the critic’s ongoing attempt to establish an interpretive statement.
To establish an interpretive statement, a critic needs to do more than simply
make that statement. She needs, for instance, to marshal evidence. Thus it is that
one way intentions are said to be critically relevant is by their being adduced as
evidence. But there may be other ways. Indeed, I will rely on there being other
ways. In the fifth chapter, I will describe a sort of “conversational” discourse
that critics employ to establish their interpretive statements. A full answer to
the present set of questions must, therefore, be deferred until then; but I will
go a little further here.
What does it mean for something to “contribute” to the establishing of
an interpretive claim? Can anything so contribute? In short, yes. I take it to
be untenable, first of all, that the only kinds of statements that are critically
relevant are statements of the (logical, if not surface) grammatical form “the
work means such-and-such” or “the work has such-and-such value.” So some
sort of broadening is called for anyway, if only to reasonably account for the
actual language of criticism. It also seems to me untenable, secondly, that we
may simply legislate beforehand that certain kinds of fact or statement are
The Aims of Interpretation 111
always irrelevant to criticism.19
Intentionalists often stop at making this second point, but I urge that it is
not enough. For it only acknowledges the openness of the question, leaving
unfulfilled the demand for an answer. It is still incumbent on the intentionalist
to provide an explanation of how, as she alleges, this class of fact or statement,
concerning the artist’s biography, achieves critical relevance. Beardsley and
Wimsatt are skeptical that any critical claims can be made involving intentions as
such. This is the question I have been pressing from the start. Even if intentions
(or facts thereof ) may sometimes be mentioned in and as criticism, are they
mentioned as such? If so, how, or on what grounds? Beardsley and Wimsatt
grant that an artist’s intention is helpful to mention if it provides a hypothesis
of meaning that must then be tested against the work; but in such a case the
intention is not mentioned as such, for the intended meaning’s being intended
is not relevant to the critic’s interest in it.
Now, it may be objected that even on my proposal it is not quite intentions
as such but, more accurately, intentions as meaning-tracking that are critically
relevant. But I do not accept this construal. Granted, if criticism is to maintain a
focus on the work, not change the subject, then it is only as relevant to the work
(e.g. to its meanings) that intentions could be mentioned in and as criticism.
But my solution goes beyond the innocuous use, that of merely providing
hypotheses, for on my solution it is not merely the content of the intended
meaning that makes the intention critically relevant—though in some sense it
is just this which is value-maximizing—but also its being intended, for part of
what it is for the intention to “track” a work-meaning is its being a certain sort
of intention, a constituent of a network of mental states of a relevantly astute
artist. The standard use a critic makes of “meaning-tracking” intentions is thus
sensitive to their being part of the artist’s network of mental states.
I will give examples as I proceed, but consider that an example I mentioned
near the end of the first chapter, of Dorothea Krook’s (1974) view that intentions
19. Compare with Isenberg (1949): “we cannot be sure that there is any kind of statement
about art, dictated by no matter what interest, which also cannot act as [a critical reason] . . . or,
in other words, that there is any kind of knowledge about art which cannot influence aesthetic
appreciation” (331).
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serve the critical function of “confirming” interpretations, could be viewed as
her treating such intentions as “meaning-tracking.” For she does not think
that interpretations are ever true in virtue of the artist’s intentions, but she
nevertheless takes these intentions to sometimes be insightful in a critically
relevant way. In any event, I continue by making a case such as the above for
“meaning-determining” intentions.
3.2.2 Meaning-Determining Intentions
The class of what I am calling “meaning-determining” intentions may seem to
stand in contradiction to the truth-conditions for interpretive claims that I have
separately proposed. Namely, if such intentions really do determine a work’s
meaning, does this not run against the idea that value-considerations determine
this meaning?
Not necessarily. Letme first reiterate that the class of “meaning-determining”
intentions is defined by giving a certain interpretation to (i*) and (ii*). Regard-
less of this interpretation, however, there cannot be a contradiction with my
proposed truth-conditions because (i*) and (ii*) presuppose that meaning is
to be analyzed in terms of value-considerations. My idea, in short, is that if
intentions are to be meaning-determining, they can be so only by relevantly
determining value-considerations.
But what could that mean? I above quote Stecker as claiming, in one of
his responses to the value-maximizer, that “intention-oriented criticism can
enhance appreciation as well as any other type of criticism” (2010, 147). It
wasn’t clear to me what Stecker meant by a criticism that is intention-oriented
but nevertheless enhancing of value. If he meant only that sometimes what the
artist intended corresponds to a value-maximizing interpretation, then it would
not be enough, for we must be told why the meaning’s being intended, in
addition to its being value-maximizing, is one of its critically relevant attributes.
It is not an intention-oriented criticism that does not accord intentions any sort
of distinctive role in interpretation.
What could it be for an intention to have such a distinctive role? It cannot,
evidently, be that it is merely because a meaning was intended that it is critically
The Aims of Interpretation 113
relevant. This is so because (as I have granted) interpretation is fundamentally
about value-maximization, such that value-considerations must always enter
the explanation. However, if intentions are to be explanatorily helpful to any
degree, it equally cannot be that it is merely value-considerations which make
intended meanings critically relevant. The meaning’s being intended must
be part of the reason why it is critically relevant. This is what it takes for its
being intended to be a critically relevant attribute. So, there must be some sort
of joint activity between value-considerations and intentional considerations
in rendering a certain meaning of interest to the critic (qua critic). I will say
that an intention is “meaning-determining” if the intended meaning’s being
intended is part of the reason that it is value-maximizing.
Such a configuration of reasons typically occurs when what the artist in-
tended has (what we may call) cultural influence, such that the ways of experience
which maximize the value of the work are themselves shaped by the artist’s
intentions. This may be the sort of thing Beardsley and Wimsatt have in mind
with their “intermediate kind of evidence about the character of the author or
about private or semi-private meanings attached to words by an author” (1946,
478). They say of such evidence, which they deem legitimate and critically
relevant, that “the biography of an author, his use of a word, and the associations
which the word had for him, are part of the word’s history and meaning.” This
could be so only if such facts about the artist have had enough cultural influence
to aect the history and meaning of words.
Here is one possibility of this sort. Artists rarely work in intellectual isolation.
What they try to do in their art is informed by what other artists have tried
to do or are trying to do (and, in some cases, will inform what other artists
will try to do). If a critic tasked with interpreting some work feels that its
artist has had an influence of this sort—on artists of other works that are part
of (what I above called) the broad sweep the critic is considering as part of
his value-maximization attempt—then he will give a certain unique sort of
attention to that artist’s intentions (and general intellectual background and
ambitions). The more other artists follow or interact with the ambitions and
ideas of a given artist, the more likely a critic is to mention these ambitions and
ideas (if not to advocate experiencing the work according to them), and to be
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justified in so doing.
Such cases are not, of course, all justified. We might think that some kinds
of critical decisions based on artistic influence are insidious, destructive of
aesthetic appreciation. They may, for instance, bolster false reputations. But
some critical decisions of this sort may be acceptable, for they may rely on the
critic’s sense of being in the presence of a new artistic movement, united by
certain aims and sensibilities which, due to their widespread influence, inform
what makes certain interpretations value-maximizing.20 Such are the times
when, for instance, conventions are sidelined. A standard intentionalist is likely
to view such times as a critic’s fulfilling his function of attending to the artist
as such. I am more inclined to view them as a critic’s being motivated by an
underlying commitment to value-maximization. The merit of my position lies,
I believe, in its having a plausible explanation not only of when it is proper, but
also of when improper, for a critic to bestow such attention on an artist. For if
such attention were justified by its being an aim of interpretation to get the
artist right, then it would always seem to be justified (for there is always an
artist demanding to be got right). But if such attention were justified largely by
value-considerations, then there would be (as there in fact are) many occasions
on which the demands of an artist to be got right must (to whatever extent) be
sidelined, for instance when the artist’s aims and ambitions have no bearing on
what maximizes the value of the work.
An ideal instance of the sort of case I am imagining would go as follows. An
artist has certain ideas about what she wants a certain pending artwork to be like,
what she wants it to mean. These ideas happen to be popularly disseminated
through her having given interviews or written articles (or perhaps they are
popular in the context of her earlier work). She creates and then issues this new
artwork, and critics are tasked with writing about it. One such critic might
begin by doing (what many would regard as) his due diligence in researching
the artist and her ideas, recognizing their popularity and possible adoption
by other artists, both present and future. He might further recognize that
20. An example may be the Dogme 95 movement in Danish film, which publicized its artistic
ambitions in a “manifesto” that came to serve as the lens through which all member films were
viewed. See Badley (2006).
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experiencing (what he takes to be) a relevant sweep of works in terms (partly)
of her ideas maximizes their value, i.e. that consumers of these works would
get the most value out of them by so experiencing them (and perhaps also that
cultivating such a mode of experience would be useful). He then composes
his criticism with the aim of expressing this complicated interrelation of facts,
about value and what realizes it in this work in the context of the relevant broad
sweep of other works. To do this, he has to bring in the artist’s ideas as such,
and to make his recommendation (partly) in terms of them.
In this imagined scenario, it is not merely the artist’s having the ideas (or
intentions) that makes them critically relevant, but, in addition, the intellectual
relationships in which she thereby enters with other artists and with segments
of culture more generally. At the same time, this alleged critical relevance of her
ideas is not insensitive to the fact that they are her ideas. If she had not had them,
they would not (in relevant alternatives) achieve the prominence that they did,
and so the meanings to which they led might no longer be value-maximizing
(if certain ways of experiencing would not have been in common currency). So
there is something of a symbiosis in such cases. A meaning’s attribute of value-
maximizing, which by definition secures its critical relevance, depends on the
artist’s influence, which by association makes this influence critically relevant.
Such intended meanings do not merely happen to be value-maximizing, but
are so partly in virtue of their being intended.
It may, however, be objected, as above, that I have not quite vindicated the
claim that intentions as such are critically relevant. For does not this account
track only the publicization of the intention, not the intention itself, so that
anything so publicized, whether really intended or not, wouldwield the relevant
influence and so yield the relevant value-maximization? I cannot, that is, exclude
alternatives in which all else is the same except that the artist did not really
intend the thing for which she is regarded as influential. In such alternatives,
the critic would still be licensed to interpret the work as he does in the actual
case. Hence, he is not tracking the actual intention (at best something like the
intention-as-publicized).
As before, I concede the basic point, but understand its consequences dif-
ferently. First, I take myself to be oering an account of critical principles
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that delivers a sense of critical relevance, rather than (directly) criteria for correct
or acceptable interpretations (which is what many contributors to the debate
have chosen to focus on). It is possible for there to be occasions on which a
critic following sound critical principles, which ensure the critical relevance of
his discourse, is nevertheless led astray due to contingencies which he could
not reasonably have foreseen, e.g. that the artist has lied about her intentions
but the lies have been influential enough to aect what would maximize the
value of her work. I say this not merely in acknowledgement of an epistemic
diculty, for the objector’s point is that even if the critic came to know of the
lies as such, he would still be justified in reporting only the subject of influence,
not whatever may have been the true but unknown intention. This leads me to
my second point.
I again believe it to be a virtue of my view that it only contingently brings
intentions into its orbit: if an intention is hooked up to the channels of cultural
influence in the right sort of way, then it will enjoy attention to some extent
as such, given that it could have maintained its influence even with a dierent
content (or, perhaps more accurately, that a dierent intention in its place could
have done so). One of my objections against standard varieties of intentionalism
has been that they risk making the work contingent for the sake of having
something to say about the relevance of intentions. Although the alternative
of saying that intentions are irrelevant is equally to be avoided, it is not to be
avoided by making the discovery of intentions an aim of interpretation. The
critic must at all times be oriented toward the work.
Third, I stress that this influence-based account is but one manifestation
of the more general phenomenon that I have called, for lack of a better term,
a “symbiosis” between value-considerations and biographical information. I
happen to find artistic influence a reasonably good explainer of certain kinds of
justified critical attention to facts about the artist—even if it is merely expected
influence in the case of new or unknown artists (or of newly discovered docu-
ments pertaining to established artists).21 But there may be other manifestations
21. The relevance of “expected” influence is consistent with some views about the kinds of
statements critics make. For instance, Stecker argues that sometimes critical statements take
the form of “prescriptions or suggestions” (1991, 244). This is true, in my case, both in the
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of the symbiosis, so long as facts about an artist are influencing everyday ways
of experiencing which are then recruited for the experience of art. Think of,
say, the iconography of Hitchcock’s profile, or the voice of Orson Welles, each
of which is critically relevant if it enters into the reasons why some interpre-
tation of a work is value-maximizing. This, moreover, is a way in which the
intentionalism debate can be opened up to all biographical information, for on
such an account there is no dierence in principle between the influence of
intentions and the influence of other facts about an artist.
Let me now illustrate some of my claims in this chapter, in particular how
they may fit into an overall value-maximizing view, by means of an extended
example.
3.3 Wood and Plan 9
A much talked about example in the literature is the film Plan 9 from Outer
Space (1957), directed by Ed Wood. The dispute has turned on how facts about
Wood should make themselves felt in what we deem acceptable interpretations
of the film. I will disagree with the standard intentionalist treatment of the
example, represented in Carroll (1992). But I will also go beyond the standard
response of the value-maximizer, represented in Goldman (1995). In particular,
I will be describing a kind of justifiable critical attention to Wood’s biography
that appeals to, rather than contradicts, the demands of value-maximization.
Carroll provides a description of the film which we can treat as a starting
point:
Plan 9 from Outer Space is a cheap, slapdash attempt to make a
feature film for very little, and in cutting corners to save money it
violates—in outlandish ways—many of the decorums of Hollywood
filmmaking that later avant-gardists also seek to aront.. . . Given
the venueWood tracked in, it seems that the best hypothesis about
sense that critics make recommendations as to experience, and in the sense that sometimes they
act as if certain of the artist’s beliefs and ambitions had the relevant influence (expecting that
they would, or believing that they should, when properly publicized).
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his intentions is that he was attempting to imitate the Hollywood
style of filmmaking in the cheapest way possible. (1992, 119-120)
Since Wood’s intention was to “imitate the Hollywood style of filmmaking,”
Carroll believes that we must interpret the film according to this style—to
which I will hereafter refer as “Classical style.”22 So, for example, the film’s
“narrative discontinuities and editing howlers” should be interpreted as just that,
discontinuities and howlers, failures to conform to Classical style.
The value-maximizer is said to propose an alternative. She, like Carroll,
notices that certain avant-garde films include features very similar to those of
Wood’s film: “disturbances of continuity editing, disorienting narrative ellipses,
or disruptions of eyeline matches.” She also follows Carroll in holding that the
right way to interpret such features in the case of the avant-garde films is as
“subversions of a dominant and ideologically suspect form of filmmaking.” But
she is then said to propose that Wood’s films, too, be so experienced—not as
blunders and mistakes, which makes them less satisfying, but as subversions.
That so experiencing them would make them more satisfying provides not only
practical grounds for doing so (for who does not want satisfying experiences?),
but critical grounds. The maximization of value is said to be what makes this
the right way to experience Wood’s films.
Carroll objects by denying that canonical interpretations of the relevant
avant-garde films are to be explained in terms of value-maximization. It is
not because such interpretations make for satisfying experiences that they are
favoured, he says, but because of the artist’s intentions. The avant-garde film-
makers intended their features as transgressions, such that, “given the historical
evolution of the language game in which avant-garde filmmaking is practiced,
the attribution of such meanings to [these] films is warranted . . . on intention-
alist grounds” (119). Since Wood’s intentions are dierent—indeed, they had
to have been, adds Carroll, because the relevant avant-garde practices were not
“available” to Wood23—we are not under any pressure to interpret his films in
22. See Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson (1985) for a canonical explication of this style.
23. I am not sure what it is appropriate to say Wood had “available” to him, but the claim
cannot be merely about “later avant-garde,” for there have been transgressions of Classical
style as long as there has been such a style. I will therefore use the term “avant-garde” rather
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the same way as we do the avant-garde films. The comparison does not hold
up.
Actual value-maximizers are likely to deny that they are committed to the
alternative Carroll describes. One way they could do this is by denying that so
interpreting Wood’s films is in fact value-maximizing. Goldman makes such a
reply:
The deeper question here is whether the experience of this work
really would be better if we thought that the disconcerting tech-
niques were intentional aronts to the film establishment.. . . [T]o
think that all deviations from established methods, even when they
are intentional, indicate positive values, is to place too high a value
on mere originality.. . . [I]n this case I doubt that interpreting as
intentional deviations features of a film that appear to be mistakes
precisely because they make the experience of it so unsatisfying
would make that experience any better. (1995, 114)
As I understand Carroll, however, he is not accusing the value-maximizer
of placing too high a value on originality (or on any other such thing). His
accusation is rather that the value-maximizer is forced to assimilate Wood’s
films to those of a superficially similar avant-garde, whatever may be the value-
maximal interpretation appropriate to the latter. Goldman suggests that not “all
deviations from established methods . . . indicate positive values,” but he must
have some account of value-maximal interpretations of avant-garde films, even
if their value is not due merely to their deviations from established methods.
His account will presumably advert to interpretations that are responsive to
certain other, more complex values (those to which canonical interpretations of
avant-garde films advert). But then the question is how he can withhold the
latter interpretations fromWood’s films, given that, in virtue of the (alleged)
similarity of features,Wood’s films, too, would be benefited by such interpreta-
tions. In other words, the value-maximizer cannot justify a dierential critical
loosely, as applying to pretty much any film which systematically indulges in what Carroll calls
“transgression” of Classical style. This would include the works of certain Japanese filmmakers
in the 1930s (e.g. Naruse) no less than those of certain French filmmakers of the 1960s (e.g.
Godard, whom Carroll mentions).
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treatment of the avant-garde films and Wood’s films. Goldman does not oer
any reasons in support of such dierential treatment. Carroll’s reason invokes
artistic intentions: the avant-gardist, unlike Wood, intended her deviations, so
that only former’s work is to be read as “transgressive.”24
Intuitions may vary here, but mine dictate that we should not seek too stren-
uously to make such a dierentiation. There will, of course, be an undeniable
historical dierence in who the relevant artists are, when they are practising their
art, under which conditions, and so on. Wood was an independent filmmaker
who had few ties to any sort of industry. The avant-gardists Carroll seems to
be imagining are more organized, have coherent ideological goals, and are
working from dierent traditions than was Wood. These are all facts about
which it is worthwhile to educate oneself as a consumer of art (especially of these
artworks). But it is a separate and further question how one should interpret
these works. To the extent that the function of interpretation is to facilitate
satisfying aesthetic experience, and (let us suppose) it is satisfying to experience
Wood’s films somewhat in the way certain avant-garde films are satisfyingly
experienced, it does indeed seem legitimate for a critic to encourage consumers
to so experience Wood’s films. The value-maximizer need not shrink from this
consequence.
However, it is unclear whether assimilating the experience of Wood’s films
to that of certain avant-garde films would be satisfying. Goldman doubts the
value of mere “deviations from established methods.” What he may mean is that
the sort of deviations one finds in avant-garde films—the good ones, at any rate—
are simply more sophisticated, more conducive to valuable experience, than
are the chaotic deviations one finds in Wood’s films. In particular, the former
are easier to see as adding up to something. It may thus be more worthwhile to
get oneself to experience them as “subversions,” given the consistency one will
find across a range of such works, having cultivated such habits of experience.
Meanwhile, it is not clear that even if one gets oneself in a position to satisfyingly
24. This also obviates replies such as that made by Dickie (2006), which deny that “transgres-
sion” is an aesthetically relevant property. For the issue is not about what specifically is valuable
about avant-garde films but how the relevant features of Wood’s films are not to be deemed
similarly valuable. Carroll’s objection may thus be viewed as a variant of objections from cases
of indiscernibles.
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experience one of Wood’s films as “subversive,” it will have much bearing on
others of Wood’s films (let alone wider ranges of art), if nothing consistently
unites these films in the nature of their respective “subversions.”
Now, it so happens, I think, that Wood’s films are to some extent so unified,
but the ways in which their “subversions” may satisfyingly be experienced dier
from those in which the “subversions” of the relevant avant-garde films may
be. This is sucient for the value-maximizer as far as dierentiation of critical
treatment is concerned (between Wood’s films and the relevant avant-garde
films). But it also acknowledges that there will be some overlap. A critic writing
in an environment in which a significant avant-garde movement is thriving
should be seen as unperceptive if he completely ignores this movement in
his discussion of films which could satisfyingly be experienced in the light
of that movement. This does not, of course, require deluding oneself as to
Wood’s intentions. It is probably true that Wood had no avant-garde intentions,
that his deviations from Classical style are mere inept bumbling. But if his
product bears interesting similarities to other sorts of films, such that cultivated
habits of experiencing the latter could be retroactively applied, it would seem
to be incumbent on a practice whose aim is to guide consumers to aesthetic
satisfaction to avail itself of such possibilities. Carroll is correct to identify this
as a commitment of value-maximization, but he overestimates its harm.
Let me demonstrate this by looking at an actual critic he accuses of per-
petrating the harm: J. Hoberman, who follows something of the logic of a
value-maximizer. The fact that Hoberman’s article (the one which Carroll cites)
is entitled “Bad Movies” (1980) should tip us o that we are in for something
more complex than blind praise. Carroll says that Hoberman “began to project
[avant-garde] readings backward,” but this cannot quite be true, for Hoberman
did not view avant-garde films as “bad.”25
Hoberman calls the category in which he places Wood’s films “objectively
bad films,” and begins by outlining some reasons to be interested in it. First,
that “tastes change; that many, if not most, of the films we admire were once
dismissed as inconsequential trash; and that trash itself is not without certain
25. See Hoberman (1981).
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socio-aesthetic charms.” Second, that “bad movies have a pedagogic use value—
the evolution of film form has largely been based upon mistakes.” Third, that
movies, to a certain degree, have a life of their own.26 They mix the
documentary with the fictional, and the worst [inadvertencies]27
of one can easily overwhelm the best intentions of the other. That
is, it is possible for a movie to succeed because it has failed. (7)
Each of Hoberman’s reasons is important to consider. The first points out the
critic’s responsibility to changing tastes: how she talks about works ought to
be sensitive to the environment in which she is talking about them, to the
consumers she takes herself to be addressing. The second reason ventures a
sort of connection between the mistakes of yesterday and the avant-garde of
today. While I don’t think it is quite plausible to view Wood as some sort
of precursor to a future avant-garde, it is not unlikely that his eorts were
appreciated by subsequent filmmakers whose own eorts we are inclined to see
in a better light. (I say more about this below.) The third reason most informs
Hoberman’s approach to Wood’s films, which he treats as open possibilities for
valuable experience. That he will not in the process distort them is suggested
by his resting his case on their failure.28
Hoberman defines objectively bad films as those which are “so incoherent
that they unmade themselves”:
The conventional narrative film . . . asks an indulgent acceptance of
its own diegetic, or fictive, space. The badly-made unconvincing
film confounds this minimal requirement by ignoring or (more
often) bungling the most rudimentary precepts of screen naturalism.
(1980, 8)
26. Compare with Beardsley (1970): “The literary text . . . has a will, or at least a way, of its
own. The sense it makes—along with the sound it makes—is what it oers for our aesthetic
contemplation” (37).
27. This is a correction from a reprint (1991, 13).
28. The genre to which he is thus gesturing is camp, in particular what Susan Sontag (1967)
calls “naïve” or “pure” camp, the value of which lies in something quite other than what the artist
sincerely intended. Although there are clear anities between naïve camp and Hoberman’s
category of the objectively bad film, the latter is specifically tailored to Wood’s oeuvre (among
others).
The Aims of Interpretation 123
It is in a blatant sort of unconvincingness that the value of the objectively bad
film is said to reside. Its failed “phoniness,” an “often poignant, heightened
realism induced by . . . a failure to convince,” is “more authentic . . . than the
naturalism achieved by successfully phony” films (viz. those which are exemplary
of Classical style). “Poor acting and ludicrous dialogue” are not enough, for
many ordinarily bad or sub-par films have such features. An objectively bad
film “must relentlessly draw one’s attention away from its absurd plot.”
So much Carroll might accept, that there is such a category of film. What
draws his ire, however, is that Hoberman veers toward the characteristics of
the avant-garde, as when Hoberman takes objectively bad films to “acknowl-
edge” the view that “the seamless ‘equipment-free aspect of reality’ that movies
presented on screen was actually the ‘height of artifice’ ” (8). In these films,
Hoberman says, “the lie of ‘chronology’ is confounded by imperfect continuity;
‘invisible’ editing is ruptured by mismatched cuts; mise en scène is foregrounded
by cloddish bits of business.” Carroll would deny that the listed features do the
mentioned things, for the artists of objectively bad films do not have intentions
to this eect.
Hoberman is admittedly walking a thin line here. He wants to praise certain
aspects of objectively bad films in terms similar to those in which avant-garde
films are praised, without quite assimilating the former to the latter. He says,
immediately following the lines I have just quoted, that “[a] good bad movie is
a philosophers’ stone that converts the incompetent mistakes of naïve dross into
modernist gold.” This, again, is precisely what irritates Carroll, for, to his mind,
incompetent mistakes just are not modernist gold. For Hoberman, however,
“[s]uch movies are unstable objects,” and their value lies in their instability.
By the time of Hoberman’s writing, there were certain established modes of
experience thought to pertain to films which “transgressed” the boundaries of
Classical style. Revel in the transgression, the critic would say, enjoy the delirium of
breaks in the façade! Stilted acting, odd changes of camera angle, jarring ellipses,
all of these were to be taken in stride as part of a certain overall experience. In the
normal (Classical) mode, we are encouraged to pause over such elements, strain
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to not be led o by them.29 In the alternative mode, we allow ourselves the
luxury of being so led o. Hoberman is thus drawing on established alternative
modes of experience and extending them for the purpose of opening up films
that, he believes, have not been milked for all that they are worth.
Such would be a way to develop the sort of reasoning Carroll attributes to
the value-maximizer, and it does not seem to me all that implausible. But the
value-maximizer could, again, believe, as I mention above, that the value of
Wood’s films is not enhanced by experiencing them as one does the relevant
avant-garde films; that, furthermore, to maximize the values of these films in
the context of any sensible wider range of works is to treat them as inferior
products of Classical style. I myself don’t believe this, so I will not attempt
to defend it, but it is possible under my refinement of value-maximization
theory, which is sensitive to the fact that consumers of works cannot adopt
idiosyncratic experiential attitudes at whim. Hoberman contends that Wood’s
films just cannot be experienced in Classical style (so “unmade” are they). This
may well be the case. But it may equally be that they cannot be experienced in
the “avant-garde” mode either, in which case, if a critic nevertheless wishes to
make something of them, some other set of recommendations as to experience
must be found. My own view is that the sort of value-maximization account I
have just rehearsed, using Hoberman, is more or less correct. This does not,
however, exclude the critical relevance of Wood’s biography, as I will next
attempt to show.
3.3.1 Wood’s Biography
Let me say, first of all, that, regardless of what we think about this case, it is not
incumbent on the metacritic to always provide for such a relevance of the artist.
Often enough, works may be interpreted and evaluated in the absence of any
serious attention to the artist’s biography. I believe this maps reasonably well
29. Of course, in one sense we should not pause over them, should set them aside as mistakes
that are not to be assimilated into our experience of the film (its diegetic reality). But even to
do this much one must mark them o as such, for if they are unreflectively assimilated then one
will be forced to make odd and irrelevant presuppositions (on the fly, as it were). For example,
a continuity error, if noticed, needs to be paused over and bracketed, rather than simply taken
in stride.
The Aims of Interpretation 125
onto the practice of critics, which does not always bestow such attention. The
theoretical task is to adequately account for the kinds of attention to the artist
one does find, while also maintaining some sort of normative or prescriptive
standard that rules some of it critically irrelevant (notwithstanding any given
critic’s beliefs to the contrary).
In the case of Wood’s films, it seems to me that critics will have more
opportunity than is normally the case to focus on “meaning-determining”
intentions, and far less than is normally the case to focus on “meaning-tracking”
intentions. For Wood has had, I will argue, a certain cultural influence that has
aected what makes certain interpretations of his films value-maximizing, even
though it is not clear that very many of his intentions “tracked” the meanings
attributed by such interpretations. Consequently, the sort of critical attention I
will attempt to explain concerns biographical facts (not necessarily intentions)
that I will say are “meaning-determining.”
The demands on a critic of Wood’s films to mention the man himself, his
biography and intentions, are dierent today than they were during Wood’s
lifetime. Some background history is required to appreciate this. Consider,
first, the fact that the year of Hoberman’s article there also appeared an in-
fluential, tongue-in-cheek book by the Medved brothers entitled The Golden
Turkey Awards, a compendium of “bad” films in which Wood is awarded the
(dis)honourable title of “Worst Director of All Time,” and Plan 9 “Worst Film
of All Time.” This development had a remarkable eect on Wood’s reputation.
As one recent critic, Rob Craig, describes it,
[w]hat many film bus took from the Medved books, again under-
scoring their overall contribution to popular culture, was a curiosity
towards the filmmakers and films discussed.. . . If their object was
to scare people away from [Plan 9] by claiming it “the worst film
of all time” (which seems doubtful), the Medveds failed in this task,
for the obvious eect of glorifying the film was thus to make it
a highly sought after, increasingly popular cult film attraction . . .
(2009, 138-139)
Craig goes on to oer an interpretation of Plan 9 along the lines of what I
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have already discussed, e.g. that it has certain “shocking” elements: “abstract,
‘symbolic’ special eects; shameless, incongruous clowning on the part of several
characters; a treasure trove of nonsense verbiage.” Like Hoberman, he does not
want to
suggest that Wood was consciously trying to create a dramatic
shock-piece along the lines of a Samuel Beckett or Eugene Ionesco,
only that it is peculiar and intriguing that some of the most striking
and unique elements of post-modern Absurdist drama managed to
find their way into Plan 9, either by accident or intuitive foresight
on the part of its author. (141)
Let us set aside the possibility of “intuitive foresight” (though it is not entirely
implausible). So far we have an interpretation roughly like Hoberman’s. Craig,
however, goes on to pepper his with facts about Wood, such as that Wood
had an “obsession” with “all things religious and metaphysical,” on which fact
Craig draws for his interpretive claim that Plan 9 “looks like a religious drama.”
He bolsters this claim by mentioning that “Plan 9 was primarily produced
by transplanted Southern Baptists, who also played several key parts in the
film, and in addition insisted that the performers be baptized before production
commenced” (142). We are here clearly entering the territory of a more
traditional sort of interpretation (if concerning some peculiar facts), and one
therefore wonders what exactly is the basis of Craig’s critical interest in Wood’s
biography.
He mentions that he is relying mainly on two prominent sources for histori-
cal details, a documentary, Flying Saucers Over Hollywood–The Plan 9 Companion
(1991), and a biography by Rudolph Grey, Nightmare of Ecstasy: The Life and
Art of Edward D. Wood (1992). What is interesting to me is that people found
it worthwhile to create such documentaries and to research and write such
biographies. Surely there was no such interest at the time Wood was making
his films, and arguably very little even when Hoberman wrote his article. The
interest seems to have picked up after the book by the Medveds, and to have
been cemented around the time Carroll was writing in 1992. Since then we
have been living in the aftermath of a cemented such interest in Wood and
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his films. Craig, writing in 2009, is sensitive to this aftermath. I mention all
this because I propose to analyze (some of ) Craig’s critical interest in Wood in
terms of the latter’s now much larger influence.
Wood has garnered a reputation for making bad films that oer aesthetically
enjoyable experiences if approached a certain way. This has generated historical
interest in the life and times of a man who could be capable of making such
films, which presumably are dicult to make even if one tries. Wood appears
to have done it without trying—that is to say, without trying to oer precisely
such rewards. Clearly he was trying to do something, and those interested in
the latter rewards may believe it to be worthwhile to inquire into what Wood
was trying to do. When such facts about him become widely known, and when
artists begin to inquire after them and to incorporate into their art-making
the fruits of their inquiries, then this bit of art history has gathered steam of its
own accord, so to speak, and managed to dictate valuable ways of experiencing.
Such is, I contend, one sort of critical relevance of Wood’s aims and ambitions.
I have already outlined how the first part of this narrative unfolded, bringing
Wood and his films to a sort of cultural prominence. The second part, involving
artists being influenced by Wood, may be seen best in the example of the
director Tim Burton. His interest in Wood is on display in his 1994 biopic, Ed
Wood (the screenplay for which, incidentally, is based on the Grey biography I
mention above). While it is true that a director may make a biopic about some
figure whose artistic intentions he is not influenced by, such is not the case with
Burton and Wood. Although Burton’s output is more diverse, and securely in
the domain of Classical style, it may be regarded as similar to Wood’s in certain
respects. It is, for instance,
filled with imagery that is morbid or grotesque. He spends vast
amounts of money creating films within genres that are either
past their sell-by date or reserved for the straight-to-video market.
He has produced a body of work that focuses on the outcasts of
society. His villains are rarely resolutely evil—they’re normally
misunderstood. Traditional narrative techniques exist in his films,
but are secondary to image and feeling. In some senses his output is
belittled by mere description—a film about a man who has scissors
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instead of hands may sound trite but needs to be felt. (Odell and
Blanc 2005, 11)
It may be a stretch to say that Burton consciously replicates Wood’s unconscious
output, but clearly he has absorbed a certain aesthetic that, in much of its
original realization, was not designed to reward the kind of attention that he,
now, consciously seeks.30
In order to so harness this aesthetic, Burton needed to examine themechanics
of its original realization, part of which involved looking at what Wood (as
one of these influences) was trying to do. There is indeed evidence of Burton’s
having done this. Aside from having already been a fan of Wood,31 he also
researched him in preparation for making the biopic:
“When I read Ed Wood’s letters, I was very taken with how he
perceived himself,” Tim Burton says. “He wrote about his films as
if he was making Citizen Kane, you know, whereas other people
perceived them as, like, the worst movies ever. In American culture
it’s so easy to make fun of people. But, however good or bad Ed
Wood’s films were, the fact is that he did what he did with a passion
that is lacking in a lot of people in America.” (Dwyer 1994)
Part of a critic’s interest in Wood’s biography may thus be an interest in his
passions, and to the extent that directors such as Tim Burton are themselves
interested in Wood’s passions, so far as to be influenced by them, a critic’s
interest in these same passions may be justified on value-maximizing grounds,
in the manner I propose above. For what makes it the case that the mode of
30. Burton also accomplishes some of whatWood tried unsuccessfully to accomplish in Classical
style. There are demonstrations of this in Ed Wood, in which certain re-creations of scenes from
Wood’s films are interestingly related to depicted events from Wood’s life, the latter eectively
conveying, among other things, the pathos for which Wood clearly strove.
31. Burton says that he “grew up loving Plan 9, which is a movie you see when you’re a kid
and it remains with you. And then later on, Wood gets acknowledged as the worst director in
the world, and then starts to get a little bit more known, and then there are festivals, and they
show his movies and everybody laughs at them. But the thing is, when you watch his movies,
yeah, they are bad, but they’re special. There’s some reason why these movies remain there,
and are acknowledged, beyond the fact that they’re purely bad. There’s a certain consistency
to them, and a certain kind of weird artistry” (1995, 130-131).
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experience which now maximizes the value of Wood’s films is in common
currency is partly that Wood’s aims and ambitions (his “passions”) had a certain
influence on the culture and on what subsequent art looked like (e.g. in and
through Burton’s Ed Wood). Knowing that Wood was “passionate” came to
aect what modes of experience were deemed appropriate, not just for Wood’s
films but for films such as his, as he enjoyed greater and greater notoriety.
A critic writing about Wood’s films today may include some of Burton’s in
the relevant broad sweep of artworks. This would lead him to certain meanings,
or recommendations as to experience, that would, if not quite correspond
with, at least be sensitive to what Wood was trying to do. A recognition of
the influence of Wood’s ambitions and methods would, that is, give the critic
a reason to talk about Wood (in addition, perhaps, to talking about Burton,
who has had his own influence). This does not quite vindicate, for instance,
Craig’s invocation of Wood’s religious intentions, unless some such network of
influence could be established for these (or shown to be assumed by Craig).32
But it may justify a great deal of talk about those of Wood’s biographical details
which are held to have been influential.
Such a way of accounting for the critical relevance of biographical informa-
tion has an advantage that is especially visible in the present case. It explains
why it would not have seemed appropriate for Hoberman, writing in 1980, to
launch into details of Wood’s biography, while it does seem appropriate for
Craig, writing in 2009, to have done this. There are interlocking intuitions
here. If Hoberman had even been able to discuss the details ofWood’s biography
then perhaps his having had access to them would have indicated a standing
cultural interest in Wood that may itself have rendered a biographical interest
prima facie critically relevant. This is because such cultural facts are related to
what would be value-maximizing for members of that culture, what modes of
experience are in common currency.
It seems to me that such an account can also help explain certain lingering
intuitions about why it is important for biographical information to be public,
32. It may be significant that the production history I have quoted Craig as mentioning is
dramatized in Ed Wood. One might also, I suppose, try to explain such of Craig’s claims as
being sensitive to Wood’s (however limited) “meaning-tracking” intentions.
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rather than private. This, on my account, would not be some metaphysical
status but a social one, of publicization. It has been dicult to theoretically
motivate the relevance of such a status, many contributors to the debate finding
it arbitrary (Carroll 2001). But the reason I provide makes it relevant in terms
of relations of influence, for which some publicization is necessary. Private
diaries, read by nobody, cannot be influential.
CHAPTER 4
Intentions and Evaluation
[C]ritics who ask not ‘what is it like to be reading this’ but ‘what does this mean’ . . .
customarily have in mind something like the content usually and properly associated
with non-dramatic discourse, philosophy, or sociological psychology . . . [but] it is
necessary to stress that in dramatic literature the primary concern of literary criticism
is the way we apprehend the meaning, our experience of it rather than the meaning
itself, abstractly considered.
– Richard Poirier1
I introduced in the previous chapter the rudiments of a metacritical intentional-
ism that supervenes on value-maximization theory. It may be wondered what
is the significance of the latter choice, why some other theory of meaning
could not suce. One advantage, to be explored in this chapter, is that it
gives intentionalists something to say about the relation between intentions
and evaluation, a subject about which they have been conspicuously silent.
Intentionalists might wish so to remain, but anti-intentionalists have exerted
certain pressures to break them out of their silence. I describe such pressures in
the first part of the chapter and make a case for their force. In the second part, I
consider some ways intentionalists have tried to relieve the pressure, and argue
that none of them are entirely satisfactory. In the final part, I outline how a
metacritical variety of intentionalism may lead to a better solution.
1. The Comic Sense of Henry James: A Study of the Early Novels. (1960) 1967. Revised ed.
Chatto & Windus, 62-63.
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4.1 The Value-Sensitivity Objection
Beardsley and Wimsatt’s stated thesis is that “the design or intention of the
author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a
work of literary art” (1946, 468). This appears to speak only to evaluation—“the
success of a work”—yet much of what Beardsley and Wimsatt go on to argue
involves both evaluation and interpretation. Even though they disambiguate the
two terms in subsequent writings, it is still not clear to which they give priority.
Peckham (1976) claims that “their argument amounts to the proposition that
intention is irrelevant to evaluation because it is irrelevant to interpretation”
(141). This may be true, but they could also have argued the reverse, that
intention is irrelevant to interpretation because it is irrelevant to evaluation.
Such, at least, in outline, is the objection I will consider here.
Gaut (1993) oers a nascent version of the objection, useful to discuss as
relevant background. He seizes onwhat he describes as intentionalism’s commit-
ment to “the interpretation/evaluation dichotomy: this claims that interpretation
is independent of evaluation, and that, consequently, accounts of interpretation
and evaluation are independent of each other.” Such a commitment is said to
be
fortunate for the intentionalist since, when applied to evaluation,
intentionalism is obviously false. The fact that an artist intends to
produce a great work of art is neither necessary nor sucient for
her to make such a work. Such an intention indicates her ambition,
but does not measure her achievement. (498)
By “dichotomy,” Gaut means not merely a distinction between the dichotomized
things but a claim of their theoretical independence, in particular the claim that
one may theorize interpretation independently of evaluation. It seems possible
to deny such an independence claim (as I will call it) without denying that there
is some sort of distinction between interpretation and evaluation—indeed, some
sort of “dichotomy.” Gaut’s arguments against what he calls “the dichotomy
paradigm” need to be understood in this light: he is not arguing that there is no
distinction between interpretation and evaluation, only that the former cannot
be theorized in isolation from the latter.
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One question we may have is whether Gaut is correct that intentionalists
are committed to this independence claim. I am inclined to agree with him
at least to the extent that intentionalists tend to elide the subject of evaluation
when giving their intentionalist views. Of course, intentionalists will often,
qua philosophers of art, have views about evaluation, but these need not be,
and indeed never are, intentionalist views. This is how intentionalists, to Gaut’s
mind, treat interpretation and evaluation as theoretically independent. They
oer an intentionalist view of interpretation, and something else entirely in the
case of evaluation.
But how prevalent is this? Gaut gives the example of Richard Wollheim’s
Art and Its Objects and Painting as an Art, noting that these works have “almost
nothing to say” about evaluation. Wollheim does, it bears mentioning (and
Gaut mentions it in a footnote), have a short supplementary essay on evaluation
in the second edition of Art and Its Objects, the first lines of which essay contain
an admission that “the topic of the evaluation of art” was a “deliberate omission”
from the main text (1980a, 227). But Wollheim’s ideas about evaluation in this
essay do not continue, or in any way connect with, his intentionalist theory
of interpretation, which he details in another supplementary essay (“Criticism
as Retrieval”) and later in Painting as an Art. This is a striking example for
Gaut, because Wollheim is a prominent figure in the intentionalism debate,
one whose lead many contemporary intentionalists follow.
It is important to see, however, that Gaut’s point is not merely such a
sociological one, simply that intentionalists have tended to theorize interpretation
independently of evaluation. It is instead a conceptual point about intentionalism
itself: intentionalists are said to be wise to stay away from intentionalist views of
evaluation because there is supposed to be something essential to intentionalism
that just does not apply to evaluation, and intentionalists tacitly pick up on it
even if they do not explicitly acknowledge it.
I will raise objections to this conceptual claim later, drawing on the meta-
critical view I introduced in the previous chapter. But first I want to join
Gaut in arguing against the independence claim. For I agree with him that
interpretation cannot, nor should we desire it to, be theorized independently
of evaluation.
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4.1.1 The Evaluative Stance
One of Gaut’s arguments against the independence claim is based on what
he calls “the evaluative stance.” He claims that in seeking out artworks one is
looking
for a valuable experience, and what one values includes not just
pleasure, but also encompasses cognitive insight, experience of
emotional depth, etc. Nevertheless, it is true that one takes an
evaluative stance in reading, for one’s concerns are not purely (non-
evaluatively) cognitive: one does not research novels, one appreciates
them. This evaluative stance manifests itself at the level of inter-
pretation too. One criterion for a new interpretation being an
improvement over others is that, on the proered interpretation,
one can see a work that before seemed boring, inane and lacking
in coherence as lively, profound and vital. (1993, 599)
Gaut thus concludes that “[t]he revelation of value counts towards the correct-
ness of interpretation,” not as the “sole criterion” but as “one criterion.”
All of this strikes me as very similar to the Aesthetic Argument (covered in
the previous chapter). The first premise of such an argument is a function-of-art
claim that identifies this function as that of aording aesthetic satisfaction. So
Gaut says that in seeking out artworks one is looking for valuable experience.
The second premise is a claim about the dependence of the function of inter-
pretation on the function of art, i.e. that, as Carroll puts it, interpretation is
an “adjunct to artistic consumption.” So Gaut says that the evaluative stance
“manifests itself at the level of interpretation.” He doesn’t say why, or give
any reasons for thinking this, but clearly he has in mind some such idea as
interpretation’s being an adjunct to experience. The conclusions of the two
arguments are also roughly the same. Both for Gaut and for the Aesthetic
Argument, it is that value-considerations are criterial for correct interpretation.
I take what Gaut says here to bring out a latent commitment of the Aes-
thetic Argument. This is that, by defining interpretation in such a way, as a
practice of value-maximizing, one gets not only a conception of interpreta-
tion but an overall conception of criticism in which evaluative concerns are
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given priority. Criticism is undertaken with an “evaluative stance.” A problem
with Gaut’s argument, however, is that it arrives at this more general claim
by presupposing value-maximization theory (via something like the Aesthetic
Argument). Although I agree with much of what he says, it will be more useful
for my purposes to characterize this stance somewhat independently of any
overt value-maximization theory. Someone who does this to my satisfaction
is Peter Lamarque (2002). I therefore articulate the objection in which I am
interested in terms of (what I take to be) his characterization of the evaluative
stance.
Lamarque argues that a lot of people havemistaken ideas about what literary2
interpretation really is. He begins his discussion by co-opting a three-part
distinction of Beardsley’s (1958), between “explication,” “elucidation,” and
“interpretation”:
For Beardsley, to explicate is “to determine the contextual meanings
of a group of words”; to elucidate is “to determine parts of the world
of the work, such as character and motives, that are not explicitly
reported in it”; and to interpret is “to determine the themes and theses
of a literary work, given the contextual meanings of the words and
a complete description of the world of the work.” (Lamarque 2002,
291)
Let us call the last category interpretation*, to dierentiate it from the more
ordinary notion that is often taken to encompass all three activities. I leave it
open whether ultimately the concept of interpretation should be restricted to
interpretation*.
The interest of this division concerns method. As Beardsley notes, “the
three processes of understanding literature are dierent enough in method
to demand dierent names” (1958, 403). Lamarque seems to concur. About
explication, he observes that it “most readily lends itself to the appropriation
of models of meaning from outside literary practice,” such as “conversation”
and “utterance meaning” (2002, 291). With respect to elucidation, he voices
his dissatisfaction, in league with Kendall Walton, with popular means of
2. He restricts his attention to literary works, but my focus is more expansive.
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adjudication like “the Reality Principle” and the “Mutual Belief Principle” (295).
And about interpretation* he argues, concerning themes, that their “elicitation
as an organizing principle of the work demands, and is a product of, a kind of
imaginative reconstruction on the part of a reader” (298).
Proposals of such restrictions on the label “interpretation” are commonly
made on epistemic grounds, e.g. regarding the puzzling aspects of that which
is interpreted (Barnes 1988). Lamarque speaks in this way sometimes, argu-
ing that a conversational activity is properly called interpretation only when
communication “breaks down” or when words are taken not to be “honestly
or straightforwardly spoken.” But his real reason for so restricting the label
appeals to evaluative grounds, for he thinks that interpretation* has “less to do
with meaning as such, or with understanding, than with appreciation of a spe-
cial kind” (2002, 290). What kind? That which is “constituted by just such a
reconstruction [i.e. imaginative] of the work’s underlying themes” (298).
In Lamarque’s view, explication and elucidation are “subordinate” to inter-
pretation*, which in turn must answer to “the work at large and, what is more
important, to questions about the interest of the work and its value” (297). Each
of these critical activities is goal-oriented: explication and elucidation are un-
dertaken for the sake of supporting some interpretive* activity, and this activity
itself is undertaken for the sake of appreciating the work in some respect. There
are certain values a work has, and certain reasons why we may be interested in
it. We interpret* the work for these reasons, and for the appreciation of these
values.
Imaginative reconstruction fits in as follows. The immediate objects of
interpretation* are, as I say above, what Lamarque calls themes:
Literary themes, which serve to exhibit a work’s unity, are iden-
tifiable with more or less specificity: as abstract concepts (pride,
despair, jealousy, ambition), as noun phrases (the futility of war,
the conflict between desire and duty), as propositions (fate disrupts
the best-laid plans), or in other forms besides.. . . Standardly, the
focus of interest at the thematic level rests not in the bare statement
of a theme but in the manner in which the theme is elicited and
supported through interpretation[*]. (297-98)
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So our interest in the work (at least one prominent sort of interest) concerns the
work’s themes, and this interest is satisfied by our eliciting and supporting such
themes through interpretation*. The reason why we need a distinct such pro-
cess, interpretation*, beyond merely explication and elucidation, is that themes
are not, like “semantic meaning,” “properties of the linguistic text inherent in
the language”; rather, “[t]hey ‘emerge’ only under imaginative reconstruction”
(302). In particular, they are features which the “work possesses under a con-
ception.” The results of explication and elucidation on which interpretation*
draws come to be “of literary interest only relative to a certain perspective” on
the work. “What is happening here,” Lamarque explains, “is related to . . . the
assigning of ‘salience’ ” (303).
As an example of interpretation*, i.e. of “an imaginative exploration of a
work’s thematic content on the assumption of an aesthetic payo,” Lamarque
mentions critic J. Hillis Miller’s characterization of a “mirror motif in Our
Mutual Friend.” Miller is said to take “a certain perspective on the novel and
scenes within it,” under which perspective certain events are interpreted* as
“concrete revelation[s] of the way the lives of . . . people are self-mirroring” (qtd.
303). Lamarque does not take “the image of the mirror, fulfilling this symbolic
function” to be “an intrinsic part of the text (i.e., sentences) of the novel, even
though the occurrences described are objectively present.” Rather, the mirror
motif is a function of certain (value-laden) saliences assigned by the interpreter
to these “objectively present” occurrences.
Now, we might not agree with all of this—e.g. the distinction between
“semantic meaning” and “emergent” properties—but I propose to accept Lamar-
que’s general conception of interpretation* as a privileged critical activity distinct
from others which are more subordinate. The idea of an “evaluative stance”
is represented in Lamarque’s belief that this privileged activity is essentially
value-sensitive, guided by value considerations.
Lamarque, however, it turns out, holds intentionalism in low esteem, rele-
gating it to the largely unexciting task of explication:
Suppose we were to follow what I take to be a fairly widespread
practice among critics and adopt a relaxed view about intention:
where intentions are available and known, make use of them; where they
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are not, make do. I suggest that even in the light of that attitude the
most interesting questions about literature still remain: why literary
works are valued, what makes them distinct from other kinds of
works, what rewards are to be had from reading them, how the
literary development of themes diers from their development in
other modes of discourse, what basis there is for the selection of
canonical works, and so forth. (300)
I disagree with the claim that all of these questions, and others like them, must
remain untouched by intentionalism, and my disagreement turns on how we
are to understand “making use” of intentions. Lamarque understands it as
helping to explicate meaning, where the latter is construed narrowly as lexical
or (what is standardly called) word-sequence meaning.3 More importantly,
he does not think that intentions can be of substantive use for appreciation
of the kind that involves imaginative reconstruction. I believe that intentions
may be of precisely such use under the intentionalist view I began describing
in the previous chapter. I argue this later on. First I properly formulate the
objection that is latent in what Lamarque says. To do this, I return to Gaut and
the independence claim.
4.1.2 Independence and Value-Sensitivity
So far I have given an argument (or at least provided a sketch to the eect)
that criticism manifests an evaluative stance. If this is so, then no theory of
interpretation can entirely forgo theorizing evaluation. So the independence
claim, we can agree, is false. Gaut spends a fair amount of time on this, but little
on what strikes me as the equally pressing task of demonstrating the damage
that this, if true, is supposed to do to intentionalism.
In fact, I have quoted more or less all of what Gaut says on this score, which
spans only a few sentences. He says that “[t]he fact that an artist intends to
produce a great work of art is neither necessary nor sucient for her to make
such a work,” and that “[s]uch an intention indicates her ambition, but does
not measure her achievement.” But there is a complication in Gaut’s central
3. See, e.g., Levinson (1992) for the relevant taxonomy of meaning.
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claim that “when applied to evaluation, intentionalism is obviously false” (1993,
598, emphasis added). What does it mean to apply intentionalism to evalua-
tion? Gaut’s idea must be that the intentions which intentionalism standardly
promotes are interpretive intentions, those which speak to how the work is to be
interpreted (such as the artist’s intention that her work mean a certain thing).
But, Gaut wishes to add, to apply intentionalism to evaluation is to promote,
not interpretive, but evaluative intentions, those which speak to how the work
is to be evaluated (such as the artist’s intention that her work be great).
A consequence of the independence claim being false, Gaut seems to think,
is that intentionalism cannot so split itself into an interpretive version and
an evaluative version. If intentionalists promote interpretive intentions, they
must perforce promote (at least some) evaluative intentions. This is because
no principled theoretical distinction can be made between the relevance of
interpretive intentions as such and the relevance of evaluative intentions as
such. In other words, intentions cannot be deemed relevant or irrelevant qua
interpretive or qua evaluative. An intentionalist cannot say the following: an
intention that the work mean a certain thing is the right sort of intention
to be relevant because it speaks to how the work is to be interpreted but an
intention that the work be great is not because it speaks only to how the work is
to be evaluated. Saying something like this, which the intentionalist may wish
to do in order to disqualify apparently irrelevant intentions, presupposes the
independence claim.
Let me propose an answer that may occur to a contemporary intentionalist.
This is that evaluative intentions may be specified, and then deemed critically
irrelevant, in terms other than as evaluative. In particular, an intentionalist may
have principled reasons to deem them characteristically unsuccessful, and then
to disqualify them on such grounds—not qua evaluative but qua unsuccessful.
How this works will depend on the operative theory of success conditions. For
instance, if (against my advice from the previous chapter) success conditions are
defined in causal terms—say, that an intention is successful to the extent that it
makes a non-accidental causal contribution to some aesthetic property of the
work—then it might be held that greatness isn’t really the sort of property to
which intentions can make the relevant causal contribution.
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Although this is a possible reply, it all the more signals a disconnect between
intentions and value, if evaluative intentions as a class just happen to be excluded.
So it is a double-edged sword. Let it be granted, however, at least for now,
that a moderate intentionalist could maintain a de facto distinction between an
interpretive version of intentionalism and an evaluative version, even if not
quite in such terms.4 (I will later consider some problems with this strategy.)
I wish now to develop a slightly dierent and more challenging version
of Gaut’s objection, using Lamarque’s conceptual framework. As I say above,
Lamarque restricts the relevance of intentionalism to explication, because inten-
tions, in his opinion, do not provide us with answers about the value of works
or their interest. Such answers come for him chiefly through interpretation*.
This is slightly dierent from Gaut, who says that it is impossible for the in-
tentionalist to restrict herself to the scenario in which interpretive intentions
are relevant only to “non-evaluative” properties which in turn are relevant
to evaluation. Lamarque considers a similar proposal, that intentions may be
relevant to value-neutral explication which feeds into value-sensitive interpre-
tation*, but considers it merely inadequate, not impossible. Both authors object
to the proposal of such a contribution from intentions, but Lamarque’s way of
describing it, which countenances its possibility, can better help us formulate
what is supposed to be objectionable. (For one thing, Lamarque’s objection will
not be resolvable in the manner I suggest above.)
The Lamarquian objection, which I will hereafter call the value-sensitivity
objection, is that intentionalism does not give intentions enough of a role in
what is really distinctive about art, because what is really distinctive about art is
ineliminably valuative and intentionalism seems to give intentions no direct role
in the appreciation of a work’s value and interest. The “directness” is what is
key. Intentions are allowed to contribute to one’s understanding of the meaning
of the work, and this of course has consequences for the work’s evaluation; but
this is an indirect contribution.
What, then, does it mean for the contribution to be direct? One option is
4. An absolute intentionalist could avail himself of such a reply by, as I describe in the second
chapter, reconceiving success conditions as conditions on one’s having an intention, claiming in
eect that artists cannot truly form the relevant evaluative intentions.
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to draw on Gaut’s notion of the intention itself being evaluative, i.e. having
content that pertains to the work’s value. But this strikes me as the wrong
sort of notion. It is not the content of the intention that defines the directness
of its relation to a work’s evaluation, but the manner of its elicitation and
use in criticism. Lamarque’s conceptual scheme thus provides the appropriate
option. We may understand the directness of a contribution to evaluation in
terms of the critical method to which the contribution is made. An intention
is taken to directly contribute to a work’s evaluation when that intention is
invoked as part of a critical method that is value-sensitive. One such method is
interpretation*, but intentions do not (so the objection goes) need to be invoked
at the level of interpretation*. Although other interpretive methods, besides
interpretation*, may be value-sensitive, the intentionalist has the burden of
showing why intentions should need to be invoked for any of them. Moreover,
if we add that the relevant method needs to involve not just value-sensitivity
but also imaginative reconstruction, then interpretation* begins to seem more and
more relevant, and intentions less and less.
I find this to be quite a powerful objection, one to which intentionalists
have not given the necessary attention. This is perhaps because they reject the
importance accorded to evaluation, or because they are simply unconcerned
with intentions making the sort of direct contribution that Lamarque would
require. It may also be that the objection has never been so formulated, cer-
tainly not as an objection, even though most of the materials from which I have
constructed it can be found in Lamarque (2002).
Stecker, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, brushes the value-maximizer
aside by claiming that “intention-oriented criticism can enhance appreciation
as well as any other type of criticism” (2010, 147). This, of course, is consistent
with intention-oriented criticism only indirectly enhancing appreciation, via
explication and not via interpretation*. What is needed is an argument for
why intentions should be invoked in some such process as interpretation*. The
diculty of answering this is readily apparent: intentions are typically invoked
simply to tell us what the work means, but nothing about the manner in which
they are so invoked seems to be sensitive to the work’s value and interest, or to
involve imaginative reconstruction.
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In the remainder of this chapter I consider three distinct ways of answering
this objection, the last of which is the one I favour and of which my proposal in
the next chapter will be an elaboration. I devote time to the other two because
they are likely to be the first to occur to an intentionalist, despite their being, as
I will argue, less satisfactory than the third. The first is what I will call a value-
oriented response, because it involves positing a distinct sort of intentionalist value
for the appreciation of which reference to intentions is deemed indispensable.
The second, which I will call an ontological response, appeals to a constitutive role
for the artist’s creative process in the very existence and nature of the work.
4.2 Value-Oriented Response
The example I will be considering of a value-oriented response concerns (so-
called) “achievement value.” The notion of such value has been around for some
time, but very few people have taken up the cause of saying what exactly it is
supposed to be. In fact, as far as I know, among contemporary intentionalists
only Noël Carroll (2009) has put the notion to any substantive use.
Carroll grants—in fact, argues—that “the distinguishing feature” of crit-
icism is evaluation, that critical activities such as “description, classification,
contextualization, elucidation, interpretation, and analysis . . . are not generally
thought to be ends in themselves; they are characteristically undertaken for
the purpose of providing the grounds for the critic’s evaluation of the artwork
in question” (13). It therefore seems that he, too, takes criticism to manifest
an “evaluative stance.” But he is also known for his opposition to the Aesthetic
Argument. The apparent conflict here has been noticed by Goldman (2009):
I agree that critics aim primarily to uncover the values (or disvalues)
of works, but I see a tension between this central thesis and Carroll’s
defence of intentionalism in interpretation and evaluation. If a critic
aims to facilitate an audience’s appreciation of a work’s value, doesn’t
that suggest that the critic ought to aim at allowing the audience to
get the most value out of their experience of the work? Limiting
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interpretation to the uncovering of value specifically intended5 by
the artist does not always allow for such optimal experience.
But the tension is not lost on Carroll, who, in the same book, addresses it as
follows:
Since the point of criticism is to say what is valuable about an
artwork, what is valuable about the artwork is the object of criticism.
It is what the work of criticism is about. However, we have already
established [under intentionalism] that the object of criticism is
something that the artist is doing or has done in producing the
artwork. So how can we combine these two insights about the
object of criticism in away that aords amore precise understanding
of it? (2009, 51)
What Carroll seeks is a “connection between the artist’s action and what is
valuable in the work,” and his answer is that there is a distinctive artistic value
which is “a matter of whether or not the artist has succeeded in achieving her
ends” (53). Call this a work’s achievement value.
There is a natural follow-up question, which Carroll anticipates: “What is
it about that which the artist has done or is doing with respect to the artwork
that gives the artwork value?” He responds in a roundabout sort of way by first
distinguishing achievement value from what he calls “reception value,” that
of “the positive experience that the work aords the audience” (53). He seems
ultimately to want to say that achievement value is not something that can
be experienced, but also that this shouldn’t disqualify it from being a genuine
artistic value. In support of the latter claim he asks us to be on guard against a
certain bias that “the only things that are valuable are experiences” (57), and to
consider a value such as originality which he argues cannot be experienced.
Goldman (2009) is quick to seize on the presupposition that some values
may not be experienced. He objects that Carroll has “an impoverished view of
5. Contrary to what Goldman (much like Gaut) seems to assume, such value need not be
specified by an artist’s evaluative intentions on any given occasion. I will say more about this as
I proceed.
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the experience of artworks as bare sensory experience of the patches of paint or
heard notes.” For although properties such as originality are
not experienced directly, [they] aect the ways we experience art-
works; hence focus on these properties by critics does not refute the
thesis that criticism aims to facilitate the most valuable experience
of artworks in audiences and so should not be restricted by artists’
specific intentions6 regarding the significance of their works.
This issue of experienceability is not, I think, as important as Carroll makes
it out to be. Suppose Carroll is correct that some artistic values need not be
experienced in order to be appreciated, and suppose we even grant him his
example of originality. What does this show? Goldman, of course, is concerned
to refute even this much because he is committed to a view on which facilitating
experience is paramount for criticism (as detailed in the previous chapter). But
what does the concession show for intentionalism? Nothing as far as I can see. It
is quite consistent with originality being appreciable in a non-experiential way
that it is also appreciable in an a-intentional way—as a relational property that
a work bears to other works (and perhaps to an artistic tradition) regardless of
the artist’s specific intentions. A separate argument is thus needed to establish
why any such property, as a value, can only be appreciated as part of a critical
process that invokes the artist’s intentions.
Now, Carroll does oer a separate such argument, but what will be impor-
tant to see is that it is separate, that it does not rely on the foregoing claims of
inexperienceability. As before, I choose to set aside questions about whether a
given value must be experienced in order to be appreciated. Although it is nat-
ural for a contemporary intentionalist to appeal to inexperienceable properties,
I will be content to have the relevant value be a species of what Carroll would
call reception value, for my dierence with value-maximizers will not be here.7
6. Goldman here again mischaracterizes Carroll’s position as being one which assigns weight
to evaluative intentions. That anti-intentionalists reflexively take intentionalism about evaluation
to involve evaluative intentions is a sign that this is an under-examined subject.
7. It does, however, bear mentioning that Goldman’s defence of experience is no less contro-
versial than Carroll’s restriction, for a property’s (legitimately?) aecting experience (presumably
when somehow or other known about) is not the same as its being itself experienced.
Intentions and Evaluation 145
Carroll’s separate argument is oered as a response to an objection that, in
fact, is very much like Gaut’s above:
a critical evaluation assesses what the artist has achieved, not what
she attempted. Why should we care whether or not the artist had
noble or aspiring intentions? The critic should only concern herself
with the outcome . . . (Carroll 2009, 77)
In response, Carroll observes that:
it is not the artist’s intention that the critic is appraising. The critic
is not saying, for example: “Oh, that’s a very nice intention.” Rather
it is the artist’s achievement, the product of the artist’s agency or
what she has done, that concerns the critic. Nevertheless, in order
to assess what she has done, we need a notion of what she has done.
And since what she has done is an action or a series of actions, that
calls for a description of what has been done which alludes to the
intentions that constitute the action or actions in question.
Carroll and his opponent agree that it is the artist’s achievement that is of
critical interest. The disagreement is said to concern “a notion of what [the
artist] has done.” The notion, or description, that Carroll favours is one which
“alludes to the intentions that constitute the action or actions in question.” The
notion his opponent favours, by contrast, is presumably some a-intentional one,
the achievement as a self-standing object, contextualized relative to art history
perhaps, and to the relevant conventions, but certainly not to any specific artistic
intentions.
This is one sort of debate we could have, and it may be that Carroll’s position
is to be preferred. But what is interesting is that Lamarque has conceded
territory on this ground. Lamarque has not said that intentions are simply
irrelevant to any process of understanding an artwork. Instead, he has drawn a
distinction between “lower-level” processes like explication and “higher-level”
ones like interpretation*. And the objection has been that there is no need to
invoke intentions at the higher-level. The only way for an intentionalist to
make the opposite case is to relate intentions either to the value-sensitivity that
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such a higher-level manifests or to the method of imaginative reconstruction that it
employs. Carroll’s eorts fit most naturally with the former option, given that
he is attempting to describe a distinctive sort of value from which intentions
are said to be ineliminable. I have been calling this a value-oriented response.
But how exactly is it supposed to work? Carroll’s conclusion seems to
extend only to the limited point that has already (for the sake of argument)
been conceded: in order to evaluate a work one must have before one a work
to evaluate, and this object is defined only relative to certain intentions of the
artist—“a notion of what the artist has done.” But now Carroll has run out of
ground on which to stand. Intentions seem to be needed only to supply an
object to then evaluate, but do not figure into this evaluation itself. Carroll
in fact makes many claims to just this eect, e.g. “Intentions enter the critical
picture for the purpose of identifying the nature of the artist’s performance,
including its implicit or internal goals. This information can then be used in
order to gauge whether the work is a success on its own terms” (77). This is
not far from Lamarque’s view of things (modulo the part about “internal goals”).
The objection, therefore, stands.
4.2.1 Achievement as Success
So far I have given some reasons to doubt that Carroll has provided a helpful
notion of achievement value. But we may wonder if there is not anything in
the concept that Carroll has overlooked, or that we may bring out on his behalf.
I am, however, pessimistic about such prospects. Let me explain why. I think
it is very easy when one arms the existence of achievement value to take
this to mean simply the value of that which the artist has achieved. This notion
is insucient for present purposes. That the artist has achieved it may imply
some role for intentions in defining what it is that the artist has achieved. But
there is a further question about the nature of the value of that which the artist
has achieved. If the relevant value is meant distinctively to be achievement value,
then something must be said about what is valuable (a) about achievement as
such (b) in the work. This is the minimum we need for it to be worth our time
to further reflect on whether reference to intentions is needed to reconstruct
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such value. We might therefore return to Carroll’s earlier question: “What is it
about that which the artist has done or is doing with respect to the artwork
that gives the artwork value?”
One option is that achievement value is a sort of value arising simply out
of an artist’s achieving her intentions. That is, there is something valuable
about success as such. This is plausibly what Carroll means when he says that
achievement value is “a matter of whether or not the artist has succeeded in
achieving her ends” (53). But this conception gives rise to a certain obvious
worry, anticipated by Carroll:
it may be charged that if the artist’s intentions are relevant to critical
evaluation, then that gives the artist too much power. For in order
to score a critical kudos, all the artist need do is to set her intentions
very, very low. Imagine the dancer who, with no postmodern
ambitions, announces her intention to simply bend over and pick
up her car keys. Once she completes this action, does she deserve
our applause? (69-70)
Carroll only chides the artificiality of the example, noting that artistic intentions
“typically . . . commit the artist to ambitions more strenuous than bending over
successfully,” that “artists rarely aim [so] low.” But the worry may be taken
more abstractly, as raising a question about the very nature of the value that
Carroll is touting. Why should it matter that the intention aims high or aims
low if the relevant sense of value is sensitive only to success as such? If that is what
achievement value really is, then it should be equally present regardless of the
worthiness of the success. By contrast, the fact that it matters that the dancer in
the example did not have postmodern ambitions indicates that we are responding
to more than just the fact that the her intention was successful. At the very least,
Carroll is talking about two dierent sorts of value: success value and (what we
may call) worthiness-of-success value. While it may be true that whether or not
the dancer’s performance is interpreted as being postmodern depends on her
intentions, once we make this determination we could, perhaps, carry out the
evaluation of her performance independently of these intentions, relative only
to the interest or worthiness of the specified type of performance. That is to say,
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it is not clear that reference to intentions is necessary to a critical assessment of
the worthiness of an achievement, once the nature of the achievement is fixed.
Perhaps an intentionalist could make the following sort of case: It’s true that
the value of the performance in which a dancer picks up her car keys involves a lot of
things beyond merely whether she succeeded in her intentions; but it involves at least
this. So, to get a full picture of the value, intentions do have to be invoked. This is
not implausible, but I still have doubts. Even if we grant that success value is
a distinctive sort of value associated with successful intentions, it still remains
to be shown that it is a value of the work, not merely of the artist or of her
intentions. The present construal of such value, being concerned with success
as such, is not reassuring.8 For while it is possibly a value of one’s intention that
it succeeds, it is not at all clearly a value of the product of this intention that it is
the product of a successful intention. More simply put, it does not seem to be
either a good or a bad thing about an artwork that it was made with largely
successful intentions. Knowing further things in connection with this, like that
the intentions were ambitious, might give one an indication of a work’s value;
but the mere fact about success certainly does not seem to constitute any sort of
value.
Such a point has been made before, for instance by Wimsatt (1976). He
describes as follows the argument to be rejected: “[t]he poet had a specific aim or
plan in mind; he managed . . . to carry this out in the poem; thus he is a successful
artist; his work is good art” (127). Wimsatt objects that “here we may indeed be
likely to assign a kind of merit, but it should be understood as referring to the
artist himself (who was ‘skillful’ enough to do what he aimed at doing) rather
than to the work.” This would be what I have called the success-as-such portion
of achievement value. For what I have called the worthiness-of-success portion,
Wimsatt suggests that we attend, not to whether we can “prove that the artist
achieved his intentions,” but to “whether the proposed subject and technique
were actually the most poetic conceivable” (128). Similarly, Saam Trivedi has
8. I set aside the more obvious complaint that this is just not a very interesting sort of value.
As Goldman (2009) observes, “critics don’t speak as often about what artists successfully intend
as they speak about what their works say or do, what kinds of eects they have on viewers or
what their aesthetic properties are.”
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claimed that “while the fact that the artist has been successful and skillful in
realizing her intentions in her work is good for her it is not clear that the work
must thereby be better or more valuable,” for “[such] value attaches to the artist
though not necessarily to her artwork” (2015, 705).
To reinforce the preceding series of points, let me consider an argument
from Huddleston (2012a), who is responding to Dominic Lopes (2011) about
the artistic/aesthetic distinction. The context of their disagreement need not
detain us here, but I will set the scene a little, for some of it is relevant.
Lopes laments the rise in the number of philosophers aligning themselves
with a notion of non-aesthetic artistic value, and argues that any artistic value
that is a value of art as art, not merely in art, is subsumable under aesthetic
value. He considers, on behalf of his opponents, achievement value as a possible
candidate for non-aesthetic artistic value, putting the case for it as follows (530):
art works are achievements whose value is realized in how they
come to be.. . . We can assume, in general, that an item’s value as a
member of a kind is its value as the product of an achievement of
that kind. For example, the value of a song as a work of music is its
value as a musical achievement. On this model,
V is a value of an art work as art = V is a value of the
work as the product of an artistic achievement.
Lopes accepts that “making a work of art is often an achievement,” but he does
not think it follows that “it is in every case an artistic achievement.” He doubts
the “artistic” part, for he does not think that an “achievement-based theory of
artistic value” will be able to supply a suitable “theory of what makes an act
artistic.”
My own concerns are somewhat dierent from Lopes’s, though we are both
in a manner objecting to achievement value. I am concerned less to withhold
the label “artistic” from such putative value and more to interrogate what kind
of value it is even supposed to be. Lopes, following others, talks of a work
having “value as the product of an achievement,” but it is possible for a work
to have value as the product of an achievement—i.e. under the description
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“achievement,” or “product of achievement”—without thereby having some
distinctive achievement value.
Huddleston, in disagreement with Lopes, claims that “achievement value
is ultimately going to need to underwrite artistic value. To the extent that
aesthetic value is a component of artistic value, it is only derivatively so” (2012a,
712). His argument for this appeals to a case of indiscernibles, one Giorgione’s
The Tempest and the other an array of paint randomly generated on a canvas by
a machine. The two are said to produce “very rich aesthetic experience in many
of the same ways,” but Lopes, adds Huddleston, “will surely want to say that
only the painting produced by Giorgione has artistic value.” We might reply
that the dierence comes down to one’s being a work of art and the other’s
not, but Huddleston believes that this is “just [to] restate instead of [to] answer
the pressing question: What feature accounts for this drastic dierence?” (713).
Huddleston’s preferred answer is that “Giorgione’s painting is a great human
achievement and the array is not. When aesthetic value is a value of art as art,
it is only because this aesthetic value has been achieved by an artist.”
Here is my problem with such an answer. It might well be that what
explains The Tempest’s aesthetic values also being artistic values, when this isn’t
so for the array, is that it is an “achievement.” But it is something further to
say that The Tempest’s being an achievement is a distinctive value that it has, an
achievement value. A property can serve to explain why an object’s aesthetic
values are also artistic values without thereby itself constituting something
valuable about that object. At least in principle. Huddleston would need to say
more about why this distinguishing feature is furthermore a distinctive value of
the object it distinguishes. (He seems to want to say this.) The question, again,
is merely: what makes one object an artwork and the other not? Lopes makes
the useful observation that not all (purported) art-status-conferring properties
also “realize any characteristically artistic value” (2011, 525). He has here in
mind the so-called “institutional theory,” on which it is not an artistic value of a
work that it has been inducted into (or is a member of ) the relevant institution.
Huddleston’s example is, incidentally, very similar to one given by Gregory
Currie in support of a very similar point, a denial that “a work’s aesthetic
properties are independent of the artist’s achievement” (1989, 36). Currie asks
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us to imagine an artistically superior Martian race an average child of which
produces a painting that is unremarkable for them but indiscernible from a
painting which we humans hold in high regard (Picasso’s Guernica). The idea is
supposed to be that both value judgments may be correct (ours that the human
painting is great, theirs that the Martian one is not), each being predicated on
the achievement that the relevant work represents relative to its community
(human in the one case, Martian in the other). This is said to explain the alleged
dierence in value, the conclusion being that a work’s status as an achievement
is relevant to its evaluation. I have no problem granting this. All I have been
wondering is whether this status itself represents an artistic value, and whether,
furthermore, its critical reconstruction as a value requires invoking authorial
intentions. It is not clear to me that either question should be answered in the
armative.
What I wish to conclude from my eorts in this section is the following.
There are reasons to doubt that achievement value is a distinctive sort of value,
to doubt that it is a value of artworks, and to doubt, even if it is an interesting sort
of artistic value, that to reconstruct what is interesting about it one must invoke
the artist’s intentions. I have argued for the first doubt by raising questions about
what is supposed to be valuable about achievement as such, for the second by
raising questions about what is supposed to be valuable about artworks in their
being an artist’s achievement, and for the third by separating the relevant value,
or one construal of it, into that of success simpliciter and that of the worthiness
of the success (where only the former, which is less interesting, seems to need
reference to intentions).9 While I do not take these doubts entirely to foreclose
the possibility of achievement value helping to answer the value-sensitivity
objection, I myself don’t see how it could.
9. It might be objected that there is a third option, on which it is not merely success as such,
nor quite worthiness of success, but something like the intelligibility of the success, the fact
of an agent’s creative handling of a medium, that constitutes an achievement that ipso facto is
artistically valuable. I thank Eileen John for this suggestion. See John (2014), in which this is
described as “taking reflective charge” (265). I am not entirely sure how to understand such a
claim in the light of my own eorts, but I suspect that my positive proposal, gestured at near
the end of this chapter and more fully worked out in the next, may accommodate the sort of
insight at issue, in terms not of a distinctive kind of value but of a value-sensitive critical process
which sometimes makes essential reference to such facts about the artist.
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4.3 Ontological Response
One may notice a certain dilemma in the ong against the intentionalist. The
link to evaluation is made either via interpretive intentions or via evaluative
intentions (these exhausting the domain of possibly relevant intentions). On
the first horn, the relevance is not “direct,” for interpretive intentions seem not
to be required for value-sensitive critical processes like interpretation*. But
though evaluative intentions, on the second horn, might have some relevance
content-wise, they equally don’t seem required, for what value an artist wanted
her work to have does not seem to matter to a determination of what value the
work in fact has.
The argument of the first horn was developed in the previous section, using
Carroll’s remarks about how achievement value fits into artistic appreciation,
but could be reiterated using a similar remark of Currie’s, for my contention
is that this way of thinking is common. Based on his analysis of the Martian
child example, Currie claims that
Our conception of aesthetic value is essentially bound up with our
interests, experiences and abilities. And it is clear that we can have
no adequate understanding of what the artist’s achievement was in
producing a given work unless we have a detailed knowledge of
the work’s history of production. (1989, 39)
Notice the distribution of duties. Determining a work’s value requires us to
draw on our “interests, experiences and abilities”—in short, on what matters to
us—but it is only for figuring out what it is we are evaluating—for an “adequate
understanding” of the achievement—that production history is sought.
The idea behind the second horn, which is the more familiar anti-
intentionalist route of objection, is not something I have developed at length,
partly because it is familiar enough. Just as a joke’s oensiveness is felt not
to be (to any significant degree) sensitive to whether it was intended to be
oensive, maybe determinations of value are simply out of the hands of the
artist. Aside from Gaut, whom I have already quoted on this point, consider
Wimsatt (1976):
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we should find no trouble in putting to one side the common
artistic aim of creating a masterpiece—or perhaps of not creating
a masterpiece, but just of turning out a potboiler—or of having a
‘lark’. ‘He intended only to appeal to popular sentiment; therefore
we should not. . . ’ (Or, to translate this kind of motive into the key
of interpretive argument and thus get it out of the way: ‘We know
that he thought of this as his masterpiece; therefore it. . . ’). (127)
Wimsatt likens evaluative intentions to “secondary or ulterior intentions,” such
as those of “making money” or “winning a prize,” and finds them irrelevant on
the same grounds.
It seems to me that in such discussions anti-intentionalists take the second
horn to be the intentionalist’s only option, and thereby dismiss the relation
between intentions and evaluation a little too hastily. Meanwhile, intentionalists
do not regard as in any way problematic the path of the first horn, and therefore
fall headlong into the value-sensitivity objection. I have been trying in this
chapter to urge the problem of the first horn. If I have been right in my claims
so far, then the intentionalist does not have any promising resources on which
to draw to elucidate a distinctive sort of value the reconstruction of which
demands the invocation of intentions.
A dierent strategy, to which I now turn, is to secure for intentions an
enduring evaluative relevance by viewing them as partly constitutive of the
artwork.10 An advocate of this is David Davies (2004). The “principal con-
tention” of his book is that “artworks . . . must be conceived not as the products
(decontextualized or contextualized) of generative performances, but as the
performances themselves” (x). His chief rival is the contextualist, who admits
the relevance to criticism of such generative performances (also called “the
creative process”) but only in terms of “relational properties” of the artwork
proper, which happen to be of critical interest for one reason or another. My
aim here is not to come down conclusively on Davies’s ontological thesis, but
to examine the view he sets out about intentions and value, to which he devotes
10. One sense of this, which will not be my interest here, involves conceiving of intentions
as “immanent” in the sort of thing we normally take to be an artwork. I have discussed such
claims in previous chapters under the rubric of the neo-Wittgensteinian view.
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the better part of a chapter.
Davies prefaces his remarks with an estimation, in accord with my own, of
the status quo of the intentionalism debate:
Knowledge of what the artist intended is said [by Beardsley and
Wimsatt] to be irrelevant, first, to the evaluation of her work, and,
second, to the interpretation of her work. The irrelevance of artistic
intentions to the evaluation of works is defended on the grounds
that, in evaluating a work, we are interested in assessing what the
artist achieved, not what she attempted to achieve. Critics have
generally granted this point, and debate has turned upon whether a
proper interpretation of what the artist achieved requires attention
to what the artist intended. (84)
Davies favours an “uptake” theory of interpretation (one that is opposed to in-
tentionalism). According to him, a work’s meaning is to be identified with “the
meaning that a properly informed receiver, correctly applying the appropriate
interpretive norms, would ascribe to a vehicle taken to be intentionally used to
make a given kind of utterance” (89). But he nevertheless, in an unusual turn,
takes “the actual intentions of the actual author” to have a “role to play in the
proper appreciation or evaluation of the work,” despite the fact that for him such
intentions have no role in “determining meaning-properties.” He makes sense
of this by denying that the only way intentions can play a role in evaluation
is via determining meaning-properties (or, more generally, contributing to
value-neutral interpretation). It might therefore seem that he is denying the
status quo rehearsed above, but, as it turns out, he is denying a dierent status
quo, one pertaining to the work’s ontological category.
Let me present a simplified version of the argument Davies takes himself
to be answering. I follow him in referring to the product of a creative process,
what we normally call a work, as a “work-product.”
1. The proper object of critical evaluation is the work-product.
2. The artist’s intentions contribute to critical evaluation only by contribut-
ing to the value-neutral interpretation of the object of critical evaluation.
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3. Therefore, the artist’s intentions contribute to critical evaluation only by
contributing to the value-neutral interpretation of the work-product.
4. The artist’s intentions do not contribute to the value-neutral interpretation
of the work-product.
5. Therefore, the artist’s intentions do not contribute to critical evaluation.
(1) is a standard assumption. (2) falls out of the status quo of the intentionalism
debate. (3) follows from substituting “the work-product” for “the object of
critical evaluation” in (2), as dictated by (1). (4) is something to which Davies
is committed through his independent defence of the “uptake” theory. The
conclusion follows from (3) and (4), in that the only way for intentions to
contribute to evaluation has been blocked.
I want to be clear that I do not take this argument itself, as it stands, to be very
pressing against the intentionalist. For the intentionalist will of course be itching
to reject (4), that intentions do not contribute to value-neutral interpretation. In
practical terms, this would amount to contending with Davies’s defence of the
“uptake” theory, which I imagine many intentionalists will be happy to do. The
argument’s significance for me is as follows. I have been construing as a source
of objection the widely accepted claim that intentions contribute to evaluation
only by contributing to value-neutral interpretation. Now even if, contra (4),
intentions do contribute to value-neutral interpretation, the contribution they
thereby make to evaluation is, I have been saying, insucient for them to be
deemed important either to evaluation or to value-sensitive interpretation—
certainly not important enough for intentionalism to be an interesting general
theory of criticism. This is what I have been calling the value-sensitivity
objection. So, naturally, I find it very interesting when somebody claims to be
arguing, as does Davies, that a work’s value may be “directly dependent” on
the artist’s intentions.
What does Davies mean by such directness? (I defined my own sense of
it above, in terms of value-sensitive critical processes.) He claims that inten-
tions may “bypass” meaning-properties in their contribution to a work’s value.
Although this is a claim primarily about intentions and works, not about the lan-
guage and methodology of criticism, the former will have certain consequences
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for the latter, in this case that works which merit the exact same value-neutral
interpretation may nevertheless be felt to dier in value solely on the basis
of a dierence in the intentions with which they were created. It is worth
examining whether the manner in which this plays out for Davies provides
us with a promising line of response to the value-sensitivity objection. I will
argue that ultimately it does not, though the way in which Davies sets up the
dialectic is instructive.
He gives the following example. Imagine a pair of indiscernible novels
produced by an author, Smith, in alternative scenarios, w1 and w2. In w1 Smith
intends the protagonist to be motivated by “fear of emotional commitment,”
while in w2 Smith intends him to be motivated by “self-centered ambition.”
Given that the novels are indiscernible, the “uptake” theory, which we may
accept for the sake of argument, yields identical interpretations for both, in-
cluding (suppose) the fact that the protagonist is motivated by self-centered
ambition, not fear of emotional commitment. So the Smith of w2 has her
intention corroborated by her work, while the Smith of w1 doesn’t have hers
corroborated by her work.
Suppose further that “Smith’s earlier novels express a general view . . . that
what motivates individuals in such situations is a fear of emotional commitment”
(86). Given this background, continues Davies, w2 will seem to “represen[t] a
deliberate attempt by Smith to express a view of human motivation dierent
from that developed in her other works, and may therefore have appreciable
properties and a consequent value in virtue of enriching and rendering more
nuanced our understanding of the oeuvre as a whole and the other works in
particular.” Meanwhile, w1, “as a failed attempt to furnish one more illustration
of a single thematic preoccupation, has no such virtues” (93-94). So it seems
that we are inclined to find a dierence in value between the two novels which
must be due to the mentioned dierence in intention, for ex hypothesi this is the
only available dierence. Thus, the intentions are making a direct contribution
to value.
It will, of course, be wondered whether it is plausible that these imagined
novels, which are said to be duplicates as far as meaning-properties are con-
cerned, may so dier in value. Davies acknowledges the “air of unreality” about
Intentions and Evaluation 157
his assessment, and therefore attempts to ground it “in a very concrete critical
context”:
If two critics, subscribing to an “uptake” account of how the seman-
tic or narrative properties of a given work are determined, disagree
as to the actual narrative or semantic intentions with which a given
linguistic structure was generated in a given context, they may as a
direct consequence legitimately disagree as to the artistic properties
and values of the work in question. (94)
Note that it is meant to be a “direct consequence,” not one that is mediated
by a disagreement about the work’s meaning. For the critics are said to agree
about this meaning. Their disagreement, in particular of value judgment, turns
exclusively on a question of the artist’s intentions. Here we take there to be
a single work, and the critics to be disagreeing about its value on the basis
of disagreeing about the creative process by which it came about. One critic
says that Smith is attempting to break from her oeuvre, the other that she is
continuing in the trajectory of her oeuvre.
If such a situation is plausible, then we would seem to have an answer to
the value-sensitivity objection, for it would seem to be possible for intentions
to be invoked in a value-sensitive critical process (rather than only in a value-
neutral critical process that independently feeds into evaluation). The Smith
example, of which the above “critical context” is meant to be a more practical
manifestation, admittedly is overkill, since it establishes the result in a sort of
crude experimental fashion (demonstrating the desired sensitivity by excluding
all other alternatives), but it does establish the result nonetheless, if we share
Davies’s intuitions.
I suspect, however, that many people will not share Davies’s intuitions. For
example, Kathleen Stock finds there to be “something wrong with the way the
case under consideration is set up” (2005, 28). She doubts that such intentions
could indeed be “relevant to appreciation” without making a “dierence to the
manifest properties of the work-product, i.e., the meaning properties of the
text.” Her view is that
where a semantic intention is ascribed to the making of a work,
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even by the author himself, perhaps in some external source such
as an interview or diary, but where the work-product displays no
evidence for it . . . there is no reason to think the work takes on any
relevant artistic properties as a result of the claimed intention, and
so this kind of case cannot show us what Davies hopes it will. (29)
Stock thus rejects the example because, for her, an intention cannot be critically
relevant if it does not, so to speak, “show up” in thework-product. The intention
inw1 is alleged to be of this sort, not relevantly showing up in the work-product.
The intention in w2, given that it does show up in the work-product, would
presumably be found by Stock to be critically relevant.
But this may be too hasty an explanation. Certainly it will be the case that
many intentions which fail to “show up” in the work—which, as intentionalists
typically say, are “unsuccessful”—will not be critically relevant. But some of
them might be. I myself am not confident that the best thing to say about
intentions such as the one in w1 is that they are critically irrelevant. I therefore
propose to take a slightly dierent tack in explaining the example, which seems
to give rise to some unstable intuitions.
Consider, again, Davies’s imagined critical dispute. We might take issue
with the suggestion that critics frequently disagree as to a work-product’s value
without in some manner disagreeing as to its meaning. At best, they might
not know that they are having a disagreement about a more complicated sort
of meaning than some simpler one about which they believe themselves to
have settled their dierences. I think this is evident, in fact, in Davies’s own
description of the example. He says, as I quote above, that w2 “represents a
deliberate attempt by Smith to express a view of human motivation dierent
from that developed in other works,” and that w1 represents “a failed attempt
to furnish one more illustration of a single thematic preoccupation.” Now,
one way to understand this, the way Davies prefers, is to attribute one and the
same “view of human motivation” to both work-products, and to construe the
mentioned dierence only in terms of the context of production (the creative
process). This is, in eect, howDavies understandsw1 andw2: they are dierent
generative performances that culminate in qualitatively identical work-products.
But I am not sure that this is how Davies’s imagined critics will be likely to
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discuss the work-product in question. (It is a single work-product in Davies’s
imagined critical dispute, the disagreement over which is said to turn on which
of w1 and w2 is true.)
While it is common for critics to disagree about, and to take to be critically
relevant, the question whether a work-product breaks from or perpetuates the
trajectory of an artist’s oeuvre, this is not what the critics here are disagreeing
about, for they agree as to the work-product’s meaning and presumably also
about the trajectory of the artist’s oeuvre. Therefore, they agree about whether
or not the work-product is a break from or a perpetuation of this trajectory.
They are disagreeing simply about what the artist attempted. But when a critic
wishes to establish something about what the artist attempted, it is usually for
the purpose of making a claim about the meaning of the work-product—that
the work-product means this instead of that. Davies wants us to believe, instead,
that critics will want to establish what an artist intended only to make a value
judgment, holding fixed the work-product’s meaning.
We will either find this implausible or just not have any clear intuitions. In
the latter case, we may be tempted, however unconsciously, to import intuitions
about the more common sort of case, in which it is the work-product’s conformity
to or deviation from the oeuvre that is in question. (In the terms of the original
example, it is to take the work-product in w1 to indeed dier in meaning
from the work-product in w2, namely in the view of human motivation that
each represents.) Such ambiguity is encouraged by Davies’s language. He says
that the entire scenario, w1 or w2, represents such-and-such thematic departure
or conformity, when we are used to speaking this way about work-products.
This, of course, is conducive to Davies’s conclusion, for the scenarios roughly
correspond to the sort of thing he would call a work.
That said, Davies’s discussion, though it does not provide us with a tidy
solution to the value-sensitivity objection, does make salient the intentionalist’s
quandary. For Davies notes, correctly in my view, that it is not clear how
an intentionalist proposes to account for the relevance to a work’s evaluation
of intentions which do not determine that work’s meaning-properties. Some
such intentions may rightfully be regarded as irrelevant, but with respect to
others the intentionalist will, it seems, have to bite the bullet. The latter are
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the intentions which do not quite make it into the work but still seem worth a
critic’s time, such as the “various preparatory explorations the artist went through”
(2004, 82). Even if these are treated as “relational properties” of the work, the
intentionalist still needs to account for their critical relevance. This is dicult
because intentionalists typically regard such aspects of the creative process as
“unsuccessful,” hence prima facie irrelevant to criticism. This is the other edge
of the double-edged sword I mentioned earlier, in relation to my provisional
resolution of Gaut’s objection.
4.4 Metacritical Response
Value-oriented responses look to answer the value-sensitivity objection by
providing a distinctive sort of value the reconstruction of which is said to require
the invocation of intentions. Ontological responses answer by reconceiving
the ontology of the artwork such that intentions are constitutive of the bearers
of value. Both of these responses may be described as metaphysical in that they
focus on the metaphysics of the terms in the relation of interest, i.e. that of
intentions to the value of a work. Value-oriented responses focus on the second
term, ontological responses on the third. One might equally focus on the first
term, describing a kind of intention that has some essential property making it
always relevant to a work’s value. A failed candidate for this is probably the
evaluative intention.
My preferred response is, by contrast, what I call a metacritical response,
so labelled because it takes seriously the idea that the relation of interest is a
critical relation. Such a response concerns, in the first instance, discourse, not the
metaphysics of the entities involved in the discourse. I do not think that there
is any specific value which essentially involves intentions, or that intentions
need somehow to constitute the bearers of value in order to be evaluatively
relevant. Nor, to mention the third option, that any particular sort of intention
is specially suited to be so relevant. My suggestion is that the value-sensitivity
objection may be answered by specifying a kind of critical process or method, in
particular a kind of interpretation* (as I call it above), that, due to its internal
logic, makes essential reference to intentions. While it should be possible to
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combine this approach with any of the above metaphysical approaches, my
claim is that a metacritical response may be a self-standing response. Under it one
can leave open a great deal about what sorts of intention are relevant to what
sorts of value. Most of the details of the particular metacritical response I favour
will be provided in the next chapter, in which I describe how a certain kind
of intention-talk is manifested in criticism. Here I outline what a metacritical
response should look like.
The metacritical approach has become unfashionable in the intentionalism
debate as of late, but a recent example is Olsen (2010), who clearly enough
recognizes his departure from the mainstream. Themost noticeable dierence is
that he speaks notmerely of intentions but of biographical information generally:
“The problem of the artist’s intentions may be an interesting question in its
own right, but the long debate about authorial intention that followed on
the Wimsatt and Beardsley article and is still going on prevented the dierent
question about the usefulness of biographical information as a critical instrument
from being pursued” (441). Olsen does not say much about why the question
of intention should have supplanted the one about biography, which, as he
notes, was the more widely discussed question before Beardsley and Wimsatt’s
article and, indeed, was the impetus for that article. My own contention (which
I have articulated in previous chapters) is that Beardsley and Wimsatt’s focus on
intentions stems from a very dierent sort of question, concerning an intention’s
causal profile, which they sought precisely to set aside. For them, intention
is simply a placeholder notion for what seems most causally ecacious in a
semantically rich way. The semantic richness allows for the opportunity of
trying to “match” a work to an intention.
Olsen is right, in any case, to talk more generally of biography, which
is closer to the roots of the debate. But he departs from the contemporary
mainstream in yet another way, with respect to which I propose not to follow
him:
Those arguing against the employment of biographical information
have made use of the concept of “legitimacy” rather than concepts
like “relevance” or “usefulness.” The notion that some kinds of
criticism are “illegitimate” because they employ biographical infor-
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mation is a dicult one since this criticism often, though not always,
seems useful or relevant. Usefulness and relevance are practice-based
notions and their normative force is based in shared perceptions
which are a result of mastering the practice. (436)
I think, contra Olsen, that it is important to hold on to some notion of “legiti-
macy,” even if not by that name. For it allows us to dierentiate the sense in
which Beardsley and Wimsatt do not object to the use of biographical informa-
tion from that in which they do. Aside from the fact that they have no wish
to outlaw any kind of information,11 they also grant, as I describe in the first
chapter, that intentions are often “useful” and “informative.” What they deny is
that intentions may serve as standards, or that the mention of them can achieve
any special status, other than that of a hypothesis to be tested. I have understood
this to mean, more specifically, that intentions may not be mentioned as such
in and as criticism, i.e. that such (inexpugnable) talk of intentions may not be
critical discourse, though it may be historical discourse (which could have its
own relevance to criticism, but is not itself criticism). Olsen aims to establish
only that “[t]here are . . . principles” which distinguish “the informative use and
the uninformative use of . . . information of the biographical kind” (449). But
this is something with which Beardsley and Wimsatt can agree—in terms of,
say, the distinction between a fruitful hypothesis and an unfruitful hypothesis.
Olsen’s eorts are nevertheless allied with mine. He makes many of the same
moves that I have made. He, too, adopts what I have been calling a criticism-first
approach, starting o by separating biography “as a historical discipline” from
biography “as a critical instrument” (442). The former, he says, aims primarily
to “give a historically correct presentation of the author and his environment,”
while the latter is “used to understand the works produced by the author.”
More to the point of the value-sensitivity objection, Olsen distinguishes three
dierent uses for biographical information: as an “aid to understanding,” as an
“aid to appreciation,” and as “an integral part of appreciation.” By “appreciation”
Olsen means a form of understanding that “involves the recognition of a type of
11. As Wimsatt somewhat insultingly puts it, “[t]here is no way to keep the simpler kinds
of intention-hunters from jumping on the vehicle of literary inquiry, and nobody I suppose
wishes the power to legislate anything against them” (1976, 118).
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value.” This, of course, is just the sort of thing for which I have been searching,
namely a critical process that is sensitive both to value and to biography.
However, though Olsen does aim at something like my target, it seems to
me that he stops short due to his reluctance to embrace any sort of standard of
“legitimacy.” He demonstrates that biographical information is in some sense
useful, but does not connect this to the intentionalism debate. One way to do the
latter is in terms of the model of evidence, but, in line with his repudiation of any
standards of legitimacy, Olsen denies that the uses of biographical information
in which he is interested must conform to such a model.
Consider his discussion of Ian Watt’s attempt to “explain” the “apparent
incoherence and inconsistencies” inMoll Flanders as “a consequence of Defoe’s
way of working, of his aims, and of his attitudes” (443). We are told by Olsen
that here “biographical information does not figure as ‘evidence’ in a literary
interpretation.” But then, wemight wonder, how exactly is it critically relevant?
If Watt is not using reports about Defoe’s way of working as evidence for a
certain interpretation (of incoherence and inconsistency), then how else is
he performing criticism? Olsen claims that “Watt’s discussion contributes to
an understanding in general of Defoe as an artist.” But to what extent is
this also criticism of Moll Flanders? What is the precise connection between
the biographical information Watt invokes and the interpretive claims he is
encouraging us to accept?
Here is my own sense of what Watt appears to be doing. He mentions
certain odd and somewhat incomprehensible events in the novel which to him
“strongly suggest that Defoe did not plan his novel as a coherent whole, but
worked piecemeal, very rapidly, and without any subsequent revision” (qtd.
443). This sounds like Watt is deriving his interpretation primarily from what
the work itself suggests, from an ordinary sort of examination of the novel’s
events. He then inquires into what must have been the state of mind of an artist
who produced a work with such “discontinuities,” confirming his suspicions
through an independent biographical inquiry which reveals to him certain
facts about Defoe’s working habits. But if this construal is right, then Watt has
shifted from an aesthetic inquiry to a biographical one (inferring facts about the
artist from those about the work), and the adduced biographical information has
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an uncertain critical status. Absent something like a standard of “legitimacy,”
we have no terms in which to ask how the biographical information contributes
to criticism of the work, rather than merely to a portrait of the artist.
I propose to extend Olsen’s analysis with my own value-maximizing variety
of metacritical intentionalism. In the previous chapter, I described how certain
types of biographical facts, in particular about “meaning-tracking” intentions
and “meaning-determining” intentions, may be interestingly bound up with
value-considerations. In short, an artist’s intentions may (to some extent) either
track value or determine it. If this is true, then it may be seen how a value-
sensitive critical process could make use of such intentions, seizing on such of
their relations to value. This is my response to the value-sensitivity objection,
which I will describe in more detail presently (the full scope of which, however,
must await the next chapter).
4.4.1 The Value-Sensitivity of Biography
Let us approach the issue in terms of experience, namely of what knowing
about an artist’s biography could do to one’s experience of a work. Olsen gives
the example of a critic who finds there to be a heightened “pathos” in a certain
melancholy poem once he comes to “know that it was written by Charles
Lamb—a fact which is no part of the poem—and know something of the tragic
circumstances in his life” (qtd. 440). Beardsley comments on a similar case, in
which a poet’s having been an octogenarian at the time she composed a certain
poem is felt by a critic to add an “emphasis and significance” to the poem (1970,
qtd. 35). Beardsley has the following to say about this:
I suppose that in many cases (I have doubts about this one) there
might be no harm; and the importation might be allowable. But I
insist that it is (clearly) an importation. The text of the poem does
not supply an eighty-year-old speaker, nor, I think, does it require
one to make poetic sense. We would not really be interpreting the
poem, but treating the act of writing the poem, for the moment,
as a biographical event. A poem, if reasonably tight, can take a
certain amount of this kind of treatment without serious harm.. . .
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Therefore, whatever comes from without, but yet can be taken as
an interesting extension of what is surely in, may be admissible. It
merely makes a larger whole. (36)
This, again, is why I say, contra Olsen, that there is a “legitimacy” question,
for Beardsley grants that the mentioned biographical information is admissible
as an “importation,” but denies that it enjoys any special status that does not
await confirmation. He would likely say of the Watt example that, thoughWatt
treats Defoe’s work “for the moment, as a biographical event,” “there might
be no harm” in adducing evidence of Defoe’s working habits, given that what
such evidence suggests is an extension of “what is surely in”Moll Flanders. An
intentionalist, to the extent that he wishes to disagree with Beardsley, must
make the case that such information may be more than a hypothesis to be tested,
not an “importation” but genuine criticism.
I now consider how a value-maximizer may treat the above sort of example,
and then work my way to what I take to be the relevance of biography. Take
the case of the octogenarian poet. Beardsley acknowledges that the text of
the poem could be understood as indicating an aged speaker (if not quite
an octogenarian, which may be too specific). The value-maximizer could
likewise judge that construing the poem as having an aged speaker is in fact
value-maximizing. Consequently, there is a question, first, about why it is
value-maximizing. The following is how one sort of answer may go. (It is not
important how things stand specifically with respect to the poem Beardsley
is discussing, which happens to be from Marianne Moore’s Complete Poems.)
There are certain phrases, or certain relations between phrases, or whatever
other poetic features, which, when understood as indicating an aged speaker,
allow for a valuable experience of the poem as a whole, such that applying this
mode of experience relative to a suitable background range of works provides
a cumulative value greater than that provided by other modes of experience.
The next question is more specific: why is it that this mode of experience
maximizes the poem’s value? It seems to me that here answers will vary in
type according to the interests of the inquirer. If one prefers stylistic answers,
as presumably Beardsley does, then one may be told various things about
the eects on our senses of the relevant poetic devices. But one may equally
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prefer biographical answers, as presumably the intentionalist does, and then one
may be told, if such should be the case, that certain facts about the artist have
influenced which modes of experience are in common currency. These would
be “meaning-determining” biographical facts. (Why a critic’s preference should
matter here is something I leave for the next chapter.)
The third (and, for our purposes, final) question is yet more specific: how is
it that certain facts about the artist have influenced which modes of experience
are in common currency? Here answers will come in many shapes and sizes,
but all of them will involve attributions of some sort of cultural influence. The
idea is that the facts about the artist which are held to be critically relevant are
those which are (or are expected to be) influential to such an extent that they
begin to aect what are felt to be the appropriate modes of experiencing the
sort of work in question. I gave an example of this in the previous chapter,
concerning the odd sort of influence Ed Wood has had on the culture. What I
showed there, and the result holds good for all art, is that whether or not facts
about an artist are critically relevant depends on the state of the culture which
the critic is addressing. This can mean that artists who were once irrelevant
become relevant, as in the case of Ed Wood, or the reverse, that artists who
were once relevant are no longer (due, perhaps, to the gradual fading away of
modes of experience for whose availability they were partly responsible).
Critical judgments of this sort are not always obvious, either to readers of
the criticism or even to the critics who make them. This is why I describe this
phenomenon at the level of principles, which work “under the surface.” But
merely to say this is not quite sucient, for one must have some reason to think
that they do, indeed, work under the surface. I believe that the example of Ed
Wood, in particular of the history of the critical attention paid to him, provides
some support for my hypothesis. But there are other cases. One of them may
be Olsen’s final example, which he uses to illustrate the category of biographical
information which is supposed to be an “integral part” of appreciation.
The example is of a certain critic’s take on Yeats’sMeditations. The critic
adduces facts about Yeats’s youthful “hope that Ireland would produce, and
that he would contribute to, an art both major and popular,” and proposes to
readMeditations in the light of this hope, which is said to “reasser[t] itself in a
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painful yet fruitful way” (2010, qtd. 447). The example is set up to highlight
the informativeness of such biographical information. Olsen says that “Yeats’
intellectual biography is used as a point of departure for a thematic analysis of
the poems,” such that “[w]ithout the knowledge of Yeats’ dream of a sound
national culture and the loss of that dream,” parts of the work become “vague, if
not unintelligible. Knowledge of Yeats’ dream and what he suered makes the
content clear and gives the poem a poignancy which it would not otherwise
have had” (448).
But how do we justify this invocation of biographical information as criticism,
rather than merely as a hypothesis that must further be tested? Olsen says
that the poem would become “vague, if not unintelligible” if the biographical
information is not used to give it sense—so that, one imagines, there is nothing
against which it can be tested. But what could Olsen say to somebody who
maintains that the correct thing to conclude, then, is that the poem simply
is “vague, if not unintelligible”? Olsen might reply, in the spirit of a value-
maximizer, that this would be to forgo a valuable experience the poem could
provide (the “poignancy which it would not otherwise have had”). At this point
the objector may latch onto the series of questions I describe above, jumping to
the second stage and asking what makes it the case that experiencing the poem
in the proposed way, as an expression of a failed dream of a “sound national
culture,” makes it value-maximizing? Is it merely that this was Yeats’ dream, or
is it rather that, when so interpreted, regardless of whether anybody actually
had such a dream, the work becomes capable of providing valuable experience?
Olsen does not consider such a line of objection, but there is something he
says that could give credence to the idea that the value of experiencingMedita-
tions as an expression of the mentioned failed dream is not entirely unrelated
to its being Yeats’s dream, more than just a dream with those same attributes
(whether or not Yeats had ever had it). Olsen notes that “Yeats himself felt
guilty about the ‘troubles’ because he saw the dream of a sound national culture,
that he had helped to foster, as a partial cause of the violence to which the Civil
War led” (447, emphasis added). But if Yeats had truly helped to foster the
dream, then its having the poignancy that it does in the context of his work
may be due at least partly to its being his dream. That Meditations comes in
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Yeats’s oeuvre after he is already a well-known poet makes it more plausible
that what counts as a value-maximizing way to read that work is sensitive to
established modes of experience to which Yeats himself contributed with his
much publicized opinions and attitudes.
If some unknown poet, whose views had never been publicized, had pro-
duced qualitatively the same work asMeditations, perhaps this work would still
be best interpreted the same way asMeditations (i.e. in terms of the failed dream),
but then it is not clear that facts about this unknown poet’s biography would
be critically relevant after all (beyond merely being “useful” for suggesting
hypotheses). At the very least, something further would need to be said to
motivate any claims as to their relevance.
This is how “meaning-determining” intentions may be invoked as part of a
value-sensitive critical process. The same may be true of “meaning-tracking”
intentions, but to see this requires a greater attention to the rhetorical dimen-
sion of criticism; for such intentions need not aect the truth-conditions of
interpretive claims (the very reasons why some meaning is value-maximizing).
They are used more for the sake of reasons of intelligibility. I therefore turn,
in the next chapter, to the centrepiece of my metacritical intentionalism, my
account of how intentions may be integrated into critically relevant pieces of
discourse.
CHAPTER 5
How to Do Things with Intentions
Approach? Either one has the truth about a poem or one does not. Approach? Just as
a thousand misunderstandings will not alter in the least the possibility of a correct
understanding, so a thousand varied approaches cannot negate uniqueness of
meaning.
Then I began to eat of the tree of knowledge, so that my eyes were multiplied . . .
– Georey H. Hartman1
I argued in the third chapter that value-maximization theory provides the
truth-conditions for interpretive statements, but also that one may build on top
of this what I called a “metacritical intentionalism.” In the previous chapter, I
described a signal advantage of construing intentionalism this way, namely that
it answers a standing puzzle about how intentions may be relevant to evaluation.
In the present chapter, I add to what I have said by describing in more detail the
metacritical aspect of the view, for until now I have focused largely on its relation
to an underlying value-maximization theory. Even if value-maximization
theory is granted, along with the fact that sometimes an artist’s biography is
interestingly related to the reasons why some meaning is value-maximizing,
it still remains to be shown how such a relation manifests itself in criticism.
Although I believe that there are many ways for it to do so, I here focus on one
that I find salient, that of conversation. I begin, however, by rehearsing the sort
1. The Unmediated Vision: An Interpretation of Wordsworth, Hopkins, Rilke, and Valéry. 1966.
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., ix.
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of explanatory obligation I take myself to be discharging, which I describe in
terms of a long-standing objection due originally to Beardsley and Wimsatt.
5.1 The Dilemma Objection
It is not enough, one might think, merely to point to “meaning-tracking” or
“meaning-determining” intentions. For it might be granted in some given case
that the artist is astute about what would maximize the value of his work, or
that facts about him are part of the reasons why some meaning maximizes
value, but doubt remain that a critic’s coming to know of such things will
be critically useful. The sort of additional claim to which I earlier gestured
relies on expanding the notion of what makes a piece of discourse critically
relevant. I observed that Beardsley’s notion, given in terms of the individual
statement, is not only unduly restrictive but also explanatorily inadequate, for
it does not account for the contextual features of critical statements. (The notion
of conversation I will go on to develop can be viewed as one such feature.)
If we open up the terms of the debate as I suggest, then it is at least possible
that some account could be given of the critical relevance of biographical state-
ments even though such statements are not themselves interpretive or evaluative
statements. But this is just to restate the explanatory burden I have incurred.
The intentionalist must still go on to provide some such account. The objection
in terms of which I here press the urgency of this explanatory burden is one that
has been fashioned with very much such a burden in mind. It has had a storied
career in the debate, but has rarely, if ever, been treated in respect of its full
history. Because I have not seen the objection satisfactorily answered elsewhere,
I take myself, in answering it, to be providing something of more general
interest than simply a vindication of my particular brand of intentionalism.
I call it the dilemma objection, and follow Beardsley and Wimsatt in their
articulation of it:
One must ask how a critic expects to get an answer to the question
about intention. How is he to find out what the poet tried to do?
If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what
he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the
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poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the
poem—for evidence of an intention that did not become eective
in the poem. (1946, 469)
The critic is said in either case to be required to consult the work, so that she
has already come to know what the work means in confirming the intention’s
“success.” Even if it is true, therefore, that some intentions are “successful,” there
is never any benefit for a critic in attempting to figure out what those intentions
are.2
It is important to see that this is an epistemic objection, but not of the
common sort that is easily answered, the one on which it is said that critics
never have relevant “access” to what the artist intended. The dilemma objection
allows for such access, but questions its critical benefits. How does knowing
what an artist intended help the critic in what she is trying to do? Even if
the intention is successful, the critic can come to know this only through
a procedure (consulting the work) that will independently deliver her the
information she seeks (what the work means). So she is better o retreating
to that procedure to begin with, forgoing the (at best) superfluous search for
intentions.
Wollheim devotes careful attention to this objection (without bringing up
Beardsley and Wimsatt, curiously). In his terms, the objection states that a
search for the artist’s intentions, roughly what Wollheim calls “retrieval,” “is,
from the critical point of view, on any given occasion either misleading or
otiose” (1980b, 188). It is “misleading when its results deviate from the findings
of scrutiny,” viz. what I have described as consulting the work, “and it is otiose
when its results concur with the findings of scrutiny” (188-189). The reason
why scrutiny should not be deemed otiose, at least according to the objector, is
that “retrieval can never do better than scrutiny, sometimes it can do worse,
and which is the case cannot be determined without the benefit of scrutiny”
(189).
2. Here the notion of “success” appears to involve simply a “match” in semantic content
between intention and work. I have in previous chapters raised questions about whether this
correspondence should be regarded as critically or aesthetically relevant. The present objection
seems to me to proceed from a variant of such a question.
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I focus on Wollheim because I take him to have oered the definitive
statement of (and, as I will presently discuss, a near-definitive set of solutions
to) this objection. Although it has variously been raised since Wollheim, the
state of the argument seems still to lag behind him. Take Trivedi (2001), who
brings up the objection in terms very similar to Beardsley andWimsatt’s (again,
curiously, without citing either them or Wollheim):
how do we, as the audience, know whether the artist’s semantic
intentions have been successfully realized or not?. . . If there is a
fit or match between the artist’s actual semantic intentions and
work-meaning when these are compared, then we can say that
the artist’s semantic intentions have been successfully realized.. . .
[O]n the other hand, if there is no such fit, we can say that the
artist’s intentions have not been successfully realized. But, if we
have figured out what the work itself means without reference to
the artist’s actual intentions . . . then actual intentionalism is otiose.
(198-199)
The dialectic that has come to surround Trivedi’s contribution is not without
interest, but in its failing to take account of how the dilemma has been treated
in the past, in particular by Wollheim, it unnecessarily repeats certain mistakes.
For example, in reply to Trivedi, Sheila Lintott observes that “successfully
realized intentions are frequently, in art and elsewhere, a matter of degree”
(2002, 69). Wollheim has considered such a reply, that “the creative process may
be realized in the work of art to varying degrees,” but found that it “presents no
real problem,” that “the objection can surely concede that the creative process
may be realized to varying degrees” so long as it is recognized that “retrieval is
misleading if, and as soon as, it is carried beyond this point” (1980b, 189-190).
Wollheim canvasses a number of such replies. Each of them oers some
insight, but none, in my view, is ultimately satisfactory. In one, it is ventured
that “there is something that reconstruction of this [successful] part of the
[creative] process can bring to light which scrutiny of the corresponding part
of the work cannot. It can show that that part of the work which came about
through design did indeed come about through design and not through accident
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or error” (190).3 This, of course, presupposes that “criticism is concerned to
find out not just what the work of art is like but what the work is like by
design” (190-191). But such a claim is precisely what needs to be explained—
that facts about production history may be critically relevant—so it cannot be
presupposed.
Wollheim may be viewed as defending the presupposition in his subsequent
denial that the critical relevance of intentions must be a function of “the likely
degree of match between the creative process and the resultant work” (192).
According toWollheim, the critic may “continue to be interested in the creative
process even in the case when he knows that there is a mismatch between the
two.” I have some sympathy with this idea—and, indeed, will defend a variant
of it shortly—but I think there is a danger, in accepting it, of sanctioning a
change of subject. Attention to the creative process for its own sake, regardless
of what it reveals about the work, should not be regarded as a critical end.
Wollheim claims that inquiries into aspects of the creative process which do
not “match” the work may constitute “description profounder than scrutiny
can provide,” but it is not entirely clear what he means, why this is description
not only of the creative process but also of the work.
In his final and most forceful reply, Wollheim calls into question the objec-
tor’s assumption that scrutiny is an independent check on retrieval. He insists
that scrutiny, far from being unproblematically self-sucient, “needs to be
filled out by a definition of the person whose scrutiny is authoritative, or ‘the
ideal critic’, and any such definition must be partly in terms of the cognitive
stock upon which the critic can draw” (194). He does not here define what
a “cognitive stock” is supposed to be, but does elsewhere: “what I actually
perceive will vary not just with the visual stimuli that I receive but also with
the knowledge, belief, and conceptual holding—what I shall call the cognitive
3. It is not quite true to say that scrutiny cannot reveal what the work is like by design.
As Carroll (1992) observes, one can come to discover failed intentions through noticing
irregularities in the words used by an author, which may indicate that the author probably
intended something other than what was said (100). See also Redpath (1976): “it is sometimes
possible to detect from inspection of a poem, particularly in the case of an inferior poem, that
the poet has not said exactly what he meant to say” (15). Similarly, the absolute intentionalist is
surely right in holding that works are often the best clue we have to the intentions of the artist
(even if, as I have maintained, it is not the business of criticism to treat them as such).
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stock—that I bring to bear on the visual stimuli” (1993, 134). Wollheim takes
admissibility to the cognitive stock to be determined by whether or not the
item in question “contribute[s] to scrutiny,” i.e. is “capable of modifying our
perception of a work of art” (presumably to the eect of a correct perception).
He then notes that among such items will invariably be beliefs that “need to
be acquired independently” of such perception, through an “external” source.
Some such beliefs are said to pertain to the artist, in which case scrutiny may
be seen to rely on the fruits of retrieval. Wollheim concludes that there is no
sense in asking which of scrutiny and retrieval is “otiose,” for scrutiny will in
such a manner rely on retrieval at least as much as it is relied on by retrieval.
However, the examples Wollheim gives are, again, precisely what need to
be explained, rather than assumed to have the upshot that he attributes to them.
One such example is that “a reader’s response to Hardy’s ‘At Castle Boterel’ will
be modified when he learns that the poet’s wife had just died” (1980b, 193).
This undoubtedly carries intuitive appeal—we take such facts to somehow be
worth the critic’s time—but it is always open to the anti-intentionalist to explain
this appeal in terms more favourable to her, as in the previous chapter I showed
Beardsley to have done with respect to the example of the octogenarian poet.
Here the anti-intentionalist might say that the poem clearly enough supplies
a bereaved speaker, and that to read facts about Hardy’s life into it may be
acceptable if they are consistent with the latter.
There is a second part to the example which may be more dicult to treat
in such a way. Wollheim adds that the reader’s response “will be modified
again as he learns how unhappy [Hardy’s] marriage had been” (1980b, 193).
The anti-intentionalist is likely to say that nothing in the poem even hints at
this.4 Wollheim, of course, will agree, but take this to establish his point—
that the reader must go outside the poem for such facts in order to correctly
experience the poem. One subject of dispute will thus be whether or not “going
outside” is indeed required for correct experience. But another, perhaps more
4. This is not the anti-intentionalist’s only option, for there may be ways to read the poem
as suggestive of, if not quite an “unhappy marriage,” at least rumblings. Barbara Hardy (2000)
notes that the speaker “creates two points of view, one self-centred and the other place-centred,
and shuttles between the two. The space between the two is small but significant, because it
deromanticizes or undermines love’s hyperbole” (145).
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interesting dispute will concern what to make of such a requirement (supposing
that something like it obtains). Consider that a value-maximizer might agree
with Wollheim that the speaker ought to be read as having had an unhappy
marriage—if this is what Wollheim means5—but might take this to be due to
the value that a reader would extract from the poem when it is so experienced.
This would be yet another way to account for the intuition that biographical
facts are worth the critic’s time.
Wollheim would deny that this is how their relevance is to be explained, in
eect as hypotheses to be tested, for he believes that having such facts in tow
is part of the very test we would perform. But it is not clear what grounds he
has for believing this. He claims that certain aesthetic properties—we are never
quite told which—are open to scrutiny only if one brings to the experience
antecedently held beliefs about the artist (which themselves are not apparent
in the work). But is it necessary that these beliefs be true, i.e. really describe
the actual artist? Suppose Hardy’s wife had not just died, but that the poem
was indistinguishable from the actual one. Presumably the eect of believing
that his wife had just died would be the same on a reader of the poem in this
alternative scenario, but Wollheim would, I imagine, insist that in this case the
response is incorrect. Yet such a consequence is just what needs to be explained,
cannot be presupposed.
It makes sense, of course, for intentionalists to try to answer in such a way,
for it is easy to think that this is the only way in which retrieval may be a
self-standing and independently useful critical practice, not rendered otiose by
another practice of which we must always first avail ourselves to confirm an
intention’s “success.” Without foreclosing the latter sort of answer, I propose
to follow a dierent (and, I believe, largely uncharted) intentionalist route. I
choose to describe the relevance at issue in terms primarily of what critics are
trying to do, of the use to which they are putting biographical facts, rather than
of some antecedent relation between intentions and work.
Observe that, though Wollheim is ostensibly talking about methods of
5. Strictly speaking, allWollheim says is that a reader’s response to the poemwill be “modified”
upon learning the mentioned facts about Hardy’s life experience, but this does not entail that
such experience is to be attributed to the speaker.
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criticism—retrieval and scrutiny, respectively—he gradually slides into talk
of perceivers, of what is necessary for certain kinds of perception. Similarly,
Trivedi speaks of how audiences come to know whether the artist succeeded,
rather than, as Beardsley and Wimsatt do, about how critics come to know.
This dierence in terminology is important, for it signals a shift away from the
subject of criticism and toward that of experience. The ambiguity is encouraged
by Beardsley and Wimsatt, in their conception of the relevant “use” being one
of figuring out what the work means—which, in some sense, both critics and
audiences do.
Most intentionalists follow suit, taking for granted that the “use” to which
critics are to put any given piece of information is the same sort of use to which
audiences will put that information, namely as an item in their “cognitive
stock.” But producing criticism of a work is a dierent sort of activity from
experiencing that work, even if it typically relies on the critic’s having had
the relevant experiences. One famous characterization of the dierence is due
to Arnold Isenberg (1949), who contends that the critic has in mind certain
perceptible qualities “which he sees and which by his use of language he gets
us to see” (336). Isenberg goes on to give a controversial view of how such
language operates, which we need not accept.6 What is important for me
is only his acknowledgement that the critic’s activity vis-à-vis perception is
crucially mediated by her use of language. She is concerned with perception
not as something she herself must do but as something she must by means of
her language enable her readers to do (upon their appropriate exposure to the
work). Thus, the notion of a “cognitive stock” is somewhat out of place in
this discussion. The critic makes use of methods such as retrieval and scrutiny
not to experience the work but to engage in discourse that has the function of
enabling her readers to experience the work.
With this in mind, we may dispute the terms of the dilemma as follows. It
is not obvious, to begin with, that an intention is otiose just because one must
scrutinize the work in order to discover whether or not that intention has been
successful (supposing this to be a requirement). It may be true that once one has
6. See Siegler (1968) for a critical but sympathetic assessment.
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discovered what the work means, through scrutiny, there is no further question
to answer about what the work means, hence no need to consult intentions for
this purpose. But there may still be a need to consult intentions for the purpose
of making the work accessible to readers. The latter is, after all, as I argued in
the third chapter, the function of criticism.
Nor must the terms of the second horn be accepted, on which the intention
is deemed misleading if found to be unsuccessful. For an unsuccessful intention
is misleading only if it is accepted as something the work means, if it is (so
to speak) read into the work. But, again, information about an unsuccessful
intention need not be sought by a critic for the purpose of recommending that
it be admitted to the audience’s cognitive stock. The critic may mention an
unsuccessful intention precisely to recommend that consumers of the work not
admit the intended meaning to their cognitive stock (to whatever extent this is
within their control). I take this somewhat to vindicate Wollheim’s belief that
intentions which do not “match” the work may still be critically relevant.
The latter possibility again brings out the argumentative burden of describ-
ing how such recommendations may bear witness to the critical relevance of
intentions as such, beyond merely of the intended content of which the critic
would say the same whether or not it was intended. To discharge this sort
of burden, I next discuss what I take to be a common way in which critics
integrate into their criticism biographical facts as such, that of constructing a
“conversation.” I say more about my specific proposal in due course, but first I
clear the ground by examining the existing literature on such analogies from
conversation, to which I take my view to be a contribution.
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5.2 The Conversation Analogy
There is no such thing as conversation. It is an illusion. There are intersecting
monologues, that is all. We speak; we spread round us with sounds, with words, an
emanation from ourselves. Sometimes they overlap the circles that others are
spreading round themselves. Then they are aected by these other circles, to be sure,
but not because of any real communication that has taken place, merely as a scarf of
blue chion lying on a woman’s dressing-table will change colour if she casts down
on it a scarf of red chion.
– Rebecca West7
Let me begin my examination of the conversation analogy by confirming that
it is indeed an analogy. For we are not being asked to suppose that any sort
of literal conversation is taking place by means of the artwork (though this
could separately be true). In response to such questions, Carroll, the chief
exponent of the analogy, clarifies that his view is not that “artworks and our
reception of them are literally conversations” (2007, 404, n. 4). He attempts
only to “analogize artworks to conversations (rather than classifying artworks
as conversations) in order to suggest that we have interests in artworks that
are like the interests we have in many conversations—namely, interests in
understanding our interlocutor.” The point of analogy is thus an interest.
Though Carroll seems to take this interest to be one of “understanding our
interlocutor,” he believes, more properly, that it is an interest in attaining “a
sense of community or communion that itself rests on communication” (1992,
118). The connection comes from the notion of “fulfilling conversation,” which
is said to be a means to such communion but also to require “that we have the
conviction of having grasped what our interlocutor meant or intended to say.”
Our interest in artworks is explained by analogy from such conversations:
this prospect of community supplies a major impetus motivating
our interest in engaging literary texts and artworks. We may read
to be entertained, to learn, and to be moved, but we also seek out
artworks in order to converse or commune with their makers. We
7. “There Is No Conversation.” 1935. In The Harsh Voice, 85–175. J. Cape, 85.
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want to understand the author, even if that will lead to rejecting
his or her point of view. (118)
Although in the third chapter I argued, contra Carroll, that it is not a function of
art to supply such fulfilling conversations—for it does not seem to me that it is
in the service of conversational needs and interests that we conceptually segregate
artworks as such—it remains to be shown that my objection generalizes to
the analogy writ large (which need not entail a claim about the function of
art). My eorts in the present section can be so described. I will argue that
while there is something compelling about Carroll’s proposal it cannot quite be
accepted as it stands, as a proposal directly about the experience of art.
There are two parts to his proposal, one or both of which may be rejected:
his characterization of conversational experience, and the manner in which
he analogizes it to art experience. I aim to reject the latter on the basis of
accepting the former. So I start by defending him as far as that is concerned (his
characterization of conversational experience), for he has incurred objections
on both counts.
Dickie and Wilson (1995) dispute that “in conversations hearers always
have the standard goal Carroll envisages. Hearers always have as a goal the
understanding of a speaker’s utterance” (245). It is granted that sometimes a
speaker will aim to understand the meaning not of the utterance but of the
utterer—for instance, in cases of “utterances that are clearly failures on the part
of the speaker,” or “puzzling” and/or “ambiguous” utterances. But these are
deemed too idiosyncratic to be of much help in defining the “overwhelming
majority of fulfilling and unfulfilling conversations,” in which “a hearer’s goal
is almost always to understand a speaker’s utterance meaning.”
Carroll replies, rightly in my view, that “the importance of the meaning
of the utterance in conversation” is due to the fact that “in large measure
utterance meaning is the best guide to speaker meaning” (1997, 308). Dickie
and Wilson believe that we attend to the speaker’s intention only when the
situation is unusual (e.g. the utterance somehow arouses suspicion), but Carroll
can grant this while holding that we have some sort of overarching aim in most
ordinary conversations to get the speaker right, and that attending to utterances
is normally assumed to be the best way to do this (hence conversation taking
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the form of an exchange of utterances).
To help illustrate his position, Carroll imagines two cases in which he is
“stopped at a street corner in New York City and . . . asked for the whereabouts
of the Empire State Building” (308). In the one case, he is asked by a “trav-
eler, with suitcase in hand,” and in the other by a “pollster, with clipboard
in hand, doing research on . . . geographical knowledge.” It is clear that each
of these conversations is oriented around an exchange of information. The
pollster engages Carroll in conversation because she wishes to record his level
of knowledge. The traveller engages him in conversation because she wants
directions. Both wish to knowwhat he knows (or, more neutrally, to learn what
he believes). Carroll concludes from this that he must “presume or conjecture a
framework that will situate what [the inquirer] intends to learn by means of
saying ‘Where is the Empire State Building?’ ” But this perhaps obscures the
point of the example.
Here is what I think the point should be. Carroll seems to claim, and we all
agree, that it is only for the purpose of learning a certain thing that the inquirers
engage him in conversation. The fundamental or ultimate aim of each is to
acquire certain information. Now, it is primarily in what Carroll intends to
say that what he knows is reflected. His utterance, the words that he uses, are
merely the instruments by which he is conveying the knowledge in which the
inquirer is ultimately interested. She attends to the uttered words only under the
assumption that they will reliably convey to her the information she seeks. This
explains why, as Dickie and Wilson observe, she would begin attending more
carefully (in ways normally deemed unnecessary or even perverse) to Carroll’s
intentions if his utterance fails. For if his utterances are no longer deemed a
reliable vehicle for his intentions, and the latter contain the information she
seeks, then of course she will ignore the utterances and construct some other
means of getting at the intentions (assuming, naturally, that Carroll sincerely
wishes to convey the information). But common to both the normal case and
the case of utterance failure is the hearer’s ultimate interest in what the speaker
intends.
Suppose we reach this sort of conclusion. What dierence would it make?
Wilson introduces into the discussion a term that will help us see the dier-
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ence. He says, in a separate reply—but in line with his earlier remarks with
Dickie—that on “occasions . . . when a speaker’s utterance is puzzling or obscure
. . . knowing what the speaker meant or why she said what she said assumes
higher priority” (1997, 309). He calls this an “ordinary example of a ‘meta-
conversational’ interest,” but argues that such interests, in which intentions are
given a “higher priority,” will not be “as universal as [Carroll’s] claims about
conversation . . . suggest.” If I am right, however, then they will indeed be as
universal as Carroll suggests.
Let us first get clear about what exactly a “metaconversational” interest is
supposed to be. Wilson uses this term very casually, only the once. I imagine he
has in mind the following sort of distinction. A metaconversational interest is an
interest of a conversation, that which motivates us to engage in conversation to
begin with. A conversational interest, by contrast, is an interest in a conversation,
that which motivates us to do certain things while engaged in conversation.
Presumably, one’s reasons for engaging in a conversation are not unrelated
to one’s reasons for doing certain things while engaged in that conversation.
So metaconversational interests, to some extent, guide conversational interests.
If one has a metaconversational interest to find out from one’s interlocutor
whatever one can about a certain subject, then one’s conversational interests
will dictate, say, paying closer attention when one notices that subject come up,
or perhaps forgoing certain conversational proprieties for the sake of getting
the information.
Now consider the possibility that, as Carroll suggests, most of our metacon-
versational interests give priority to the intentions of our interlocutors. I believe
this is true, for most of our conversations are motivated by a desire to exchange
information or goods. The information which we have to exchange is ours in
the sense that it is known (or believed) by us. Should we wish to convey it to
our hearers, we use specific words under the belief that they will be suitable
vehicles for that information. What matters, however, is what we as speakers
know, not how we make it known. Something similar is true also in the case of
exchanges of goods. Carroll gives what we may take to be an example of the
latter:
If someone with a cigarette in his mouth asks me for a match and all
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I have is a lighter, I will hand him the lighter, on the assumption that
he wants me to ignite his cigarette. I will do this rather than doing
nothing at all on the assumption that he, say, is a match collector.
(1997, 308)
Mymetaconversational interest here is to get a light for my cigarette. The words
I use are chosen merely for their expedience at conveying this information;
they hold no independent interest. To the extent that my interlocutor knows
(or believes) that people who ask for matches normally are looking for just any
way to light a cigarette, what he will subsequently do is very likely to serve
my metaconversational interest. I am not looking, metaconversationally, for
him to understand the utterance-meaning of what I have said. It equally serves
my metaconversational interest if my interlocutor does not strictly speaking
understand the meaning of my utterance but, say, has several times in the past
heard what I utter be uttered by a person who is subsequently helped to light
his cigarette, and correctly infers my intention.
Admittedly, not all metaconversational interests are of this informational
sort, where what matters is simply what the speaker knows, not how he conveys
what he knows. I might really enjoy a friend’s accent or diction, and engage
him in conversation with the metaconversational interest of appreciating this
accent or diction. Here I am not looking to learn anything from him, or to
participate in any (tangible) exchange of goods. I simply wish to hear him talk.
To sustain such a conversation, I might have to summon the conversational
interest of minimally attending to the meanings of his utterances. For even if he
is tolerant of my somewhat disrespectful metaconversational interest (should he
become aware of it), he might not wish to talk very long with somebody who
does not minimally reciprocate in the form of at least vaguely relevant replies.
But note that, even with the latter qualification, my metaconversational interest
is sensitive neither to his intentions nor to the meanings of his utterances.
Carroll would likely say of such a conversation (as he says of “firings”) that
it is not what he is looking to analogize to the experience of art. The conversa-
tions in which he is interested are, again, “fulfilling” or “serious” conversations,
and in these, he thinks, there will always be (what I am now calling) a meta-
conversational interest to commune with one’s interlocutor (e.g. share in her
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experience), which will involve giving her intentions a “high priority.”
This need not be ad hoc. We might say that my example is of a conversation
that is indeed frivolous, that does not take advantage of what conversations have
the capacity to provide. The fact that I am conversing with my friend does not
much matter to my reasons for doing so. One’s metaconversational interests
with respect to conversations that are good qua conversation, by contrast, should
at least be sensitive to its being a conversation that one is using to satisfy the
interests. Perhaps such sensitivity must involve the rationality or agency of
the person with whom one is entering into conversation, which, in turn, will
involve the interlocutor’s intentions, for these will inextricably be bound up
in her rationality and agency. So at least one such argument could go. I
think, therefore, that there are good grounds on which to accept Carroll’s
characterization of ordinary conversation (at least of the “fulfilling” sort).
What, however, would be the resulting analogy to art? It would lead,
it seems to me, to a picture very similar to the absolute intentionalist’s (as
described in the second chapter). The absolute intentionalist, recall, has a
theory of meaning on which the work properly speaking has no meaning
except in the derivative sense of pointing, as it were, to what the artist intended.
The work is a mere “clue,” as Irwin maintained, to the meaning that is “in the
mind” (1999, 58). Carroll achieves a similar result in dierent terms. He need
not say that the work has no independent meaning, but may hold that whatever
it independently means is of no interest, for our interest is in what was intended
rather than in the specific vehicle that happened to have been chosen to convey
what was intended.
Let me justify this reading of the analogy. I have said that interlocutors
have metaconversational interests that dictate why they are in a conversation to
begin with—what they hope to get out of it—and that these almost always, at
least in “fulfilling” conversations, give high priority to the intentions of speakers.
Conversational interests then guide interlocutors during the conversation to
the end set by such metaconversational interests. To analogize this sort of
framework to art is to say that what audiences really are doing, the reason
why they approach works to begin with, is to commune with the artist, and
that their engagement with a work, which includes attending to its features,
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only provides the means by which they may achieve their ultimate end of so
communing. The work, like the utterance, is to be treated merely as a vehicle
used by the artist to convey his intention, and as having no independent interest.
We may further re-describe, in the terms of the present analogy, a certain
defence that absolute intentionalists routinely oer (covered in the second
chapter). The absolute intentionalist says that although works are mere clues to
the artist’s intention, they are the “primary” or foremost such clue, taken to be
more reliable as to the relevant intentions than even sincere reports by the artist.
This is meant to mitigate the embarrassing consequence that the work seems
not to matter. Works do matter, replies the absolute intentionalist, but as the
best clue we have as to what, so to speak, reallymatters (the intention). Similarly,
Carroll may defend himself by saying that, although our “metaconversational”
interest is to commune with the artist, and the work is merely a vehicle for this,
it is the “primary” or foremost such vehicle, the best evidence of the information
we seek, hence in some manner indispensable. However, as I said in my initial
discussion of this argumentative strategy, I do not take it to suce, for we are
given no reason to think that, under such a proposal, the work is in any manner
indispensable. Why, for example, are not sincere reports of intention from the
artist equal or better evidence of the intention?
Perhaps Carroll has in mind a dierent analogy, one that does not align
him so closely with the absolute intentionalist, but he does not say. Indeed,
he has been criticized for not saying, for instance by Wilson who complains
that Carroll “fails to oer the necessary explanations” (1997, 309). It is quite
probable that Carroll would not accept the claims at which I have arrived on his
behalf, but the fault lies, I believe, with his analogy, which I have seen through
to its logical conclusion. I do, however, think that this analogy, even as I have
explained it, has a kernel of truth. But this must carefully be teased out.
5.2.1 Experience and Interpretation
Let me distinguish, somewhat belatedly, two sorts of analogy one could make
using Carroll’s basic proposal. One is to art experience, the other to art inter-
pretation. Carroll speaks in terms of both. He says that our experience of art is
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analogous to “engaging” in a conversation, and that our interpretation of art is
analogous to interpreting8 an interlocutor in conversation. So, of course, both
could be. But the two sorts of analogy do not entail each other. In fact, they
require very dierent kinds of defence.
My objection in the previous section is really to a certain conception of
art experience, under which consumers do not much care about the artwork
outside of its function of reliably leading to communion with the artist. But
this conception, aside from what it itself says, has certain consequences for
criticism. For instance, if consumers didn’t much care about the artwork then
critics likewise, in crafting their interpretations, would be less interested in the
artwork than in what the artist intended to convey by means of the artwork.
Much of what may be attributed to Carroll with respect to interpretation is
thus in the register of consequences of a prior claim about experience.
I am inclined, as I have said, to reject any claims to the eect that the
experience of art serves the same sorts of interests as does the experience of
conversation, if the latter is understood along the lines I have described. For it
seems to me crucial that in experiencing art we do adopt something like what
Beardsley calls the aesthetic point of view, and our typical metaconversational
interests are not relevantly similar to the interests in the service of which we
seek out opportunities to take an aesthetic point of view. But perhaps some such
analogy as Carroll’s can be maintained with respect to the interpretation of art,
not as a consequence of his claim about experience but on independent grounds.
There are a number of ways this could go. Before describing my own, which
I do in the next section, let me consider another which has recently attracted
attention. Clarifying what I take to be the latter’s shortcomings will serve as a
8. Lamarque objects that it is “odd . . . even to speak of interpretation in a conversational
context,” for “[n]ormally, conversational remarks are grasped (their meaning grasped) and
responses elicited without any deep reflection and without any need for interpreting” (2002,
288). Carroll might reply that so much is true also of art, the experience of which, like that
of conversation, involves for the most part grasping meanings without “any deep reflection
and without any need for interpreting.” See, e.g., Eaton (1973): “In ordinary conversation it is
taken for granted that a speaker . . . has said the words he wanted to say and that those words
mean what he thinks they mean.. . . The same holds true for an author. When we are faced
with a literary work, we assume that the locutionary intentions of the author have been carried
out, for example, that there are not printing errors” (61).
186 INTENTIONALISM AS METACRITICISM
useful transition to my alternative.
The proposal I wish to highlight is due to Huddleston (2012b), who objects
to Carroll on the grounds that “the central image of the conversation . . . does not
deliver the actual intentionalist result he desires, whereby authorial intentions
ought to act as a damper on the interpretations we can appropriately put
forward” (241). Huddleston frames his discussion in terms similar to my own,
distinguishing a “semantic” thesis about “what the text qua utterance really
means” from “a normative claim about interpretive policy” (244, n. 8). These
roughly correspond to what I have called a theory of meaning and a theory of
criticism, respectively.
Of particular interest to me is the fact that Huddleston criticizes the semantic
thesis for being too easily circumvented: “the non-intentionalist can always ask:
‘fine, suppose you are right, but why should I care about that [intendedmeaning],
instead of just any interesting non-intended meaning that I can sensibly find in
the text?’ ” The answer will, of course, be: because that is what the work really
means. But Huddleston is likely to ask: why care about what the work really means?
This may sound perverse, due to what we take to be the normative implications
of meaning, but we have already encountered such an attitude, not in any
anti-intentionalist but, strangely enough, in no less absolute an intentionalist
than Irwin, who, as I describe in the second chapter, casts aside his intentionalist
theory of criticism to save his intentionalist theory of meaning. Huddleston
thus makes something like my point in privileging the “normative” (or, as I
would call it, the metacritical) version of intentionalism. All I would add is that
the semantic version is irrelevant by itself, being summoned, as by Hirsch, only
for the purpose of leading to some normative claim that could vindicate critical
discourse that makes (inexpugnable) reference to intentions. For this is what
the intentionalism debate is ultimately about.
According to Huddleston, “good” conversations have two essential features,
what he callsmutuality and openness. Mutuality is defined as “some back and forth
between the participants,” and openness as “the ideas of . . . [both] participants
. . . matter[ing]” (249). The former fails when one participant monopolizes
the conversation, preventing the other from having her say, the latter when
each participant has her say but one of them intellectually monopolizes the
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conversation, not letting the other’s contributions matter. This second failure
is the one Huddleston attributes to Carroll, who is taken to believe that “any
reading that diverges from the one that the author intended is a reading that
is hermeneutically inappropriate” (251). To repair this deficiency—which we
might already find to be unfairly attributed to Carroll9—Huddleston suggests
that
[w]e as readers should be seen as having a meta-level discussion
with the author about how the text is best read. We, in being
good interlocutors, will try to discover what the author intended,
drawing not just on the text itself, but on other information we have
about the author (e.g. what we know of her political orientation or
religious sympathies). This is what we imagine her ‘saying’ to us.
But then we can think of ourselves saying, ‘Well, what about his
interpretation?’
Huddleston believes that under his view “our voices, as it were, stand a chance
to be heard.. . . Our opinions can matter.” But, we might wonder, “matter”
how, and to whom? Absent good answers to such questions, Huddleston risks
failing by his own standards.
Consider first the issue of mutuality. Huddleston seems to take the “ex-
change” between interpreter and artist to be mutual in that the artist first has
his say via the work (and any external evidence that is adduced) and then the
interpreter has hers via her critical comments. But the interpreter’s “contribu-
tion” clearly does not constitute genuine communication, even if we think that
the artist’s does. The problem is not that the artist never comes to hear what the
interpreter has to say. It is that there is no possible critical channel in which such
communication may take place, and the interpreter knows this. For even if
what she says happens to find its way back to the artist—given that many artists
read criticism—this is an accident as far as criticism is concerned. Criticism is
9. See Jannotta (2014) for a defence of Carroll as a moderate intentionalist, one who allows
that intentions may fail. I take Huddleston’s objection to be somehow sensitive to the anities I
have been pointing out between moderate intentionalism and absolute intentionalism, namely
in what appears to be their common account that intentions are critically relevant by being the
target of interpretation.
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not addressed to the artist in the way that his personal correspondence is. At
best, criticism is addressed to a readership of potential consumers of the artwork,
but even this is dicult to view as a “conversational” activity, for there equally
is no critical channel for consumers to respond to critics.10
But even setting aside mutuality, it is not clear what would determine that
the putative conversation is, in Huddleston’s terms, open—namely, how the
contributions of each participant could “matter.” Huddleston might advert
to his notion of “how the text is best read,” so that the contributions of each
participant are judged to “matter” in terms of how closely they approximate this
reading. But Huddleston is not very forthcoming about how he understands
the notion of a “best” reading.
He may have in mind something like “aesthetically best.” This appears to
be the case in his discussion of Plan 9, with respect to which he proposes a
“conversation” between interpreter and Wood in which the former acknowl-
edges Wood’s intentions but then makes her own suggestions which are said
to matter more in virtue of being “more interesting.”
For in a real conversation, I can be aware of my interlocutor’s in-
tentions, and can nonetheless suggest a better, or a more interesting
possibility. This inventive [avant-garde] reading of Wood is rather
like taking a dim idea from a not-very-talented person, and trans-
forming it into a thought that is more interesting to think about
and discuss. (253)
This looks like a variant of value-maximization theory—hence consistent with
such of my view as I have so far discussed—but, perhaps for just this reason, also
raises questions about the relevance of the notion of “conversation.” Carroll takes
the artwork to be something like the artist’s utterance, and partly constitutive of
the conversation. Huddleston says things to this eect, but, if he really believes
them, flirts with inconsistency. For, as I say above, it is a conversational norm
to take the meanings of utterances to reflect the speaker’s intentions. Moreover,
10. Cf. Isenberg (1949), who argues that a critic and her readers might experience a
“ ‘communion’—a community of feeling which expresses itself in identical value judgments”
(336).
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nobody in ordinary conversation responds to his interlocutor by suggesting
better (more interesting) meanings for what she has just said. This is surely a
recipe for miscommunication and conversational failure (not to mention the
alienation of one’s conversation partners).
So Huddleston’s proposal cannot quite treat the work as an utterance in
the conversation. What he appears to have in mind is that the participants
to the conversation are engaged in some sort of joint inquiry in search of
the most interesting possible meanings. Aside from all else, this is to depart
significantly from the basic structure of Carroll’s analogy, which is an analogy
to art experience. Huddleston’s analogy, by contrast, is an analogy to art
interpretation. This is confirmed by the way in which he speaks, e.g. of “this
‘conversational’ literary interpretation” and its “final hermeneutical result” (242).
The following is a relatively simple way to place Carroll and Huddleston
with respect to each other. Carroll analogizes from metaconversational interests
while Huddleston analogizes from conversational interests. The former, at least in
cases of “fulfilling” conversations, are said to be interests to commune with and
share in the perspective of an interlocutor. Carroll believes that consumers of art
have similar interests with respect to artists. Conversational interests, meanwhile,
are much like the sorts of procedural requirements from which Huddleston
analogizes, having to do with the “mutuality” and “openness” characteristic
of “fulfilling” conversation. Thus Huddleston believes that interpreters (not
consumers) must be allowed to make contributions which furthermore “matter”
to the outcome of the “conversation.” This outcome is an interpretation (or an
interpretive claim).
I have objected to Carroll on the grounds that, even if we somehow care
about sharing in an artist’s perspective, this is not relevantly like such of our
interests in conversation, in which the character of the utterance is, unlike that
of an artwork, more or less incidental. My objection to Huddleston is that
the procedural requirements from which he analogizes simply do not apply to
interpretation, if only because there are not “two sides” to an interpretation
which may so be constrained. The interpreter is engaged in a more or less
solitary activity, reflecting on his experiences and, if he is writing for an audi-
ence, hoping to make them accessible to others. It is unclear what is explained
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by treating his consideration of the artist’s intentions as a conversational activity
(even if some sense could be given to such a proposition).
My suggestion, which I will explore in what follows, is that we maintain,
with Carroll, that the interlocutors are indeed artist and consumer, but also,
with Huddleston, that the “conversation” is relevantly interpretive. I propose to
combine these ideas by treating the conversation not as the whole of interpretation
but as one sort of interpretive activity. It is something undertaken by a critic on
behalf of other parties—the artist and the consumer, respectively—rather than
something to which the critic is herself a party. In other words, it is not that
the critic is conversing, but that she is imagining a conversation, performing a
sort of intellectual exercise.
5.3 Critical Conversations
I am talking now of times when life is being lived, not when it is being talked about,
not when the intellect is holding the field. Then, of course, ideas can be formulated,
can be passed from one mind to another. It is not easy, but it can be done with care,
like handing round a pearl on which you wish an opinion to a circle of experts. You
cup the palm to hold it, you keep the hand very steady. No such caution is possible
when one is really living. Then there is no conversation.
– Rebecca West11
The critic’s job is to do what she can, within the prescribed limits of producing
a piece of discourse, to facilitate experience of a given work. The statements
she makes as part of such a discourse will accordingly be judged by the standard
of whether they help her to fulfill this role, will thus themselves require (what
we can perhaps call) “interpretation.” This is somewhat precarious territory,
for I do not wish to make of criticism a kind of secondary artwork (on pain of
regress), at least not in its capacity as criticism. While some criticism certainly
rises to the level of art, and may be so experienced, it does not do so as criticism.
The situation is something like the reverse of that in which an artwork is put
to pedagogic use, where the taking of an aesthetic point of view may not be
11. “There Is No Conversation.” 1935. In The Harsh Voice, 85–175. J. Cape, 85.
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essential.12 To treat a piece of criticism as an artwork is thus to appreciate it for
something other than its critical function.
Having issued this caveat, I reiterate that criticism crucially involves a distinc-
tive use of language (or, more generally, manipulation of discourse). Isenberg
approaches this point as follows:
The description of a work of art is seldom attempted for its own
sake. It is controlled by some purpose, some interest; and there are
many interests by which it might be controlled other than that of
reaching or defending a critical judgment. The qualities which are
significant in relation to one purpose—dating, attribution, archae-
ological reconstruction, clinical diagnosis, proving or illustrating
some thesis in sociology—might be quite immaterial in relation to
another. (1949, 331)
I extend this characterization not only, as does Isenberg, to the interests which
control a description, but also to its discursive context. Isenberg appears not to
go so far, for he claims of an isolated such description, “There are just twelve
flowers in that picture,” that it is “without critical relevance.” It is not clear,
however, on what grounds such an assessment could be made unless a discursive
context is specified. One needs to be told what the statement is doing in its
surrounding discourse.
Presumably, Isenberg is imagining a particular discursive context in which
the given statement is indeed critically irrelevant. As Paul Zi points out, “if
someone says ‘P’s painting is disorganized,’ he is apt to be oering a reason
why the work is bad . . . [but] he need not be; this might be part of an answer
to “Which one is P’s?’ ” (1966, 47). Similarly, one might report how many
flowers are in a picture as a means of identifying that picture—in which case
the report is likely to be critically irrelevant—or instead as part of one’s defence
of a critical judgment to which it is somehow relevant that the picture has just
that many flowers (the number might be aesthetically significant).
12. See, e.g., Mayhead (1965): “Now we cannot escape the fact that there are such things
as examinations; nor can we . . . consider whether literature is or is not a proper ‘Subject’ for
them. What we should do, however, is remind ourselves that no great writer ever designed his
work to be potential matter for the examiners of posterity” (3).
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We encountered something like this more specific point in Olsen (2010), in
which biography “as a historical discipline” is dierentiated from biography
“as a critical instrument.” The idea, as I would construe it here, is that one and
the same biographical statement could in one piece of discourse be critically
relevant, used to establish a critical point, and in another be critically irrelevant,
used only to give some interesting historical background. How we can tell
whether a given statement is one or the other, being used to establish a critical
point or not, is what I propose to explain (albeit across a limited range of cases)
in terms of the notion of conversation.
In the analogy I envision, the critic stages an imagined conversation between
the artist and a potential consumer for the purpose of making intelligible, or
fit for experience, a favoured interpretation. Since I take value-maximization
theory to be roughly correct as a theory of interpretation, it is (in the ideal
case) a value-maximal interpretation that is so made fit for experience. A given
biographical statement is critically relevant if it is constitutive of this kind of
structured discourse. I explain the details of such discourse in what follows,
concluding with an extended example.
5.3.1 The Nature of the “Conversation”
Let me start with some brief remarks on what I take to be the kernel of truth
in Carroll’s analogy. Consider the possibility of a “criticism of conversation,”
namely a discursive practice that takes conversations as its subject in the manner
in which criticism takes artworks as its subject. Just as there is a dierence
between engaging in conversation and engaging in thought (e.g. rumination)
about conversation, so there is a dierence between engaging in experiences of
art and engaging in thought about such experiences. Something important we
should desire from each type of thought is an analysis of the experience that
helps us to get better at (or to get the most out of ) having such experiences.
Frequently, one will look back on a past conversation with a very dierent
attitude from that which one had during the conversation. One might begin to
notice certain patterns, relations between things that were said, that one did
not notice while keeping up with the flow of the conversation as a participant.
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In such moments of rumination, one “plays back,” so to speak, the conversation
in memory. The same, of course, is true of one’s experiences with art, that
one “re-experiences” the work in memory (or in reality, which is usually much
easier to do with artworks than with conversations) for the purpose of directing
one’s attention to dierent things, putting into eect a subsequently learned
mode of experience (or simply for pleasure).
I have said in objection to Carroll’s analogy that our typical metaconversa-
tional interests are not relevantly similar to our typical interests in engaging
with art. But this is consistent with the idea I am now considering. For a
“criticism of conversation” may operate relevantly similarly to the criticism of
art even if the interests to which each is sensitive are dierent. The former
sort of “criticism” will direct its readers to better satisfy the metaconversational
interests of ordinary conversation, while the latter sort will direct its readers
to better satisfy their interests in engaging with art, which, I have claimed,
concern the taking of an aesthetic point of view.
A “criticism of conversation” is attentive to conversational experience as
such, to what are the metaconversational interests of interlocutors. It notes that
interlocutors have certain aims in mind when they enter into conversation,
and that they go on to do certain things while in conversation to serve those
aims. Its job is to optimize the ability of interlocutors to achieve those aims
through conversation. Similarly, criticism of art is attentive to aesthetic experience
as such, to the interests of consumers of art in taking the aesthetic point of view.
It notes that such consumers have certain aims in mind when they engage with
artworks, and that they go on to do certain things (i.e. experience in certain
ways) to serve those aims while engaging with artworks. Its job is to optimize
the ability of consumers of art to achieve those aims through aesthetic experience.
It might be wondered what is supposed to be the point of improvising
such a conception of the “criticism of conversation” which has no institutional
existence. People undoubtedly scrutinize their past conversations, but there is
no distinctive such practice, like the criticism of art, to which one can point.
Let me say in response that, though this is not quite the analogy I am proposing,
I take it to be informative scaolding. For it is easy to see why a critic of
conversation might wish to structure his discourse in the very form of his subject,
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as a conversation, if only to oer a model of that which he recommends to his
readers. I think that the same may be true of a critic in the case of art, even
though her subject—our engagement with art—is not quite “conversational.”
The eectiveness of such a rhetorical device owes to the fact that conversation
is a familiar enough notion for other things to be made intelligible in terms of
it, especially those which require adjustments of modes of experience. Most
people know what it is like to realize that what they thought was going on in
some past conversation diers significantly from what in fact was going on,
and know what it is like to adopt a dierent attitude toward the person with
whom, or subject about which, they so conversed. Critics, as people in the
world, naturally gravitate toward availing themselves of explanations in terms
of such experience, should it prove expedient. For instance, they may clarify
that what one is disposed to think a work is “saying” is not really what it is
“saying,” once the “message” is properly understood—thus availing themselves
of the more familiar senses of the words I have enclosed in quotations. This
does not yet settle the nature of how they are availing themselves of the familiar
senses (i.e. whether it is an analogy), but it seems to me clear that they do in
some sense so avail themselves.
In one sense of their doing so, what I focus on here, they are not unlike
philosophers who use the dialogue form. Famous examples include, of course,
Plato, Berkeley, and, more recently, John Perry (1978). This rhetorical choice is
often a result of the author’s believing that the thoughts he wishes to express are
best expressed in the form of a competition of voices, or are best assimilated by
the reader in this complex form (as something dialectically arrived at, rather than
simply assented to or dissented from). The philosophical method of considering
objections and proposing replies—rather than simply proposing a view towhich,
from the beginning, the objections do not apply—is arguably a less direct way
to accomplish the same thing.
To the extent that critics are to be seen as presenting “arguments” (e.g.
for interpretive claims), this may be one way of understanding their use of a
conversational rhetorical device. While I don’t wish to explain my view using
the theoretical writings of actual critics, there are examples I could mention.
One is a recent book on criticism by New York Times film critic A. O. Scott
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(2016), which not only is structured partly in the form of dialogues between
Scott and an imagined objector, but also, in one such dialogue, sets him up
to defend the view that “the essence of criticism is conversation—a passionate,
rational argument about a shared experience.” It is dicult for me to say how
much this corresponds to what I have in mind, but at the very least it illustrates
that the notion of conversation is something which critics find it worthwhile
to keep at the forefront of their thoughts about their practice.
Crucial to my conception of critical conversation is the fact that it is the
responsibility of a critic not only to state relevant truths about the work but to
make them intelligible to her readers. By this I mean, more specifically, that
she must present her critical conclusions in the form of recommendations as
to experience.13 Olsen (1987) makes something like this point in terms of a
distinction between “illuminating” and “unilluminating” criticism:
Instead of taking any one critical practice as a point of departure in
the attempt to characterize the types of inferential routes relevant
to literary understanding, one might start o with an assumption
that there is a distinction between illuminating and unilluminating
criticism which is, at least in part, based on intuition.. . . The as-
sumption [is] that a reader can recognize intuitively criticism which
enhances his aesthetic appreciation of a work. (109)
Olsen defines an “inferential route” as “a set of supporting reasons which make
[an] interpretive description an acceptable answer to . . . a[n interpretive] ques-
tion” (e.g. what does such-and-such aspect of the work “signify”?). I will adopt
Olsen’s terminology of “inferential route,” but understand it to mean something
slightly more general, not the supporting reasons themselves but the manner
in which they are strung together, their “logic.” Thus, many dierent sets of
13. See Radford andMinogue (1981): “Of course, ‘understanding’ the text, and passing on that
understanding, cannot be seen simply as a matter of scholarly expertise or factual knowledge.. . .
[Criticism] consist[s] in mediating between works of art and their audience; in making it
possible for the reader to respond to the work, or where he can already respond perhaps without
fully understanding the work, making the work more intelligible” (1-2). See also Tillotson
([1951] 1967): “Critics choosing [‘a helicopter view’] sometimes seem disembodied as well
as remote. They forget the vividness of their responses when they were formerly exploring
phenomena on foot” (15).
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supporting reasons may employ the same (type of ) inferential route. Moreover,
because I am less interested in the reasons themselves than in the statements
by means of which they are adduced, it will be equivalent for me to say that
particular instances of an inferential route consist of a set of statements (which
in some sense cumulatively answer a given interpretive question).
What makes inferential routes critically relevant is that they are routes
to interpretive claims. They are part of a critic’s defence of something, an
interpretive claim, that is antecedently critically relevant. It might be asked why
a defence of something critically relevant is itself critically relevant. The answer
is that if something critically relevant is felt to need defence, in particular within
a critical context, then it follows that any supplied defence fulfills, or attempts
to fulfill, a critical function. Perhaps not every critically relevant statement so
needs defence. For example, it is routinely supposed that some critically relevant
statements are “obvious.”14 These are sometimes called descriptions, as opposed
to interpretations, and defences of themmight not ipso facto be critically relevant.
But for interpretations there will almost always be an attendant critical need for a
defence. Hence, anything that fulfills this function is fulfilling a critical function.
“Conversation” is, I submit, one such inferential route, critically relevant when it
is constitutive of a defence of an interpretive claim, and critically useful because
it is a systematic means of composing illuminating criticism.
The first question to answer, however, is whether we can even identify
something as a “route” of conversation (let alone an illuminating one). I have
suggested that Huddleston acknowledges such a route in his procedural re-
quirement of openness—viz. that the contributions of each participant must
“matter”—which he seems to understand in terms of the notion of a “best” read-
ing. His other procedural requirement is that of mutuality, a “back and forth”
between the participants. Let me start my characterization of a conversational
route in terms of suitable amendments of these requirements, which I take to
be mostly appropriate.
The inferential route I am imagining does instantiate mutuality, for interpre-
tive questions are answered by the critic in terms of a genuine back-and-forth.
14. See, e.g., Barnes (1988), especially chapters 2 and 3.
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This is, however, made up of the critic’s speaking now on behalf of artist, now
on behalf of consumer, until the “hermeneutical result” is reached, i.e. the in-
terpretive question answered. We may begin to say something about openness
in terms of the metaconversational interests of each party. Take, first, those
of the consumer. His metaconversational interest is to have the hermeneuti-
cal result illuminated for him, made fit for experience. That the work means
such-and-such, or that such-and-such is the value-maximal interpretation, is
less interesting to him than directives as to experience, which prime him to
experience the work as meaning such-and-such. To provide such directives
is, indeed, supposed to be the function of criticism, and thus it is criticism to
which the consumer typically looks for help in this regard.
Consider one such scenario. The critic imagines a consumer to be natu-
rally inclined to experience the work a certain way, but does not find that so
experiencing the work is optimal. He accordingly constructs a conversational
dialectic in which the consumer figure, fashioned so as to have initially experi-
enced the work in the more natural way, demonstrates the disagreeable upshot
of this more natural way. The latter is then countervailed through another
perspective, perhaps that of the artist. The decision of who is to occupy the role
of the consumer’s interlocutor is made on the basis of a range of considerations
having to do with what makes intelligible the mode of experience the critic is
recommending (the result to which the critic wishes to guide the consumer,
and the manner in which he wishes to do so).
One reason why the artist may be chosen is that she has intentions which are
either “meaning-tracking” or “meaning-determining” (in the senses I defined
in the third chapter). If the artist is astute about what makes for a correct inter-
pretation (or what the critic feels does so), then she is suitable as an interlocutor
on the grounds that she represents the perspective to which the critic hopes to
guide the consumer. To track reasons of value-maximization is often to provide
an intelligible path to the value-maximal result. The same is true of facts which
enter into the very reasons why a meaning is value-maximizing. That which
determines what is value-maximizing is likely to provide a means by which
the value-maximal thing may be rendered intelligible (even if it is not itself so
intelligible, about which more below).
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In each case, intentions are mentioned neither as mere hypotheses nor
simply for the content of what is intended (i.e. regardless of its being intended).
They are instead mentioned as the artist’s intentions, for this is the only respect
in which they make the relevant contribution to the “conversation.” Mere
propositions are not gambits in a conversation, absent a perspective to which
they are attributed and an attitude that this perspective shows itself to take
toward them (e.g. of having intended them).
Moreover, as I suggested near the beginning of this chapter, something
similar may obtain with respect even to unsuccessful intentions, those which do
not “match” the work (or do so but “accidentally”). For the critic may wish to
use the artist as a foil in a conversation designed to lead the consumer away from
certain modes of experience. She might find that the best (or at least a very
good) way to illuminate certain experiential dead ends is by erecting the figure
of the artist as their defender, should facts about the artist provide promising
material with which to do so. In this way, the intuition may be vindicated that
unsuccessful intentions could also be critically relevant. The relevance comes
from the critical use to which they are put, rather than from some independent
relation between such intentions and (what we may more abstractly identify
as) what the work means. Arguably, no interesting such relation obtains if the
intentions in question truly are unsuccessful.
But here a familiar objection will rear its head. The critic need not advert
to any actual such person as the artist. She may simply invent a figure with
whom to put the consumer into dialogue. Sometimes it will be dicult even
to dierentiate her doing the latter and her doing the former, and, what’s
more, the dierence might not matter very much if her adverting to the actual
artist is insensitive to its being the actual artist to whom she is adverting—if the
conversation would be more or less the same with a fictive artist instead. This
poses an obvious problem. If there is no identifiable critical dierence, in terms
of making interpretations intelligible, between advertence to a fictive artist and
advertence to the actual artist, then (actual15) intentionalism would seem not to
15. This would not aect the view known as “hypothetical intentionalism,” which I have not
discussed at all. See Levinson (1992) for an articulation of this view. As I see it, hypothetical
intentionalism is not relevantly an intentionalist view given that it is not about the actual
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be vindicated.
It might be thought that one very easy way to respond is in terms of
“meaning-determining” intentions, for with these it appears to matter that
the actual artist intended the content that is recruited for the critic’s imagined
conversation, i.e. if she didn’t intend it, then it wouldn’t be what the work
means. Intentionalists standardly make such claims on the basis of expansive
theories of meaning which in some manner identify what a work means with
what the artist intended. I have been resisting such theories on the grounds
that they are dicult to motivate, but earlier granted a place for “meaning-
determining” intentions within an overall value-maximization theory, namely
as those intentions which are partly determinative of the value-considerations
which more directly determine meaning.
Whether or not this sort of response is felt to be adequate depends upon
what one takes to be the nature of the “defence” a critic must oer for her
interpretive claims. One might require of a critic either that she explain what
makes a given interpretive claim correct or that she render this claim intelligible.
To do the former is to adduce the facts in virtue of which the interpretive claim
is correct. To do the latter is to enable the reader to experience the work in
accordance with the interpretive claim. It seems to me that only the latter sort
of “defence” is the proper concern of a critic (at least by virtue of the function of
her practice). The first, which is given a lot of attention in such discussions, is
more a subject for the metacritic, whose job it is to inquire into the theoretical
underpinnings of correct interpretations.
A critic should, of course, defend only correct interpretations—for otherwise
it is not clear what sense could be given to calling interpretations correct. But
the sort of defence she must give of such interpretations is not that which
metacritics must give. The critic performs the function of passing on correct
interpretations so that a consumer of the work can apply them to his experience
of the work. What this requires is the ability to correctly experience works and
then direct readers to have similar experiences. This is a practical skill more
than a theoretical one, involving the making of a sensible recommendation
intentions of the actual artist. See Stephen Davies (2006) for an assessment along the latter lines.
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rather than the explaining of what makes any given recommendation sensible.
When, therefore, it is proposed that facts about the artist achieve critical
relevance through determining (to whatever extent) the meaning of the work,
it must be asked how such determination is relevant to the critic’s task as
just described. For one might object that relations of determination are a
subject only for the metacritic, answering as they do questions of what makes
an interpretation correct. It is not clear, the objector will continue, how
they furthermore enable a critic to make an interpretation intelligible—to
compose, that is, illuminating criticism. Granted, the fact that a piece of
criticism is illuminating cannot be unrelated to the fact that it trades in correct
interpretations (at least if value-maximization theory is to be believed), but it
is a further question whether an explanation of what makes an interpretation
correct will serve equally to render that interpretation intelligible.
This is why being told merely that an artist-figure is recruited by the critic
does not settle the question of whether its being the actual artist is critically
relevant, even if facts about the actual artist determine work-meaning. The
objector believes that, whether or not a critic happens to be talking about the
actual artist, what is critically relevant, in terms of intelligibility, is only the
perspective itself, so that there is no critical dierence between the situation in
which the critic makes use of the actual artist and that in which she makes use
of some fictive corollary—as long as the features of the recruited perspective
are the same. The intentionalist must accordingly describe a critical relevance
for biographical facts that distinguishes them from their fictive corollaries.
I have an answer to this, and it begins from the observation that it is essential
to the logic of a conversation not only that there be two sides—or even, as
Huddleston contends, that there be mutuality and openness between them—but
also that the two sides be properly responsible for their respective utterances. A
conversation is an exchange between two or more persons such that what each
says properly redounds to him as something for which he is held responsible
going forward. Each is responsive to the other and, in addition, expects such
responsiveness from the other. This is entailed by each party’s having something
at stake in the conversation. This, in turn, may be understood in terms of the
attribution of tangible metaconversational interests. There must, that is, be a
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reason why each party is engaging in the conversation.
I have already explained the metaconversational interests of the consumer.
Those of the actual artist may be described as follows. The artist has created
a work for which she has certain prescriptions. While she might not wish
to “legislate” how the work is to be experienced (even if she had any such
authority), and may be happy to allow it to be taken as the consumer wishes,
she will at least have preferences in this regard (would, e.g., feel uneasy if made
aware of her work’s being treated in certain ways as opposed to others). This is
one sort of stake she has in engaging in a conversation about her work. She
occupies a perspective which defines a range of possible experiences with respect
to the work. But she also has another sort of stake, which we may summarize
in terms of the reasons why she created the artwork at all—what motivated her
to do what she did, the ideas she wished to express and why she held them to
be important, and so on.
It is true that a fictive profile of such an artist may be constructed, more
or less identical to what the actual artist thinks and feels—and maybe also that
it is sometimes better for a critic to use the former rather than whatever may
be pieced together about the latter (assuming the critic does not practice any
deception, etc.)—but I maintain that there is still, at least sometimes, a critical
dierence between doing this and attending to the actual artist. In cases in which
the artist has, say, “meaning-tracking” intentions, a particular sort of artistic
profile emerges, along with a particular sort of conversational trajectory, in
which, most importantly, the artist’s perspective is given priority and allowed to
lead the conversation. It may be countered that a fictive artist can be constructed
with just such attributes. But then what we are doing is modelling the fictive
artist on the actual artist.
The significance of this is as follows. I have been making, on the objector’s
behalf, a very natural sort of argumentative move that I must now question. This
move takes it as obvious that if a set of facts about the actual artist and another set
of relevantly similar facts about some fictive artist are each taken to be critically
relevant, then the former’s relevance cannot be due to its concerning the actual
artist. But this will not hold in all cases. It depends on how the fictive artist is
constructed. If its construction is responsive to what the actual artist is like, to
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what makes the actual artist astute about value-considerations, then, even if it
is a fictive rather than an actual figure whom the critic puts into conversation
with the possible consumer, its relevance is parasitic on the relevance of the
actual artist. The reverse of this case is the one on which the objector has
been focusing, in which the reasons why the actual artist is mentioned are
insensitive to its being the actual artist who is mentioned. But the route of
conversation I am advocating is of the former sort, in which the manner in
which the actual artist relates to possible ways of experiencing the work is
central to the perspective which the critic wishes to put into dialogue with the
consumer. So any fictive artist constructed to emulate such an artist is thereby
latching onto the latter’s relevance.16
This, I admit, will not convince everyone. It might still be felt that there
is no real critical dierence between an actual artist, however astute, and a
qualitatively identical fictive corollary. I have two things to say in response to
such residual skepticism. The first is that I do not take it to present a serious
obstacle, for the sort of relevance I aim to secure for the artist is, ultimately,
contingent, vindicating of intention-talk that makes inexpugnable reference to
intentions but perhaps in a way that extends to fictive corollaries. This is similar
to a concession I made in the third chapter, in response to worries that other
things, besides intentions, may track meaning or exert the relevant cultural
influence. That fictive corollaries also count as critically relevant need not be
construed as grounds for a reductio to the eect that neither they nor the actual
artists from which they are constructed should then be viewed as critically
relevant. It might instead be accepted at face value, as the result that, indeed,
both are critically relevant.
The other thing I wish to say, perhaps more congenial to intentionalists,
takes me back to what I earlier called the “agency argument.”17 Behind this
argument was an intuition that a meaning must be somebody’s meaning, which
16. Such a choice may be made for a number of reasons, for instance that the reader is likely
to get the most out of the perspective of the actual artist, which will certainly be the case if the
critic has chosen that artist’s oeuvre as the relevant background range of works (and wishes to
equip the reader for future works by the same artist). Even if this perspective is not directly
employed, it will serve as a model for that of a fictive artist.
17. See p. 52 above.
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I ended up explaining in terms of this meaning’s being attributable only to a
work that is the product of relevant instances of that somebody’s intentional
activity. I propose here to make use of the latter explanation to foreground a
legitimate critical interest in the artist, who may be viewed thereby as assuming
a sort of ownership over the artwork’s meanings, in virtue of its being his
intentional activity that accounts for the work’s being interpretable at all. This,
again, does not entail that his intentions will fix what the work means, but it
does make him suitable as an interlocutor with attendant responsibilities and a
stake in what is, after all, his work.
So much for the artist-figure. What about the consumer-figure, who really
is a fictive sort of figure? Do any problems arise in making use of this fictive
figure, instead of some actual consumer? While it is standard in philosophical
theories to speak of “ideal” observers or perceivers (as Wollheim does), this is
not the sort of fictive figure in which I am interested. For I do not make use of
such a notion to define what a work means. I use it only to define a sense of
critical relevance. Allow me now to finish the thoughts on which I embarked
in the third chapter.
As I maintained earlier, the nature of the possible consumer is largely
up to the critic. But there are two main sources of constraint, one abstract
and one very practical. The latter is that of her readership. The critic is
addressing a particular audience, i.e. the sort of person she imagines will be
reading what she writes. She may write partly for posterity, and partly in
terms of what she knows of past audiences, but largely it is a contemporary
activity, undertaken in the light of cultural and artistic developments that
have led to the work’s interest for a contemporary audience. The critic writes,
moreover, with a sensitivity to the venue, to the character of the publication
to which she is submitting her piece (should this be how she promulgates her
criticism). Typically, acknowledgements are made about such things when
a piece of criticism is republished and the contemporary reader cannot be
expected to understand the circumstances in which it originally appeared. Such
understanding is important for a coherent sense of, among other things, who
the critic is addressing as a potential consumer of the work, so that the critic’s
recommendations can be correctly applied.
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A good example of such recontextualization is Paul Fussell’s introduction to
Reviewing the Forties (1978), a collection of Diana Trilling’s literary criticism
from her tenure at The Nation in the 1940s. Fussell, writing in the late 1970s,
attempts to create a bridge between the circumstances in which Trilling was
writing and (what for him was) a contemporary audience. His first sentence
reads, “The context of this book is the culture of the nineteen-forties,” and is
followed by a rehearsal of the relevant touchstones, e.g. “the Andrews sisters,”
“The Road to Morocco,” an ad featuring “a mother at her doorstep looking up
from a telegram” (v-vi). This leads Fussell to questions such as, “what did people
want to believe in the forties? What struck them as important?” (ix). His
answers concern not only the art which Trilling was reviewing—novels which
“explore[d] the degree of dishonor attaching to ‘the parasitical professions’:
advertising, the vending of cosmetics, commercial radio”—but also her manner
of reviewing it. “Her theme,” according to Fussell, “is the threat of monomanias
and systems and theories and sentimentalities to fiction” (xi).
To become aware of this as a reader in the 1970s is perhaps to take a view
of Trilling’s sensibilities that is dierent from the one that the contemporary
culture would have encouraged. Fussell reminds us “of the moral sense that most
people in the forties, swept up in a war, exercised instinctively,” and contrasts
it with the contemporary sensibility which “tends to invoke ‘style’ as its main
criterion of the interesting” (xiv). (A critic’s “criterion of the interesting” is,
of course, very much a function of her surrounding culture.) Lastly, and this
is significant for my claims about “venue,” Fussell also places The Nation in
the cultural landscape of the 1940s: “In rural reaches it was thought wickedly
radical, or, to put it another way, oensively ‘New York’; and I remember
finding no copy on any newsstand in the whole of Georgia, Texas, and Arkansas
during 1943 and 1944” (viii).
Such facts may seem too incidental or ephemeral to be accorded the the-
oretical role that I seem to be giving them, but to the extent that a piece of
criticism may be substantially dierent, including dierent in terms of the pos-
sible consumer imagined by the critic, depending on the environment in which
it appears, such practical considerations seem to me theoretically significant.
Trilling writing in the 1970s is not Trilling writing in the 1940s, and how
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we understand what she says on any given occasion should be sensitive to the
people she is addressing and the natural audience of the publication for which
she is writing.
I say I do not take these considerations to define what a work means be-
cause there is a dierence between a critic’s having said something critically
relevant and her having hit upon a correct interpretation. Bad criticism is still
criticism, and a poor defence of an interpretive claim (or a good defence of a
false interpretive claim) is still a defence of an interpretive claim. My interest
here is in distinguishing the critic’s having said something critically relevant
from her not having done this—whether or not, as a separate matter, she is
practising good criticism. It admittedly would not be a very satisfactory way
to answer anti-intentionalism if it should turn out that intentions are recruited
for genuine criticism but always (or most of the time) for bad criticism. Indeed,
this is not what I argue. But it would be sucient, for Beardsley and Wimsatt’s
objection is not to poor criticism. It is to something which merely masquerades
as criticism (viz. “writing the personal as if it were the poetic”).
To the extent that there may be good criticism and bad criticism of the sort
I describe, I must, it seems, say something about the norms governing a critic’s
having made a good choice of possible consumer. This is the more abstract sort of
constraint. I appeal here, to begin with, to standard intuitions about misjudging
one’s audience. Olsen describes something like this during his elucidation of
the distinction between illuminating and unilluminating criticism. He calls a
certain interpretation unilluminating on the grounds that “the inferential route
which it employs goes via an esoteric theory of literature which requires the
reader to make specific assumptions he would not otherwise make” (1987, 117).
While Olsen acknowledges that the interpretation in question is “perceptive,
imaginative and intelligent,” he objects that “its point is obscure: it does not
enhance our appreciation.”
But suppose the critic has imagined the possible consumer to be one who
will have the requisite esoteric knowledge. Olsen defines esoteric knowledge
as “knowledge which it is unreasonable to suppose is accessible to more than a
small group of the literary community because it can be acquired only through
special skills or with special tools” (118). But, as I say, maybe the critic has
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defined his possible consumer in terms precisely of such a “small group.” As it
happens, Olsen is talking about Harold Bloom in Poetry and Repression (1976),
in which case I think it is safe to say that the critic is writing for an unusually
learned audience (more learned, probably, than the average reader of the work
in question). This alone doesn’t allow Bloom to evade Olsen’s objection, but it
at least gives rise to a further question about Bloom’s rhetorical choices.
While Bloom’s interpretation might well be illuminating for the possible
consumer he is imagining, this is not, we might think, the possible consumer
he should be imagining. Such is the sense in which it seems that it is not entirely
up to a critic whom he imagines to be the possible consumer. Although a
critic is, of course, free to imagine what he likes, there will be norms on good
criticismwhich determine which sort of consumer is most appropriate for which
sort of work. This might still be sensitive to contextual factors such as I have
mentioned—e.g. the time at which the critic is writing, with a consciousness of
what else in the culture—but will certainly have to take into account the sorts
of value-considerations I discussed in the third chapter, namely what maximizes
the work’s value in the context of the most sensible background range of works,
how the work has been read in the past (i.e. what histories of experience have
accumulated with respect to that work), and so on.
So much for decisions about the possible consumer. Let me now say a little
about the substance of the conversation. I have, in the previous few passages,
been speaking very generally about the demands of criticism. To the extent
that my analogy from conversation describes a genuine critical activity, it does,
of course, have to meet such demands, which merit independent attention. But
the specifically conversational nature of my proposal arises from how the two
perspectives I have described, that of the artist and that of the possible consumer,
are dialectically related by the critic.
The main thing I have said about this so far has involved the metaconversa-
tional interests of each side. As I noted in my initial discussion of such interests,
they substantially inform what I called conversational interests, those which
motivate us to do certain things in conversation. I have, moreover, tied the
latter to Huddleston’s procedural requirements of mutuality and openness, and
claimed that there is an ambiguity in Huddleston’s proposal having to do with
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the trajectory of the conversation, how each side’s contribution can be said to
“matter.”
Huddleston posits a “hermeneutical result” at which the conversation aims,
and we may take this to give some definition to the conversational trajectory.
Artist and consumer will naturally have their own perspective on this result. The
artist wishes a given result established so that it satisfies her standing interests in
having her work be taken in certain ways as opposed to others. The consumer
wishes a given result established so that it satisfies his standing interest to derive
aesthetic satisfaction. The critic must negotiate these demands in staging a
conversation that yields what she takes to be the correct hermeneutical result.
Given the described relationship between metaconversational interests and
conversational interests, what each side is made to say in the conversation will
be determined not only by the sorts of procedural requirements Huddleston
mentions but also by the relevant metaconversational interests—in addition, of
course, to the truth about the artist (for reasons mentioned above). A critic’s
reporting that the artist had such-and-such beliefs should be deemed critically
relevant in the context of any such conversational dialectic only if a case can be
made that such of the artist’s beliefs are plausibly expressed in support of her
perspective (as this is understood by the critic). The sort of “support” at issue
is left deliberately vague, for we might be talking of arguments establishing a
given hermeneutical result or simply of a clarification of the artist’s motives—
why the artist is invested in the work being taken this way rather than that.
Likewise, what the possible consumer is made to say will be determined by
facts about how a person such as him needs to position himself with respect to
the work in order to experience it correctly. If this consumer is given certain
attributes which, say, prevent him from so experiencing the work, he will
naturally raise certain questions, object in certain ways, when presented with
statements of a certain sort by the artist. He might, ultimately, oer resistance
to the artist’s perspective, or acquiesce to it, depending on what the critic finds
appropriate. As I say above, the nature of this consumer is usually determined
by the critic’s sense of who will be reading her. More specifically, what a critic
takes to be the natural perspective of such a reader is likely to be what she
thereby attributes to the possible consumer, for her aim, as a critic, is to allow
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the reader to imaginatively occupy the position of this consumer. In such a way,
perhaps, the reader of the criticism “simulates” the conversation—if not literally,
which would be unusual, at least in the sense that certain common questions,
which the reader may or may not happen to have, are posed to the artist as if
on behalf of the reader. If the reader happens not to have these questions, he
might, simply by identifying with a perspective that is designed to be easy to
identify with, come to be inquisitive in the way that the critic hopes.
It is dicult to speak with any greater precision here, since such things are
handled in dierent ways by dierent critics, and often it is not quite so explicit
as I am making it sound. The ideal case is, of course, that of an explicit dialogue,
but the demands of readable prose, among other stylistic constraints, make this
unsuitable. In what follows, I present a series of examples, all concerning a
certain work by H. G. Wells, that demonstrate in degrees how the rhetorical
device I have been describing is actually used by critics.
5.4 Wells and Moreau
There are certain anities between the case of H. G. Wells and that of Ed
Wood, the other artist to whom I have devoted such a section. Both specialize
in science fiction, and with respect to both it has been a subject of interest how
one is to think of their work as art. Also common to both is that the way critics
refer to them has been a constantly changing proposition, dierent for the early
critics and for the later ones.
But there are also important dierences. Wood is universally regarded as
incompetent at his craft, a failed artist. Wells, on the other hand, is universally
regarded as supremely talented, an inaugurator of genres (if historically dis-
reputable ones). One significance of this is that, while it is very unlikely that
Wood had any “meaning-tracking” intentions, it is, by contrast, very likely that
Wells had such intentions. This, I have been saying, aects how and why critics
are interested in an artist.
The work on which I will focus is The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), partly
because it occupies an interesting juncture in Wells’s oeuvre. He had achieved
great success with his first work, The Time Machine (1895), but had not yet
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consolidated the reputation he would enjoy upon the publication of The War of
the Worlds (1898). As we will see, those who appreciated the former work were
not unanimous in their approval ofMoreau, and the reasons they oered began
to involve speculation about the author. Such a thing often occurs as an artist
builds up an oeuvre. With a first work, usually very little of substance is said
about him as such (unless he is already famous for some other reason). When
he is mentioned, it is usually pro forma, couched in what Beardsley would call
“merely verbal” intentionalistic language. This indeed appears to be a common
feature of the early criticism ofMoreau.
Chalmers Mitchell, writing in the Saturday Review the year the work was
published, opens his piece as follows:
Those who have delighted in the singular talent of Mr. Wells will
read The Island of Doctor Moreau with dismay.. . . He has given us
in The Time Machine a diorama of prophetic visions of the dying
earth, imagined with a pitiless logic, and yet filled with a rare
beauty.. . . [But] Mr. Wells has [in Moreau] put out his talent to
the most flagitious usury.. . . The usurious interest began when the
author, not content with the horror inevitable in his idea, and yet
congruous with the fine work he has given us hitherto, sought
out revolting details with the zeal of a sanitary inspector probing a
crowded graveyard. (Parrinder 1972, 43-44)18
In his very first sentence, Mitchell defines both the possible consumer and some-
thing of the trajectory of the ensuing interpretation. The possible consumer
is one who has “delighted in the singular talent of Mr. Wells” (namely, one
who has read and enjoyed Wells’s earlier work), and she will be encouraged to
experienceMoreau in a register of disappointment. Much of Mitchell’s review
is geared toward making intelligible such disappointment.
His main point, evident in the quote, is that the horror inMoreau is unduly
amplified with “revolting details,” unlike a certain other work (The Time Ma-
chine) in which the horror is more balanced. Wells is invoked as the author
who understood his task dierently across the two works. When Mitchell goes
18. All subsequent citations of the early criticism refer to this Parrinder anthology.
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on to talk of “the blood that Mr. Wells insists upon forcing on us,” though
there is a sense in which the interpretive claim is simply about “the blood . . .
[that is being] forc[ed] on us,” the image of Wells forcing it on us is crucial to
make intelligible the sort of attitude Mitchell wishes us to adopt.
He invokes Wells in slightly dierent terms at the end of his review, when
he brings up certain factual concerns about the science represented inMoreau.
He describes an appended note in which Wells claims a scientific credibility
for the procedure of vivisection practised by the title character, objecting that
Wells overstates his case, that there is not in fact very much credibility to the
depicted procedure (45-46). This is certainly a factual mention of Wells, of
what Wells actually said, and the point being made is crucially expressed as a
disagreement with Wells. We would not adequately be reconstructing the point
if we omit mention of Wells and treat Mitchell as merely expressing skepticism
about the realism of the depicted procedure.
But is this disagreement critically relevant, even supposing that it substan-
tively implicates Wells? It is dicult to say. Some philosophers believe that the
factual claims expressed in an artwork can be aesthetically relevant (and thus
fitting objects for critical interest).19 But here it is an appended note through
which Mitchell is treating such factual claims. He is disagreeing with external
commentary, not with the work itself. He is not saying, for instance, that the
work contains within it a claim as to the scientific credibility of the depicted
procedure. This may separately be true,20 but we do not hear about it from
Mitchell. It is possible, I suppose, for a critic to treat such of Wells’s statements
as partly definitive of his perspective on the work, and then to put such a per-
spective into dialogue with an imagined consumer; but Mitchell does not seem
to be attempting anything like this.
Another review from the same year, this one in Spectator, opens similarly,
with an acknowledgement of “[t]he ingenious author of The Time Machine
19. See Mikkonen (2013) for a recent defence.
20. Cf. Atwood (2005), who reads Moreau as a fable: “the word ‘fable’ is suggestive, for—
despite the realistically rendered details of its surface—the book is certainly not a novel, if by
that we mean a prose narrative dealing with observable social life . . . [and] it is quite apt, as
no man ever did or ever will turn animals into human beings by cutting them up and sewing
them together again” (386-387).
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[who] has found in this little book a subject exactly suited to his rather peculiar
type of imagination” (46). This itself is not a critical point—it is merely praise
for an author—but sets up a particular sort of invocation of Wells-as-author.
It is said that “the real value for literary purposes of this ghastly conception
depends on the power of the author to make his readers realize the half-way
stages between the brute and the rational creature . . . [a]nd we must admit that
Mr. Wells succeeds in this little story in giving a most fearful vividness to this
picture” (47). This is a claim that Wells “succeeded” in his intention. We might,
of course, ask: how does the critic know? Is this not just a claim about what is good
in the work, and the part about Wells’s having intended it just irrelevant speculation?
Perhaps not.
The critic makes a claim for Wells’s having had (what sounds an awful
lot like) “meaning-tracking” intentions. He says that “Mr. Wells has had
the prudence, too, not to dwell on the impossibilities of his subject for too
long” (47, emphasis added). He may mean by this that Wells is astute about
value-considerations, i.e. that Wells recognized that if he had dwelt on the
impossibilities longer, he would have run the risk of making the work less
valuable. True or not, this characterization of Wells appears to be oered as
part of an attempt to make a certain recommendation as to experience (about
the suspension of disbelief ).
The critic goes on to make a further claim, that the “very slight, though
. . . very powerful and ghastly, picture” (of the title character’s operations) is
calculated to “render vivisection unpopular, and that contempt for animal pain,
which enthusiastic physiologists seem to feel, hideous” (47).21 This is probably
a misreading of the work. (The editor of the volume from which I am quoting
thinks so.) But it is, in any event, a nascent attempt to put the figure of Wells
into dialogue with a possible reader, to use him to motivate a reading on which
the untimely death of Moreau “has a kind of poetic justice in it which satisfies
the mind of the reader.” Here the statements about Wells (though perhaps false)
21. That it is so calculated (to “render vivisection unpopular”) may not be deemed aesthetically
relevant, if one does not think that such (what are called) perlocutionary intentions are aestheti-
cally relevant. See, e.g., Wimsatt (1976). But what would certainly be deemed aesthetically
relevant is that the work is of such-and-such a “ghastly” character.
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seem at least critically relevant, adduced in reference to what “satisfies the mind
of the reader.”
An unsigned review in Speaker understands the work as having a very dier-
ent moral eect. The review opens, again, by praisingWells’s “originality,” and
says of him that “he could interest a reader, even if his theme was comparatively
commonplace” (50). But then there is a shift in tone:
the commonplace is evidently hateful to him, and he makes it his
first business, when sitting down to write a story, to hit upon an
idea that shall startle everybody by its extravagance and novelty.
In the present instance he has achieved originality at the expense
of decency (we do not use the word in its sexual significance) and
common sense.
Then, equally abruptly, as if in response to an anticipated objection, the critic
becomes defensive: “[w]e need not go further into the details of this delectable
theme. Mr. Wells, as we have said, has talent.” Finally, in the last sentence,
it is insisted that “talents are accompanied by responsibilities—a fact which Mr.
Wells seems to have forgotten” (emphasis added).
Here the critic wishes to impress on the reader (of the criticism) the fact that
a certain eect which Wells intended to create by means of his work, the way
he wanted it to be experienced, is not in fact the way it should be experienced:
we should shrink from, rather than delight in, “this delectable theme.” To make
intelligible this recommendation, the figure of Wells (perhaps, again, more
fictive than real) is erected, with attendant “responsibilities” against a sense of
which the reader is to play o her own sensibilities. Whether or not we agree
that Wells has failed in such of his responsibilities (or that he even has them),
we may at least see such claims as critically relevant, to the extent that they are
implicated in how the critic is attempting to defend the interpretive claim at
issue. They are not extraneous remarks about Wells, incidental to the critical
point.
A theme may be noticed across these examples. They are all scant on factual
information about Wells and rife with speculation of the what-must-the-author-
be-like variety. This could be a source of objection, for it might be held that
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the invocations of Wells I have so far discussed are, not just potentially false,
but only deceptively such invocations at all—that really they have nothing to
do with Wells. Recall the view, discussed in the first chapter, that it is not
an invocation of intention if it is something “reconstructed entirely from the
data [of the work] which would in themselves serve equally well to limit the
meaning” (Gang 1957, 182). I might thus be charged with misconstruing what
the critics in question are doing. They are simply reflecting back on the work
what they have already got out of it, not going outside of the work in an eort
to illuminate it.
This is a question of how one analyzes the data I have presented. The
foregoing is the anti-intentionalist’s analysis, summarizable in terms of Beard-
sley’s “merely verbal” category of intentionalistic language. Let me oer an
intentionalist alternative. It seems to me that, though the critics in question are
indeed making do with the “work itself,” this is not a reflection of the normal
state of aairs—in which, the objector believes, the work itself is enough (or,
at the very least, the arbiter of what is enough). In my view, the situation of the
examples I have discussed is instead one in which normal protocols are curtailed.
The critic wishes to talk about the artist, but conditions are not optimal for her
doing so. This may obtain for a variety of reasons, some of which have already
been mentioned: that it is de rigueur to not conduct biographical research on a
“new” artist, that the biographical information is not relevantly accessible, and
so on. But the same critics, with the same curiosities, would, I contend, “go
outside the work” if conditions were more conducive to doing so.
The anti-intentionalist takes these critics to really be talking about the
features of the work when they say that Wells had such-and-such attitudes: this
is treated as shorthand for something like such-and-such attitudes are expressed by
the work. But I would counter this suggestion with the following one of my
own: the critic, in the absence of conditions that conduce to “going outside”
the work, makes do with drawing inferences about the artist from the work.
When she says that Wells had such-and-such attitudes, it is not shorthand for
some claim about the work’s features but a claim really about the artist. Such
claims just happen to be inferred on the basis of the work, rather than derived
from external sources.
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It might be objected that if it is an inference drawn from one’s examination
of the work then it cannot very well contribute to such an examination (on
pain of circularity). This might in some sense be true, but I return to the sort
of comment I made in resolution of the dilemma objection at the beginning of
this chapter. In short, the critic may draw inferences from his examination of
the work and then recruit such inferences for the critical task of making the
work intelligible to his readers. Since the first task is distinct from the second,
there is no circularity.
To substantiate my intentionalist analysis of what these early critics of
Moreau are doing, let me consider a more recent critic, one for whom, I cannot
deny, the conditions for biographical inquiry are indeed optimal, for Wells’s
status as an artist is now established and facts about his life and work have been
extensively documented. The piece I will consider is by Margaret Atwood
(2005), commissioned as an introduction to a recent Penguin edition.
In one of Atwood’s initial discussions—an interpretation of the protagonist,
Prendick—she alludes to The Time Machine, in which “human beings . . . have
split into two distinct races,” an upper class, the Eloi, consisting of “[t]witterers”
who “have lost the ability to fend for themselves,” and the “working classes
[which] have become vicious and cannibalistic” (388). Atwood reports that
Wells did not sympathize with either class: “He must have felt he represented a
third way, a rational being who had climbed up the ladder through ability alone,
without partaking of the foolishness and impracticality of the social strata above
his nor of the brutish crudeness of those below.” Her aim in mentioning this is
to construct a certain perspective on behalf of the author, one which is then
used to make intelligible Prendick as a character, in particular to defend the
interpretive claim that “Prendick, though not quite as helpless as a full-fledged
Eloi, is well on the path to becoming one.” We are thus encouraged to view
Prendick’s behaviour as manifesting the “foolishness and impracticality” of such
an upper class. This, indeed, is how Atwood goes on to read him, calling our
attention to “his hysteria, his lassitude, his moping, his ineectual attempts at
fair play, and his lack of common sense.”
This characterization is persuasive, however, only if, following Atwood,
we view Prendick through the lens of Wells’s sympathies. That is, Prendick’s
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behaviour looks like hysteria—rather than, say, vigilance—only under a certain
way of experiencing his social class. There are two questions here. First:
what makes it the case that Prendick manifests hysteria rather than vigilance?
Second: what is the best way to make intelligible the fact that Prendick manifests
hysteria rather than vigilance? It might be thought that the answer to the
former straightforwardly delivers an answer to the latter, but this ignores the
importance of criticism as a discursive institution with its own norms and
protocols.
If value-maximization theory is correct, then the first question is to be
answered mainly in terms of value-considerations, not of Wells’s sympathies
(unless the latter are somehow meaning-determining). Roughly: what makes
it the case that Prendick manifests hysteria rather than vigilance is that ex-
periencing the text as his manifesting hysteria makes it more valuable than
experiencing the text as his manifesting vigilance. But to know this fact is not
to know what would make it intelligible to a reader of criticism, or what would
put a consumer in a good position to appreciate the sort of value at issue. I have
claimed that, for this second sort of task, it is often appropriate to lead a reader
through a dialectical process one side of which is the perspective of the artist.
Atwood makes use of such a rhetorical device at various points. After
reporting Wells’s views, her next sentence reads:
But what about Prendick, the narrator of The Island of Doctor
Moreau? He’s been pootling idly about the world . . . is a “pri-
vate gentleman” who doesn’t have to work for a living, and, though
he—like Wells—has studied with Huxley, he has done so not out
of necessity but out of dilettantish boredom.” (388)
We might wonder who is posing the initial question. It is not quite Atwood
herself, neither her real self nor some writerly persona. It is instead, I think,
an imagined consumer, who has just been “listening in,” so to speak, on the
rehearsed details of Wells’s background and attitudes. The consumer, having
such background and attitudes in mind, is shown to wonder how he is to view
Prendick in the light of them. Atwood obliges by speaking again on behalf of
Wells, for it is dicult otherwise to explain her peppering her exposition with
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comparisons toWells (e.g. the interjection of “likeWells”). The question/answer
model, which has many discursive uses, is often a critic’s way of staging a
dialogue. Short of explicitly using a dialogue form, which, as I have said,
tends to be clunky and unsuitable as a prose style, the critic has to assume
the relevant roles and integrate them into a seamless flow of what looks like
ordinary exposition.
This is more obvious in other parts of Atwood’s piece. In discussing certain
religious themes, Atwood mentions that
Wells called The Island of Doctor Moreau “a youthful blasphemy,”
and it’s obvious that he intended Moreau—that strong, solitary
gentleman with the white hair and beard—to resemble traditional
paintings of God. (393)
So far there is no interpretive claim, and Beardsley would characterize this
as “inexpugnably intentionalistic” language, hence as critically irrelevant. He
would say that we are simply being told what Wells intended, not what the
work means. If it is supposed to be a claim about the work, then we must,
according to Beardsley, dig out “its nonintentionalistic meaning” (1958, 28).
However, as I have argued at various points, such a sentence could be both
inexpugnably intentionalistic and critically relevant, namely if it is constitutive of
a larger discourse which depends on it for its critical relevance. In fact, this is just
the use that Atwood is making of it. She is recruiting Wells’s intention to help
defend an interpretive claim concerning the status of Moreau as a God-figure.
Atwood notes that Wells “surrounds Moreau with semi-Biblical language”
and that “Moreau is the lawgiver of the island.” These facts are meant to be
appreciated in terms of a perspective (Wells’s) which takes them to constitute
“a youthful blasphemy.” The blasphemous element is introduced by Atwood
in the following transition: “But [Moreau] isn’t a real God, because he cannot
really create; he can only imitate, and his imitations are poor,” immediately
after which, as if on behalf of the consumer, she poses the question: “What
drives him on?” This is then answered in terms of Moreau’s “cold ‘intellectual
passion.’ ” As before, it is not quite that Moreau is a God-figure in virtue of
Wells’s having intended him to be one (or having intended his work to be a
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youthful blasphemy), but that Wells is suitable to recruit as an interlocutor for a
possible consumer who is being led to a certain way of experiencing the work
(as a youthful blasphemy).
Consider, next, a passage that describes an allusion to the Trinity. I have
emphasized what I take to be the interjections of the imagined consumer.
The third person of the Trinity is the Holy Spirit, usually portrayed
as a dove—God in living but nonhuman form. The third M crea-
ture on the island [after Moreau and his assistant Montgomery]
is M’Ling, the beast creature who serves as Montogomery’s at-
tendant.. . . The Holy Spirit as a deformed and idiotic man-
animal? As a piece of youthful blasphemy, The Island of Doctor
Moreau was even more blasphemous than most commentators have
realized. Just so we don’t miss it, Wells puts a serpent beast into
his dubious garden: a creature that was completely evil and very
strong, and that bent a gun barrel into the letter S.Can Satan, too,
be created by man? If so, blasphemous indeed. (2005, 394)
We may view this as leading to a consolidation of the interpretive claim that
the work is a youthful blasphemy. Nothing further is reported about Wells
here, but his perspective is extended in accordance with the demands of the
conversation: important for Atwood is to say not just that one finds a serpent
beast in the “dubious garden,” but that Wells has put it there.
Let me conclude with a yet more complex example, still from Atwood. She
devotes a short section to cat imagery and feminism, focusing on the fact that
though there are “no female human beings on Moreau’s island . . . Moreau is
busily making one,” attempting “to turn a female puma into the semblance of a
woman.” Atwood leads her interpretation, which has not yet taken shape, with
certain biographical facts:
Wells was more than interested in members of the cat family, as
Brian Aldiss has pointed out. During his aair with Rebecca West,
she was “Panther,” he was “Jaguar.” But “cat” has another connota-
tion: in slang, it meant “prostitute.” This is Montgomery’s allusion
when he says—while the puma is yelling under the knife—“I’m
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damned . . . if this place is not as bad as Gower Street—with its cats.”
(395)
Here we see one very minor interpretive claim: that Montgomery is making
such an allusion. For this, of course, the previous sentences about Wells and
West are not needed. What, then, is the function of those sentences? Do they
have a critical function? Atwood continues:
the puma resists.. . . It is she who kills Moreau.. . . Like many men
of his time, Wells was obsessed with the New Woman. On the
surface of it he was all in favor of sexual emancipation, including
free love, but the freeing of Woman evidently had its frightening
aspects. Rider Haggard’s She can be seen as a reaction to the femi-
nist movement of his day—if women are granted power, men are
doomed—and so can Wells’s deformed puma. Once the powerful,
monstrous sexual cat tears her fetter out of the wall and gets loose,
minus the improved brain she ought to have courtesy of Man the
Scientist, look out.
There are two touchstones here: Wells’s sexual attitudes, and Haggard’s She.
As far as Wells goes, the critical move is an attempt to read the puma’s escape
and subsequent killing of Moreau in terms of Wells’s anxieties. Again, it is not
quite that the suggested reading is true in virtue of Wells’s having had such
anxieties. The point, rather, is that the anxieties are eective for making the
reading intelligible. What is “obvious” in the work is that the puma escapes
and then kills Moreau. This could further “mean” a number of things. Atwood
thinks it has certain (what we now consider) retrograde meanings, about what
women are and what they could do. But to simply state such things as cold facts
(“if women are granted power, men are doomed”) is not a good way to make
them experientially come alive. This is why Atwood chooses to make them
intelligible in terms of “a reaction to the feminist movement of [Haggard’s]
day.” The example of She does this further, giving a sort of template (for it does
seem that She is easier to experience along the lines being suggested).
In many of her references to Wells, Atwood clearly is relying on what she
takes to be facts about him. She is not inventing a figure on the basis of the
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text and then reflecting that back on the text, nor, it is worth adding, is she
allowing herself to be guided merely by her rhetorical purposes with respect
to this one work. To do the latter may be to contravene some basic tenets of
value-maximization theory, as I have developed it in the third chapter. For
example, if one has in mind, as the relevant “background” range of works, some
subset of Wells’s oeuvre (and maybe the works of Rider Haggard), then one’s
sense-making activities, the recommendations one makes as to experience, must
be constrained by a sense of how the consumer must relate to all of these works.
If a critic’s idiosyncratic fictive artist has no bearing on anything other than
this one work,Moreau, then it is to be judged the less eective for that.
Conclusion
The intentionalism debate is unusual in that it was inaugurated by those who
held a negative position. I describe how this played out, including the distortions
it entailed, in the first chapter. Those who outlined a positive position in reaction
to this negative position largely failed, I have claimed, to take account of what
exactly the negative position is supposed to be. That is, intentionalists did not
suciently attend to how their proposals are or could be objectionable to anti-
intentionalists. In my definition of intentionalism, I have attempted to be so
attentive, to look at what exactly Beardsley and Wimsatt found objectionable.
It is easy to get lost in the ambiguities of claims about “standards of inter-
pretation,” in terms of which Beardsley and Wimsatt do couch some of their
argument, but the debate comes down, essentially, to what we take critics to
be doing when they talk about the intentions of the artist (or, more generally,
about biographical facts). This is what it means to treat the question of interest
as a metacritical question, one that is about the discourse of a critic qua critic.
Although it may sometimes seem like Beardsley and Wimsatt are simply pluck-
ing out of the air abstract questions about intentions and meaning, they instead
inherit an existing debate over biographical information which proceeds from
the data of critical practice. They look at the way critics talk about works and
find some of this talk objectionable.
Answers to metacritical questions must themselves be metacritical. If the
anti-intentionalist makes claims about certain kinds of critical discourse, the
intentionalist must likewise make claims about those kinds of critical discourse,
at least to the extent that she wishes to disagree with the anti-intentionalist.
Beardsley and Wimsatt say that there is a critical error of “writing the personal
as if it were the poetic,” and identify what they take to be examples of this. The
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intentionalist must, in response, counter the sorts of examples Beardsley and
Wimsatt give, carve out a substantial enough space for such examples in which
they do not count as erroneous.
As I detail in the second chapter, the absolute intentionalist proposes a theory
of meaning which, if true, would vindicate all such instances of critical discourse.
But this theory leads to a picture of criticism on which the critic is oriented
toward the artist rather than toward the work, which is precisely the outcome
to which Beardsley and Wimsatt are objecting. It might thus seem that we
have a stalemate, one side objecting to that on which the other side insists, but I
have given some reasons to think that the absolute intentionalist comes out the
worse for wear. Although it is true that Beardsley and Wimsatt cannot simply
assume that the personal may not be written as if it were the poetic, the absolute
intentionalist must at least provide a sense of its being indeed the poetic that
is being written under the guise of the personal. The absolute intentionalist,
however, provides only a sense of writing the personal, and argues that this just
is to write the poetic. Aside from being explanatorily unsatisfying, this also
may seem to run against how critics actually do write the poetic.
It will be said that so much a moderate intentionalist could accept, and that it
is only such an intentionalist who should be contended with, not an absolute
intentionalist, given the development of intentionalism over the decades. But, as
I say in the second chapter, it does not seem that moderate intentionalists have
suciently reckonedwith the problems of absolute intentionalism. They rightly
take it to be a problem that absolute intentionalism fails to countenance the
possibility of intentions failing (what I have called the misspeaking objection),
but this is, in the grand scheme of things, a minor problem. I have argued that
the way moderate intentionalists patch up absolute intentionalism in the light
of the misspeaking objection does not rectify the more serious problem of the
latter’s untenable answer to how a critic’s talk of intentions is talk of the work.
In my own answer to anti-intentionalism, I separate the question of truth-
conditions from that of relevance. I observe that the former do not always deliver
the latter, and that, indeed, it is possible in the intentionalism debate both to
deny that intentions provide the former and to maintain that they achieve the
latter. To write the poetic under the guise of the personal does not require that
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the personal provides the truth-conditions for the poetic. All it requires is that
there be acceptable discursive contexts in which critics may write the poetic
under the guise of the personal.
Beginning in the third chapter, I accept a version of value-maximization
theory as providing the truth-conditions for interpretive statements, and then
develop (what I call) a metacritical intentionalism that attempts to secure a
discursive relevance for intentions (and biographical facts generally) on the basis
of the latter’s relation to value-considerations. It is important to see, however,
as I say at various points, that value-maximization theory is not essential to
metacritical intentionalism. Some other theory could suce, but some such
theory must be held in order to properly explicate the workings of any such
discursive relation as must be established. The discourse in question has to
be about something, and it is not sucient to say simply that it is about the
meaning of the work, absent some account of what sort of thing this meaning
is.
I am independently convinced by value-maximization theory, but also find,
as I argue in the fourth chapter, that if it is taken to underlie the relevant
metacritical intentionalism then we can see how facts about the artist could be
relevant to a work’s evaluation. To the extent that an intentionalist has intu-
itions to this eect, the choice of value-maximization theory is thus reinforced.
Otherwise, it is not clear how such intuitions could be vindicated.
I tie up the loose threads of my view in the final chapter, in which I recon-
ceive a niche view in the intentionalism debate, the “conversation” view, in
terms of a discursive relation by means of which, I claim, critics attempt to write
the personal as if it were the poetic. They do this by imagining a conversation
between the artist and a possible consumer, for the purpose of defending and
making intelligible some interpretive claim. I understand themaking intelligible
of an interpretive claim in terms of making it fit for experience, and tie this into
a “defence” of the interpretive claim through, again, value-maximization theory,
on which what a work means is a function of how valuably it is experienced
under the proposed meaning. This is all the more reason for intentionalists who
wish to adopt the methodology of metacriticism to accept value-maximization
theory as the underlying theory of the truth-conditions for interpretive claims.
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The solution I propose may be understood as answering Beardsley and
Wimsatt in the following way. They point to various examples of criticism in
which the critic says something like, “the artist intended such-and-such . . . and
the work means such-and-such,” and take them to be instances of the critic’s
making a sort of error, writing the personal as if it were the poetic (which
Beardsley and Wimsatt think is impossible, or yields critical irrelevance). On
my view, at least some such examples are to be understood in dierent terms,
not as the critic’s simply inferring from the fact of an artist’s having intended
some meaning that the work means that thing (or, if we do not wish to speak
of inferences, as her simply taking the one to be the other), but as the critic’s
attempting to make the given meaning intelligible for the reader in terms of
what the artist intended. This is to be deemed criticism, as opposed to mere
rhetoric or extraneous matter, partly due to its being criticism’s function to
make meanings so intelligible, and partly due to the mentioned facts about the
artist being interestingly bound up with the reasons why a meaning is correct
(namely, by their being “meaning-tracking” or “meaning-determining”).
It will always be a question whether the critic is making an error, invoking
the intention as a stand-in for the work’s meaning or as part of some complex
rhetorical device, but much of the confusion can be avoided by examining
the contextual features of the piece in question. It is easy to quote a single
sentence (or even a few sentences) and make it seem like an error. But in
many cases the critical function being performed by a given sentence can be
discerned only by looking to the entire piece, to what the critic is attempting
to do. Beardsley is attentive to such things in his distinction between “merely
verbal” and “inexpugnable” uses of intentionalistic language, rightly noting that
sometimes a critic mentions the artist or her intentions in a misleading way.
But he does not discriminate as finely within the inexpugnable cases, some of
which may indeed, in the manner I suggest (along with many others), constitute
genuine criticism.
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